87 ideas
19767 | Reason leads to prudent selfishness, which overrules natural compassion [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: Reason is what engenders egocentrism ...turns man in upon himself ...and separates him from all that troubles him and afflicts him. Philosophy is what ...moves him to say at the sight of a suffering man 'Perish if you will; I am safe and sound'. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part I) | |
A reaction: He goes on to observe that fights in the marketplace are stopped by women, while the philosophers have all run away! This thinking leads to the sentimental movement, and then to romanticism. |
17884 | Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner] |
Full Idea: There are many coherent stopping points in the hierarchy of increasingly strong mathematical systems, starting with strict finitism, and moving up through predicativism to the higher reaches of set theory. | |
From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], Intro) |
17893 | 'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner] |
Full Idea: Roughly speaking, 'reflection principles' assert that anything true in V [the set hierarchy] falls short of characterising V in that it is true within some earlier level. | |
From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], 2.1) |
17894 | We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner] |
Full Idea: There is at present no solid argument to the effect that a given statement is absolutely undecidable. | |
From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], 5.3) |
17890 | There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner] |
Full Idea: Some of the standard large cardinals (in order of increasing (logical) strength) are: inaccessible, Mahlo, weakly compact, indescribable, Erdös, measurable, strong, Wodin, supercompact, huge etc. (...and ineffable). | |
From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], 1.4) | |
A reaction: [I don't understand how cardinals can have 'logical strength', but I pass it on anyway] |
17887 | PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner] |
Full Idea: To the extent that we are justified in accepting Peano Arithmetic we are justified in accepting its consistency, and so we know how to expand the axiom system so as to overcome the limitation [of Gödel's Second Theorem]. | |
From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], 1.1) | |
A reaction: Each expansion brings a limitation, but then you can expand again. |
17891 | Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner] |
Full Idea: The arithmetical instances of undecidability that arise at one stage of the hierarchy are settled at the next. | |
From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], 1.4) |
19757 | No one would bother to reason, and try to know things, without a desire for enjoyment [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: We seek to know only because we desire to find enjoyment; and it is impossible to conceive why someon who had neither desires nor fears would go to the bother reasoning. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part I) | |
A reaction: This appears to be an echo of Hume's pessimism about the autonomy of reason. This downgrading of reason is a striking feature of the Enlightenment, which presumably culminates in the romantic movement. |
23101 | Intuitions don't prove things; they just receptivity to interpretations [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Appeal to intuitions cannot prove or disprove anything. They merely create receptivity to particular interpretations of particular cases. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 04.3) | |
A reaction: A nice point, but more is needed. A gun to the head can create receptivity. What distinguishes good from bad intuitions? Why are intuitions different from mere whims or hopes? |
19760 | General ideas are purely intellectual; imagining them is immediately particular [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: Every general idea is purely intellectual. The least involvement of the imagination thereupon makes the idea particular. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part I) | |
A reaction: This thought is in Berkeley, who seemed to think that general ideas were impossible, because imagination was always required. Rousseau is certainly an improvement on that. |
19759 | Only words can introduce general ideas into the mind [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: General ideas can be introduced into the mind only with the aid of words. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part I) | |
A reaction: Hm. How did humanity manage to invent general words. Do animals not have general thoughts, e.g. about food, shelter, predators? Roussea goes on to deny that monkeys see nuts as a 'type' of fruit. |
19758 | Language may aid thinking, but powerful thought was needed to produce language [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: If men needed speech in order to learn to think, they had a still greater need for knowing how to think in order to discover the art of speaking. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part I) | |
A reaction: I take language to be a consequence of the emergence of meta-thought in humanity, so I thoroughly endorse Rousseau's view. The idea that rationality, and even consciousness, are mainly facilitated by language strikes me as quite wrong. |
23086 | Liberals say we are only responsible for fully autonomous actions [Kekes] |
Full Idea: The liberal view is that people can be held responsible only for actions that are in their control: actions that reflect the agents' unforced choices, evaluations, and understanding of their significance - that is, autonomous actions. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 01.5) | |
