Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Good and Evil', 'The Intentional Fallacy' and 'German Philosophy 1760-1860'

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12 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / c. Eighteenth century philosophy

22021	Romantics explored beautiful subjectivity, and the re-enchantment of nature [Pinkard]
	Full Idea: Early Romanticism can be seen as the exploration of subjective interiority and as the re-enchantment of nature (as organic). Hegel said they had the idea of a 'beautiful soul', which (he said) either paralysed action, or made them smug.
	From: Terry Pinkard (German Philosophy 1760-1860 [2002], 06)
	A reaction: [compressed, inc Note 1] A major dilemma of life is the extent of our social engagement, because it makes life worthwhile, but pollutes the mind with continual conflicts.

22010	The combination of Kant and the French Revolution was an excited focus for German philosophy [Pinkard]
	Full Idea: After the French Revolution, philosophy suddenly became the key rallying point for an entire generation of German intellectuals, who had been reading Kant as the harbinger of a new order.
	From: Terry Pinkard (German Philosophy 1760-1860 [2002], Pt II Intro)
	A reaction: Kant was a harbinger because he offered an autonomous status to each individual, rather than being subservient to a social order.

22002	Wolff's version of Leibniz dominated mid-18th C German thought [Pinkard]
	Full Idea: The dominant philosophy of mid-eighteenth century Germany was Wolffianism, a codified and almost legalistically organised form of Leibnizian thought.
	From: Terry Pinkard (German Philosophy 1760-1860 [2002], Intro)
	A reaction: Kant grew up in this intellectual climate.

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / d. Nineteenth century philosophy

22036	In Hegel's time naturalism was called 'Spinozism' [Pinkard]
	Full Idea: In Hegel's time the shorthand for the Naturalistic worldview was 'Spinozism'.
	From: Terry Pinkard (German Philosophy 1760-1860 [2002], 10)
	A reaction: Spinozism hit Germany like a bomb in 1786, when it was reported that the poet Hölderlin was a fan of Spinoza.

11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism

22048	Idealism is the link between reason and freedom [Pinkard]
	Full Idea: Idealism was conceived as a link between reason and freedom.
	From: Terry Pinkard (German Philosophy 1760-1860 [2002], 14 Conc)
	A reaction: I'm beginning to see the Romantic era as the Age of Freedom, which followed the Age of Reason. This idea fits that picture nicely. Pinkard says that paradoxes resulted from the attemptl

21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 1. Artistic Intentions

20400	Intentions either succeed or fail, so external evidence for them is always irrelevant [Wimsatt/Beardsley, by Davies,S]
	Full Idea: Wimsatt and Beardsley claimed that either the intention succeeded, so one does not need to look outside the work for its meaning, or the intention failed, so external evidence does not help.
	From: report of W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946]) by Stephen Davies - The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) 5.3
	A reaction: Actually, the external evidence may tell you much more clearly and accurately what the intention was than the work itself does. The best example may be the title of the work, which is presumably outside the work.

7266	The author's intentions are irrelevant to the judgement of a work's success [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
	Full Idea: The design or intention of the author is neither available nor desirable as a standard for judging the success of a work of literary art.
	From: W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946], §I)
	A reaction: This famous proposal may have been misunderstood. Note that it is a comment about judging the work, not about understanding it. The idea allows for a work being much more successful than the author's humble intentions (e.g. Pepys).

7268	The thoughts of a poem should be imputed to the dramatic speaker, and hardly at all to the poet [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
	Full Idea: We ought to impute the thoughts and attitudes of the poem immediately to the dramatic speaker, and if to the author at all, only by an act of biographical inference.
	From: W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946], §I)
	A reaction: Wrong. If in Browning's "My Last Duchess" (say), we only inferred the mind of the speaker (and his Duchess), and took no interest in Browning's view of things, we would miss the point. We might end up respecting the Duke, which would be daft.

7267	Poetry, unlike messages, can be successful without communicating intentions [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
	Full Idea: Poetry differs from practical messages, which are successful if and only if we correctly infer the intention.
	From: W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946], §I)
	A reaction: I am not convinced by this claim. It is plausible that a work does much more than it intends (Astaire said he danced "to make a buck"), but it is rather odd to rate very highly a work of which you have missed the point.

7269	The intentional fallacy is a romantic one [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
	Full Idea: The intentional fallacy is a romantic one.
	From: W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946], §II)
	A reaction: Wrong. Even with those most famous of anonymous artists, the architects and carvers of medieval cathedrals, without some discernment of the purpose you won't get it. The Taj Mahal is a love letter, not a potential ice cream parlour.

7271	Biography can reveal meanings and dramatic character, as well as possible intentions [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
	Full Idea: The use of biographical evidence need not involve intentionalism, because while it may be evidence of what the author intended, it may also be evidence of the meaning of his words and the dramatic character of his utterance.
	From: W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946], §IV)
	A reaction: I am very keen to penetrate the author's intentions, but I have always be doubtful about the use of biography as a means to achieve this. Most of the effort to infer intentions must come from a study of the work itself, not introductions, letters etc.

22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good

22489	'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red' [Geach, by Foot]
	Full Idea: Geach puts 'good' in the class of attributive adjectives, such as 'large' and 'small', contrasting such adjectives with 'predicative' adjectives such as 'red'.
	From: report of Peter Geach (Good and Evil [1956]) by Philippa Foot - Natural Goodness Intro
	A reaction: [In Analysis 17, and 'Theories of Ethics' ed Foot] Thus any object can simply be red, but something can only be large or small 'for a rat' or 'for a car'. Hence nothing is just good, but always a good so-and-so. This is Aristotelian, and Foot loves it.