3 ideas
13048 | Good explications are exact, fruitful, simple and similar to the explicandum [Carnap, by Salmon] |
Full Idea: Carnap's four criteria for giving a good explication are similarity to the explicandum, exactness, fruitfulness and simplicity. | |
From: report of Rudolph Carnap (Logical Foundations of Probability [1950], Ch.1) by Wesley Salmon - Four Decades of Scientific Explanation 0.1 | |
A reaction: [compressed] Salmon's view is that this represents the old attitude, that the contribution of philosophy to explanation is the clarification of the key concepts. Carnap is, of course, a logical empiricist. |
20064 | Actions are not mere effects of reasons, but are under their control [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: An action for a reason is one that is, in a special way, under the control of reason. It is a response to, not a mere effect of, a reason. | |
From: Robert Audi (Action, Intention and Reason [1992], p.177), quoted by Rowland Stout - Action 6 'Alien' | |
A reaction: This modifies Davidson's 'reasons are causes'. Audi has a deviant causal chain which causes trouble for his idea, but Stout says he is right to focus on causal 'processes' (an Aristotelian idea) rather than causal 'chains'. |
22489 | 'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red' [Geach, by Foot] |
Full Idea: Geach puts 'good' in the class of attributive adjectives, such as 'large' and 'small', contrasting such adjectives with 'predicative' adjectives such as 'red'. | |
From: report of Peter Geach (Good and Evil [1956]) by Philippa Foot - Natural Goodness Intro | |
A reaction: [In Analysis 17, and 'Theories of Ethics' ed Foot] Thus any object can simply be red, but something can only be large or small 'for a rat' or 'for a car'. Hence nothing is just good, but always a good so-and-so. This is Aristotelian, and Foot loves it. |