Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Good and Evil', 'Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma' and 'Structure and Ontology'

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3 ideas

18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
A structure is an abstraction, focussing on relationships, and ignoring other features [Shapiro]
     Full Idea: A structure is the abstract form of a system, focussing on the interrelationships among the objects, and ignoring any features of them that do not affect how they relate to other objects in the system.
     From: Stewart Shapiro (Structure and Ontology [1989], 146), quoted by James Robert Brown - Philosophy of Mathematics Ch.4
     A reaction: I find this account very attractive, even though it appeals to supposedly outmoded psychological abstractionism. It seems pretty close to Aristotle's view of things. Shapiro's account must face up to Frege's worries about these matters.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red' [Geach, by Foot]
     Full Idea: Geach puts 'good' in the class of attributive adjectives, such as 'large' and 'small', contrasting such adjectives with 'predicative' adjectives such as 'red'.
     From: report of Peter Geach (Good and Evil [1956]) by Philippa Foot - Natural Goodness Intro
     A reaction: [In Analysis 17, and 'Theories of Ethics' ed Foot] Thus any object can simply be red, but something can only be large or small 'for a rat' or 'for a car'. Hence nothing is just good, but always a good so-and-so. This is Aristotelian, and Foot loves it.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
Maybe virtues conflict with each other, if some virtue needs a vice for its achievement [Foot]
     Full Idea: Maybe so far from forming a unity ...., the virtues actually conflict with each other: that is, if someone has one of them he inevitably fails to have some other. ...Maybe he a man can only be good in one way be being bad in another.
     From: Philippa Foot (Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma [1983], p.57)
     A reaction: She suggests the self-loathing needed to rein in evil desires. She cites Nietzsche having a similar thought. Presumably the ideal virtuous person has no such conflicts, and the self-loathing undermines eudaimonia. Unity in theory but not in practice?