Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Good and Evil', 'Works of Love' and 'On 'The Beginning of Philosophy''

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3 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Philosophy is distinguished from other sciences by its complete lack of presuppositions [Feuerbach]
     Full Idea: Philosophy does not presuppose anything. It is precisely in this fact of non-presupposition that its beginning lies - a beginning by virtue of which it is set apart from all the other sciences.
     From: Ludwig Feuerbach (On 'The Beginning of Philosophy' [1841], p.135)
     A reaction: Most modern philosophers seem to laugh at such an idea, because everything is theory-laden, culture-laden, language-laden etc. As an aspiration I love it, and think good philosophers get quite close to the goal (which, I admit, is not fully attainable).
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Perfect love is not in spite of imperfections; the imperfections must be loved as well [Kierkegaard]
     Full Idea: To love another in spite of his weaknesses and errors and imperfections is not perfect love. No, to love is to find him lovable in spite of, and together with, his weaknesses and errors and imperfections.
     From: Søren Kierkegaard (Works of Love [1847], p.158)
     A reaction: A true romantic at heart, Kierkegaard ideally posits perfect love as unconditional love, and not just of good attributes, predicates and conditions. However, the real question for both me and Kierkegaard is, is perfect love desirable or even possible?[SY]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red' [Geach, by Foot]
     Full Idea: Geach puts 'good' in the class of attributive adjectives, such as 'large' and 'small', contrasting such adjectives with 'predicative' adjectives such as 'red'.
     From: report of Peter Geach (Good and Evil [1956]) by Philippa Foot - Natural Goodness Intro
     A reaction: [In Analysis 17, and 'Theories of Ethics' ed Foot] Thus any object can simply be red, but something can only be large or small 'for a rat' or 'for a car'. Hence nothing is just good, but always a good so-and-so. This is Aristotelian, and Foot loves it.