A reaction: Kekes, who is a somewhat right wing anti-liberal, thinks people should be mainly held responsible for the consequences, unless they have a very good excuse. |
23100 | Collective responsibility conflicts with responsibility's requirement of authonomy [Kekes] |
Full Idea: The ascription of collective responsibility is inconsistent with …the belief that people should be held responsible for only their own autonomous actions. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 04) | |
A reaction: The autonomy would need to be displaced, from the decision to act to the decision of identify with the organisation. But if you invest in an evil group you are responsible for actions you never even knew occurred (never mind autonomy). |
19773 | Without love, what use is beauty? [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: Where there is no love, what use is beauty? | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part I) | |
A reaction: Rousseau seems to be thinking of sexual attractiveness, but the aphorism seems to have universal application. |
23095 | Why should moral responsibility depend on autonomy, rather than social role or experience? [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Why should moral responsibility be made to depend on autonomy, rather than on intelligence, education, social role, experience, or whatever? | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 03.3) | |
A reaction: Social role seems a particularly good one to cite. 'I didn't really understand what I was doing.' 'But it's your job to understand!' |
23087 | Much human evil is not autonomous, so moral responsibility need not be autonomous [Kekes] |
Full Idea: If much evil is due to nonautonomous actions, then liberals cannot be right in idenitfying the domain of moral responsibility with the domain of autonomy. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 02.1) | |
A reaction: One might evade this anti-liberal thought by making responsibility directly proportional to degree of autonomy. Then the only counterexample would be genuine immorality that is entirely non-autonomous, but is there such a thing? |
23089 | Evil people may not be autonomously aware, if they misjudge the situation [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Agents who perform evil nonautonomously do not know what they are doing, because they have made a mistake in understanding or evaluating their own conduct. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 02.4) | |
A reaction: So while liberals say that true evil must be autonomous, Kekes says it may result from factual or evaluative error, for which people are also responsible. |
23093 | Moral and causal responsibility are not clearly distinct [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Moral and causal responsibility cannot be distinguished as clearly as the liberal strategy requires. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 03.2) | |
A reaction: I take assessment to be a two-stage operation. It is usually easy to assign causal responsibility. Moral responsibiity is quite different. Our negligence can make us morally responsible for an event we didn’t cause. |
23094 | Ought implies can means moral responsibility needs autonomy [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Ought implies can translates into the claim that only autonomous agents are morally responsible. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 03.3) | |
A reaction: Since Kekes identifies autonomy as the key to liberalism, he sees this also as a basic liberal claim (which he rejects). I ought to ring my mother, but my phone is broken (so I ought not to ring my mother?).. |
23096 | Morality should aim to prevent all evil actions, not just autonomous ones [Kekes] |
Full Idea: If one main task of morality is to prevent evil, then morality must be concerned with all evil-producing actions, not just autonomous ones. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 03.3) | |
A reaction: Hm. Is placing a railing next to a flight of steps a moral action? Possibly. |
23098 | Effects show the existence of moral responsibility, and mental states show the degree [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Psychological states are relevant to the degree of an agent's moral responsibility, while the effects of their actions are relevant to whether the agents are liable to moral responsibility. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 03.5) | |
A reaction: He has previously offered a problem case for this, where someone's social role makes them fully responsible whatever their mental state. I still think his distinction is helpful. 1) Whose fault is it, then 2) How far are they to blame? Normal practice. |
19769 | Rational morality is OK for brainy people, but ordinary life can't rely on that [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: Although it might be appropriate for Socrates and minds of his stature to acquire virtue through reason, the human race would long ago have ceased to exist, if its preservation had depended solely on the reasonings of its members. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part I) | |
A reaction: He takes our natural compassion to be the basis of morality. Hume combines that with a natural social prudence. Apes live successfully together in groups, without a Socrates. See MacIntyre on the failure of reasoned morality. |
23090 | Liberals assume people are naturally free, equal, rational, and morally good [Kekes] |
Full Idea: The view of human nature at the core of the liberal faith is that human beings are by their nature free, equal, rational, and morally good. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 02.5) | |
