Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On the Question of Absolute Undecidability', 'Letters to Thomas Burnett' and 'III.10 On Restraining your Will'

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12 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner]
     Full Idea: There are many coherent stopping points in the hierarchy of increasingly strong mathematical systems, starting with strict finitism, and moving up through predicativism to the higher reaches of set theory.
     From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], Intro)
'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner]
     Full Idea: Roughly speaking, 'reflection principles' assert that anything true in V [the set hierarchy] falls short of characterising V in that it is true within some earlier level.
     From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], 2.1)
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner]
     Full Idea: There is at present no solid argument to the effect that a given statement is absolutely undecidable.
     From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], 5.3)
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / i. Cardinal infinity
There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner]
     Full Idea: Some of the standard large cardinals (in order of increasing (logical) strength) are: inaccessible, Mahlo, weakly compact, indescribable, Erdös, measurable, strong, Wodin, supercompact, huge etc. (...and ineffable).
     From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], 1.4)
     A reaction: [I don't understand how cardinals can have 'logical strength', but I pass it on anyway]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner]
     Full Idea: To the extent that we are justified in accepting Peano Arithmetic we are justified in accepting its consistency, and so we know how to expand the axiom system so as to overcome the limitation [of Gödel's Second Theorem].
     From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], 1.1)
     A reaction: Each expansion brings a limitation, but then you can expand again.
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner]
     Full Idea: The arithmetical instances of undecidability that arise at one stage of the hierarchy are settled at the next.
     From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], 1.4)
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
The notion of substance is one of the keys to true philosophy [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: I consider the notion of substance to be one of the keys to the true philosophy. ....I imagine that philosophers will one day know the notion of substance a bit better than they do now.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Thomas Burnett [1703], 1699.01.20/30)
     A reaction: This is a controversial remark at this historical moment, when the apparent Aristotelian commitment to substances was becoming discredited. Personally I would eliminate substance, but not just because physicists don't refer to it.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Virtue inspires Stoics, but I want a good temperament [Montaigne]
     Full Idea: What Stoics did from virtue I teach myself to do from temperament.
     From: Michel de Montaigne (III.10 On Restraining your Will [1580], p.1153)
     A reaction: I take this to be an Aristotelian criticism of Stoicism. They venerate virtue above everything, but Aristotle says you must integrate virtue into your very being, so that right actions flow from you, with very little need for premeditation.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
There is not much point in only becoming good near the end of your life [Montaigne]
     Full Idea: It is almost better never to become a good man at all than to do so tardily, understanding how to live when you have no life left.
     From: Michel de Montaigne (III.10 On Restraining your Will [1580], p.1142)
     A reaction: A very nice perspective, which I don't recall Aristotle mentioning. It does, though, reinforce Aristotle's belief that early training is essential.
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
Nothing we say can be worse than unsaying it in the face of authority [Montaigne]
     Full Idea: Nothing which a gentleman says can seem worse than the shame of his unsaying it under duress from authority.
     From: Michel de Montaigne (III.10 On Restraining your Will [1580], p.1153)
     A reaction: The point is that you have to fight every day for free speech, because no matter what the law says, there are always people in power who want to shut you up.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / c. Combatants
People at home care far more than soldiers risking death about the outcome of wars [Montaigne]
     Full Idea: How many soldiers put themselves at risk every day in wars which they care little about, rushing into danger in battles the loss of which will not make them lose a night's sleep. Meanwhile a man at home is more passionate about the war than the soldier.
     From: Michel de Montaigne (III.10 On Restraining your Will [1580], p.1139)
     A reaction: It depends whether you are a mercenary (which the majority probably were in 1680), and what are the implications of defeat.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
Gravity is within matter because of its structure, and it can be explained. [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: I believe that both gravity and elasticity are in matter only because of the structure of the system and can be explained mechanically or through impulsion.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Thomas Burnett [1703], 1699 draft)
     A reaction: The significance of this remark is that gravity is held (in full knowledge of Newton's work) to be within matter, and not imposed from the outside. I believe we now postulate a particle as part of the explanation.