9 ideas
23513 | Single neurons can carry out complex functions [Seth] |
Full Idea: It is increasingly apparent that even single neurons are capable of carrying out highly complex functions all by themselves. | |
From: Anil Seth (Being You [2021], I.1 n) | |
A reaction: Bang goes the simple connectionist account of consciousness. |
23514 | The cerbellum has a huge number of neurons, but little involvement in consciousness [Seth] |
Full Idea: The cerebellum [at the back] has about four times as many neurons as the rest of the brain put together, but seems barely involved in consciousness. | |
From: Anil Seth (Being You [2021], I.2) | |
A reaction: I wonder if it also has four times as many connections? |
23516 | Maybe a system is conscious if the whole generates more information than its parts [Seth] |
Full Idea: The main claim of Tononi's 'integrated information theory' is that a system is conscious to the extent that its whole generates more information than its parts. | |
From: Anil Seth (Being You [2021], I.3) | |
A reaction: Seth seems to present this as an 'interesting' proposal. I find it unlikely that consciousness could be explain in terms of information, or that a machine constructed on this principle would thus become conscious. (Databases pass this test). |
23519 | The self is embodied, perspectival, volitional, narrative and social [Seth, by PG] |
Full Idea: The elements of a self are 1) embodied - related directly to the body, 2) perspectival - having a viewpoint, 3) volitional - being an agent, 4) narrative - aware of past and future, and 5) social - as others perceive me. | |
From: report of Anil Seth (Being You [2021], III.8) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: [summarised] Seth says there are distinctive emotions associated with each of these aspects of the self. This list is very helpful, as a discouragement for anyone who wants to pick one of these as the sole true nature of the self. |
23518 | Modern AI is mostly machine-based pattern recognition [Seth] |
Full Idea: Much of today's AI is best described as sophisticated machine-based pattern recognition. | |
From: Anil Seth (Being You [2021], IV.13) | |
A reaction: Personally I wouldn't want to underestimate the extent to which human intelligence is also pattern recognition (across time as well as in space). |
23517 | Volition is felt as doing what you want, with possible alternatives, and a source from within [Seth] |
Full Idea: The experience of volition is defined by 1) the feeling that I am doing what I want to do, 2) that I could have done otherwise, and 3) that voluntary actions seem to come from within. | |
From: Anil Seth (Being You [2021], III.11) | |
A reaction: Note that these can all be cited without reference to their feeling 'free'. |
20064 | Actions are not mere effects of reasons, but are under their control [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: An action for a reason is one that is, in a special way, under the control of reason. It is a response to, not a mere effect of, a reason. | |
From: Robert Audi (Action, Intention and Reason [1992], p.177), quoted by Rowland Stout - Action 6 'Alien' | |
A reaction: This modifies Davidson's 'reasons are causes'. Audi has a deviant causal chain which causes trouble for his idea, but Stout says he is right to focus on causal 'processes' (an Aristotelian idea) rather than causal 'chains'. |
23515 | Human exceptionalism plagues biology, and most other human thinking [Seth] |
Full Idea: Human exceptionalism has repeatedly plagued biology, and has darkened the history of human thought everywhere. | |
From: Anil Seth (Being You [2021], I.2) | |
A reaction: I increasingly agree with this, as much in philosophy as in biology. We really need to get used to our place in evolution. |
22489 | 'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red' [Geach, by Foot] |
Full Idea: Geach puts 'good' in the class of attributive adjectives, such as 'large' and 'small', contrasting such adjectives with 'predicative' adjectives such as 'red'. | |
From: report of Peter Geach (Good and Evil [1956]) by Philippa Foot - Natural Goodness Intro | |
A reaction: [In Analysis 17, and 'Theories of Ethics' ed Foot] Thus any object can simply be red, but something can only be large or small 'for a rat' or 'for a car'. Hence nothing is just good, but always a good so-and-so. This is Aristotelian, and Foot loves it. |