4 ideas
5437 | The claim of hermeneutics to give knowledge through understanding is challenged by positivism [Mautner on Dilthey] |
Full Idea: The claim of hermeneutics to give understanding instead of explanation can be seen as part of the theory of knowledge, but it seems to be incompatible with the most accepted aspects of positivism. | |
From: comment on Wilhelm Dilthey (works [1883]) by Thomas Mautner - Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy p.248 | |
A reaction: So much the worse for positivism. The same conflict occurs in modern philosophy of mind. God can be a positivist if he likes, but we must settle for hermeneutics for a lot of our knowledge. We are discussing method, not ontology. |
6558 | A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds [Emerson] |
Full Idea: A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines. With consistency a great soul has simply nothing to do. | |
From: Ralph Waldo Emerson (Self-Reliance [1841], p.37) | |
A reaction: A remark to warm the hearts of pragmatists, Wittgensteinians, Nietzscheans and the post-modern mob. But pay careful attention to the word "foolish". Robert Fogelin gives a very balanced view of the matter (e.g. Idea 6557). |
5436 | Natural science seeks explanation; human sciences seek understanding [Dilthey, by Mautner] |
Full Idea: In the natural sciences we seek for causes and ask for explanation (erklären), but in the human or cultural sciences we seek understanding (verstehen) by means of interpretation. | |
From: report of Wilhelm Dilthey (works [1883]) by Thomas Mautner - Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy p.144 | |
A reaction: This seems a nice distinction. The prospects of finding the causes or explanations of Shakespeare's plays don't look good, and when you have explained the causes of a chemical reaction you probably have all you need. |
22489 | 'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red' [Geach, by Foot] |
Full Idea: Geach puts 'good' in the class of attributive adjectives, such as 'large' and 'small', contrasting such adjectives with 'predicative' adjectives such as 'red'. | |
From: report of Peter Geach (Good and Evil [1956]) by Philippa Foot - Natural Goodness Intro | |
A reaction: [In Analysis 17, and 'Theories of Ethics' ed Foot] Thus any object can simply be red, but something can only be large or small 'for a rat' or 'for a car'. Hence nothing is just good, but always a good so-and-so. This is Aristotelian, and Foot loves it. |