14618
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Semantics is either an assignment of semantic values, or a theory of truth [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
On one view, a semantics for a given language is taken to be an assignment of semantic values to its expressions; according to the other, a semantics is taken to be a theory of truth for that language.
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From:
Kit Fine (Semantic Necessity [2010], Intro)
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A reaction:
The first is Frege, the second Tarski via Davidson, says Fine. Fine argues against these as the correct alternatives, and says the distinction prevents us understanding what is really going on. He votes for semantics as giving 'semantic requirements'.
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14619
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The Quinean doubt: are semantics and facts separate, and do analytic sentences have no factual part? [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
The source of the Quinean scepticism about analytic and synthetic is, first, scepticism over whether we can factor truth into a semantic and a factual component, and (second) if we can, is the factual component ever null?
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From:
Kit Fine (Semantic Necessity [2010], 1)
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A reaction:
You certainly can't grasp 'bachelors are unmarried men' if you haven't grasped the full Woosterian truth about men and marriage. But I could interdefine four meaningless words, so that you could employ them in analytic sentences.
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20064
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Actions are not mere effects of reasons, but are under their control [Audi,R]
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Full Idea:
An action for a reason is one that is, in a special way, under the control of reason. It is a response to, not a mere effect of, a reason.
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From:
Robert Audi (Action, Intention and Reason [1992], p.177), quoted by Rowland Stout - Action 6 'Alien'
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A reaction:
This modifies Davidson's 'reasons are causes'. Audi has a deviant causal chain which causes trouble for his idea, but Stout says he is right to focus on causal 'processes' (an Aristotelian idea) rather than causal 'chains'.
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22489
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'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red' [Geach, by Foot]
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Full Idea:
Geach puts 'good' in the class of attributive adjectives, such as 'large' and 'small', contrasting such adjectives with 'predicative' adjectives such as 'red'.
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From:
report of Peter Geach (Good and Evil [1956]) by Philippa Foot - Natural Goodness Intro
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A reaction:
[In Analysis 17, and 'Theories of Ethics' ed Foot] Thus any object can simply be red, but something can only be large or small 'for a rat' or 'for a car'. Hence nothing is just good, but always a good so-and-so. This is Aristotelian, and Foot loves it.
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