Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Good and Evil', 'On the Concept of Character' and 'No Moral Difference'

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7 ideas

22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red' [Geach, by Foot]
     Full Idea: Geach puts 'good' in the class of attributive adjectives, such as 'large' and 'small', contrasting such adjectives with 'predicative' adjectives such as 'red'.
     From: report of Peter Geach (Good and Evil [1956]) by Philippa Foot - Natural Goodness Intro
     A reaction: [In Analysis 17, and 'Theories of Ethics' ed Foot] Thus any object can simply be red, but something can only be large or small 'for a rat' or 'for a car'. Hence nothing is just good, but always a good so-and-so. This is Aristotelian, and Foot loves it.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
We see our character as a restricting limit, but also as an unshakable support [Weil]
     Full Idea: Our character appears to us as a limit by which we do not want to be imprisoned, …but also as a support that we want to believe is unshakable.
     From: Simone Weil (On the Concept of Character [1941], p.100)
     A reaction: A nice perception. It is fairly easy to criticise, or even laugh at, one's own actions, but extremely hard to criticise our own character. Maybe we all wish we were more determined in our projects, but not much else.
The concept of character is at the centre of morality [Weil]
     Full Idea: We cannot pose a moral problem without putting the concept of character at its centre.
     From: Simone Weil (On the Concept of Character [1941], p.98)
     A reaction: The question for Aristotle (which I derive from Philippa Foot) is whether moral goodness simply is good character, or whether it is the actions (or even the consequences). Weil is close to modern virtue theory here.
We don't see character in a single moment, but only over a period of time [Weil]
     Full Idea: Character is constant over a period of time; the way a person is at a single moment does not at all reflect the character of this person. We do, however, concede that character changes.
     From: Simone Weil (On the Concept of Character [1941], p.98)
     A reaction: I do think, though, that there are moments in behaviour which are hugely revealing of character, even in a single remark. But I agree that most single moments do not show much.
We modify our character by placing ourselves in situations, or by attending to what seems trivial [Weil]
     Full Idea: We can modify our character, by putting ourselves in circumstances that will act on us from the outside, …or by the orientation of our attention in the moments that appear most insignificant or indifferent in our lives.
     From: Simone Weil (On the Concept of Character [1941], p.99)
     A reaction: I've never seen anyone address this question (apart from Aristotle's emphasis on training habits). Choosing your source for current affairs information strikes me as very important. What you read, what you watch, who you spend time with…
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 2. Euthanasia
If it is desirable that a given patient die, then moral objections to killing them do not apply [Rachels]
     Full Idea: The cause of death (injection or disease) is important from the legal point of view, but not morally. If euthanasia is desirable in a given case then the patient's death is not an evil, so the usual objections to killing do not apply.
     From: James Rachels (No Moral Difference [1975], p.102)
     A reaction: Seems reasonable, but a very consequentialist view. Is it good that small children should clean public toilets?
It has become normal to consider passive euthanasia while condemning active euthanasia [Rachels]
     Full Idea: It seems to have become accepted that passive euthanasia (by withholding treatment and allowing a patient to die) may be acceptable, whereas active euthanasia (direct action to kill the patient) is never acceptable.
     From: James Rachels (No Moral Difference [1975], p.97)
     A reaction: He goes on to attack the distinction. It is hard to distinguish the two cases, as well as being hard to judge them.