13 ideas
| 17884 | Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner] |
| Full Idea: There are many coherent stopping points in the hierarchy of increasingly strong mathematical systems, starting with strict finitism, and moving up through predicativism to the higher reaches of set theory. | |
| From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], Intro) |
| 17893 | 'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner] |
| Full Idea: Roughly speaking, 'reflection principles' assert that anything true in V [the set hierarchy] falls short of characterising V in that it is true within some earlier level. | |
| From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], 2.1) |
| 17894 | We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner] |
| Full Idea: There is at present no solid argument to the effect that a given statement is absolutely undecidable. | |
| From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], 5.3) |
| 17890 | There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner] |
| Full Idea: Some of the standard large cardinals (in order of increasing (logical) strength) are: inaccessible, Mahlo, weakly compact, indescribable, Erdös, measurable, strong, Wodin, supercompact, huge etc. (...and ineffable). | |
| From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], 1.4) | |
| A reaction: [I don't understand how cardinals can have 'logical strength', but I pass it on anyway] |
| 17887 | PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner] |
| Full Idea: To the extent that we are justified in accepting Peano Arithmetic we are justified in accepting its consistency, and so we know how to expand the axiom system so as to overcome the limitation [of Gödel's Second Theorem]. | |
| From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], 1.1) | |
| A reaction: Each expansion brings a limitation, but then you can expand again. |
| 17891 | Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner] |
| Full Idea: The arithmetical instances of undecidability that arise at one stage of the hierarchy are settled at the next. | |
| From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], 1.4) |
| 8983 | If 'red' is vague, then membership of the set of red things is vague, so there is no set of red things [Sainsbury] |
| Full Idea: Sets have sharp boundaries, or are sharp objects; an object either definitely belongs to a set, or it does not. But 'red' is vague; there objects which are neither definitely red nor definitely not red. Hence there is no set of red things. | |
| From: Mark Sainsbury (Concepts without Boundaries [1990], §2) | |
| A reaction: Presumably that will entail that there IS a set of things which can be described as 'definitely red'. If we describe something as 'definitely having a hint of red about it', will that put it in a set? In fact will the applicability of 'definitely' do? |
| 8986 | We should abandon classifying by pigeon-holes, and classify around paradigms [Sainsbury] |
| Full Idea: We must reject the classical picture of classification by pigeon-holes, and think in other terms: classifying can be, and often is, clustering round paradigms. | |
| From: Mark Sainsbury (Concepts without Boundaries [1990], §8) | |
| A reaction: His conclusion to a discussion of the problem of vagueness, where it is identified with concepts which have no boundaries. Pigeon-holes are a nice exemplar of the Enlightenment desire to get everything right. I prefer Aristotle's categories, Idea 3311. |
| 8982 | Vague concepts are concepts without boundaries [Sainsbury] |
| Full Idea: If a word is vague, there are or could be borderline cases, but non-vague expressions can also have borderline cases. The essence of vagueness is to be found in the idea vague concepts are concepts without boundaries. | |
| From: Mark Sainsbury (Concepts without Boundaries [1990], Intro) | |
| A reaction: He goes on to say that vague concepts are not embodied in clear cut sets, which is what gives us our notion of a boundary. So what is vague is 'membership'. You are either a member of a club or not, but when do you join the 'middle-aged'? |
| 8984 | If concepts are vague, people avoid boundaries, can't spot them, and don't want them [Sainsbury] |
| Full Idea: Vague concepts are boundaryless, ...and the manifestations are an unwillingness to draw any such boundaries, the impossibility of identifying such boundaries, and needlessness and even disutility of such boundaries. | |
| From: Mark Sainsbury (Concepts without Boundaries [1990], §5) | |
| A reaction: People have a very fine-tuned notion of whether the sharp boundary of a concept is worth discussing. The interesting exception are legal people, who are often forced to find precision where everyone else hates it. Who deserves to inherit the big house? |
| 8985 | Boundaryless concepts tend to come in pairs, such as child/adult, hot/cold [Sainsbury] |
| Full Idea: Boundaryless concepts tend to come in systems of contraries: opposed pairs like child/adult, hot/cold, weak/strong, true/false, and complex systems of colour terms. ..Only a contrast with 'adult' will show what 'child' excludes. | |
| From: Mark Sainsbury (Concepts without Boundaries [1990], §5) | |
| A reaction: This might be expected. It all comes down to the sorites problem, of when one thing turns into something else. If it won't merge into another category, then presumably the isolated concept stays applicable (until reality terminates it? End of sheep..). |
| 12189 | Logical necessity involves a decision about usage, and is non-realist and non-cognitive [Wright,C, by McFetridge] |
| Full Idea: Wright espouses a non-realist, indeed non-cognitive account of logical necessity. Crucial to this is the idea that acceptance of a statement as necessary always involves an element of decision (to use it in a necessary way). | |
| From: report of Crispin Wright (Inventing Logical Necessity [1986]) by Ian McFetridge - Logical Necessity: Some Issues §3 | |
| A reaction: This has little appeal to me, as I take (unfashionably) the view that that logical necessity is rooted in the behaviour of the actual physical world, with which you can't argue. We test simple logic by making up examples. |
| 7320 | Holism cannot give a coherent account of scientific methodology [Wright,C, by Miller,A] |
| Full Idea: Crispin Wright has argued that Quine's holism is implausible because it is actually incoherent: he claims that Quine's holism cannot provide us with a coherent account of scientific methodology. | |
| From: report of Crispin Wright (Inventing Logical Necessity [1986]) by Alexander Miller - Philosophy of Language 4.5 | |
| A reaction: This sounds promising, given my intuitive aversion to linguistic holism, and almost everything to do with Quine. Scientific methodology is not isolated, but spreads into our ordinary (experimental) interactions with the world (e.g. Idea 2461). |