17890
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There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner]
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Full Idea:
Some of the standard large cardinals (in order of increasing (logical) strength) are: inaccessible, Mahlo, weakly compact, indescribable, Erdös, measurable, strong, Wodin, supercompact, huge etc. (...and ineffable).
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From:
Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], 1.4)
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A reaction:
[I don't understand how cardinals can have 'logical strength', but I pass it on anyway]
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5078
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Kant and Mill both try to explain right and wrong, without a divine lawgiver [Taylor,R]
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Full Idea:
Kant and Mill were in total agreement in trying to give content to the distinction between moral right and wrong, without recourse to any divine lawgiver.
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From:
Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.14)
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A reaction:
A nice analysis, in tune with MacIntyre and others, who see such attempts as failures. It is hard, however, to deny the claims of rational principles, or of suffering, in our moral framework. I agree with Taylor's move back to virtue, but it ain't simple.
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5067
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Morality based on 'forbid', 'permit' and 'require' implies someone who does these things [Taylor,R]
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Full Idea:
If morality is based on wrong (meaning 'forbidden'), right ('permitted'), and obligatory ('required'), we are led to ask 'Who is it that thus permits, forbids or requires that certain things be done or not done?'
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From:
Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.2)
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A reaction:
Clear reinforcement for Nietzsche's attack on conventional morals, which Taylor sees as a relic of medieval religious attitudes. Taylor says Kant offered a non-religious version of the same authority. I agree. Back to the Greek pursuit of excellence!
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6237
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Fear of God is not conscience, which is a natural feeling of offence at bad behaviour [Shaftesbury]
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Full Idea:
Conscience is to find horribly offensive the reflection of any unjust action or behaviour; to have awe and terror of the Deity, does not, of itself, imply conscience; …thus religious conscience supposes moral or natural conscience.
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From:
3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit [1699], II.II.I)
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A reaction:
The reply from religion would be that the Deity has implanted natural conscience in each creature, though this seems to deny our freedom of moral judgment. Personally I am inclined to think that values are just observations of the world - such as health.
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6234
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If an irrational creature with kind feelings was suddenly given reason, its reason would approve of kind feelings [Shaftesbury]
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Full Idea:
If a creature wanting reason has many good qualities and affections, it is certain that if you give this creature a reflecting faculty, it will at the same instant approve of gratitude, kindness and pity.
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From:
3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit [1699], I.III.III)
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A reaction:
A wonderful denunciation of the authority of reason, which must have influenced David Hume. I think, though, that the inverse of this case must be considered (if suddenly given feelings, they would fall in line with reasoning). We reason about feelings.
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6233
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A person isn't good if only tying their hands prevents their mischief, so the affections decide a person's morality [Shaftesbury]
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Full Idea:
We do not say that he is a good man when, having his hands tied up, he is hindered from doing the mischief he designs; …hence it is by affection merely that a creature is esteemed good or ill, natural or unnatural.
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From:
3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit [1699], I.II.I)
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A reaction:
Note that he more or less equates being morally 'ill' with being 'unnatural'. We tend to reserve 'unnatural' for extreme or perverse crimes. Personally I would place more emphasis on evil judgements, and less on evil feelings.
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5079
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Pleasure can have a location, and be momentary, and come and go - but happiness can't [Taylor,R]
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Full Idea:
Pleasures can be located in a particular part of the body, and can be momentary, and come and go, but this is not the case with happiness.
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From:
Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.16)
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A reaction:
Probably no one ever thought that pleasure and happiness were actually identical - merely that pleasure is the only cause and source of happiness. These are good objections to that hypothesis. Pleasure simply isn't 'the good'.
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5068
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'Eudaimonia' means 'having a good demon', implying supreme good fortune [Taylor,R]
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Full Idea:
The word 'eudaimonia' means literally 'having a good demon', which is apt, because it suggests some kind of supreme good fortune, of the sort which might be thought of as a bestowal.
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From:
Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.5)
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A reaction:
Beware of etymology. This implies that eudaimonia is almost entirely beyond a person's control, but Aristotle doesn't think that. A combination of education and effort can build on some natural gifts to create a fully successful life.
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6235
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Self-interest is not intrinsically good, but its absence is evil, as public good needs it [Shaftesbury]
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Full Idea:
Though no creature can be called good merely for possessing the self-preserving affections, it is impossible that public good can be preserved without them; so that a creature wanting in them is wanting in natural rectitude, and may be esteemed vicious.
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From:
3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit [1699], II.I.III)
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A reaction:
Aristotle held a similar view (Idea 92). I think maybe Shaftesbury was the last call of the Aristotelians, before being engulfed by utilitarians and Kantians. This idea is at the core of capitalism.
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5077
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The modern idea of obligation seems to have lost the idea of an obligation 'to' something [Taylor,R]
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Full Idea:
In modern moral thinking, obligation is something every responsible person is supposed to have, but it is not an obligation to the state, or society, or humanity, or even to God. It is an obligation standing by itself.
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From:
Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.12)
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A reaction:
This nicely pinpoints how some our moral attitudes are relics of religion. Taylor wants a return to virtue, but one could respond by opting for the social contract (with very clear obligations) or Kantian 'contractualism' (answering to rational beings).
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5066
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If we are made in God's image, pursuit of excellence is replaced by duty to obey God [Taylor,R]
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Full Idea:
Once people are declared to be images of God, just by virtue of minimal humanity, they have, therefore, no greater individual excellence to aspire to, and their purpose became one of obligation, that is, obedience to God's will.
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From:
Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.2)
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A reaction:
An interesting and plausible historical analysis. There is a second motivation for the change, though, in Grotius's desire to develop a more legalistic morality, focusing on actions rather than character. Taylor's point is more interesting, though.
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