A reaction: These four claims are quite distinct, and should be evaluated separately. I think I'm something of a liberal, but I don't really accept any of them. Hm. I just want all people to have these attributes. |
23117 | Love should be partial, and discriminate in favour of its object [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Love is personal and partial. It is not love if it does not discriminate in favor of its object. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 09.4) | |
A reaction: I agree with that, mainly on the grounds that this is the natural form of human love. Generalised love of mankind seems like a distortion, even if it is well-meaning. |
23119 | Sentimental love distorts its object [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Love is sentimental if it exaggerates the virtues and minimises the vices of its object. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 09.5) | |
A reaction: Not sure about this. It implies that we should retain a streak of cold evaluative objectivity, even about the people we love most. There is difference between knowing a person's qualities, and the importance we attach to those qualities. Forgive vices! |
23088 | Evil is not deviation from the good, any more than good is a deviation from evil [Kekes] |
Full Idea: There is no more reason to think of evil as deviation from the good than there is to think of the good as deviation from evil. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 02.2) | |
A reaction: This is a political moderate right winger defending the concept of evil as a basic and inescapable component of existence, in contrast to liberals who tend to deny 'pure evil'. |
23097 | What matters for morality is the effects of action, not the psychological causes [Kekes] |
Full Idea: What is crucial to morality are the good and evil effects of human actions, not their psychological causes. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 03.4) | |
A reaction: The context is his attack on the liberal idea that morality only concerns the actions of autonomous agents. Kekes says he is not a full consequentialist. He just urges that consequences be given greater weight. Even Kant must care about that. |
19752 | If we should not mistreat humans, it is mainly because of sentience, not rationality [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: If I am obliged not to do any harm to my fellow man, it is less because he is a rational being than because he is a sentient being. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Pref) | |
A reaction: How should sentience and rationality be weighted here? Kant demands instrinsic respect for beings on the grounds of their rationality. What could ever justify doing needless harm to anything? An open goal for virtue theory here. |
19768 | The better Golden Rule is 'do good for yourself without harming others' [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: Instead of the sublime maxim of reasoned justice 'Do unto others as you would have them do unto you', pity inspires a less perfect but perhaps more useful one: 'Do what is good for you with as little harm as possible to others'. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part I) | |
A reaction: His revised maxim is like J.S. Mill's formula for liberalism. The first maxim seems more contractarian, the second more utilitarian. |
23099 | It is said that if an agent is not autonomous then their evil actions don't reflect on their character [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Liberals deny the reflexivity of evil, …to prevent the evil consequences of an agent's morally deplorable actions from redounding to their detriment. Evil actions are allowed to reflect on their agents only if the agents cause them autonomously. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 03.5) | |
A reaction: A central question of morality is essentialising character. That is, when does an eater of carrots become a carrot-eater? When does a performer of wicked deeds become a wicked person? Never, say many liberals. Wrong, says Kekes. |
19766 | The fact that we weep (e.g. in theatres) shows that we are naturally compassionate [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: Every day one sees in our theatres someone affected and weeping at the ills of some unfortunate person ...Nature, in giving men tears, bears witness that she gave the human race the softest hearts. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part I) | |
A reaction: Lovely. Of course, tears in infants are for their own misfortunes, but adults more commonly weep over the sufferings of others. But we somewhat laugh at people who easily cry over dramas about suffering. |
23118 | Awareness of others' suffering doesn't create an obligation to help [Kekes] |
Full Idea: It is a mistaken assumption that knowledge of the sufferings of others creates an obligation to help them. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 09.4) | |
A reaction: A nice question is when that knowledge does become an obligation. The obvious criteria are proximity to the suffering, and capacity to relieve it. But then a wealthy person couldn't walk down the street without such obigations. Hm. |
19756 | Humans are less distinguished from other animals by understanding, than by being free agents [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: It is not so much understanding which causes the specific distinction of man from all other animals as it is his being a free agent. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part I) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure how deep Rousseau takes 'free' to go. Having little enthusiasm for free will, I would say that we are distinguished by the complexity of our decision making. But I attribute that to meta-thought, the mark of humanity. |
19755 | Most human ills are self-inflicted; the simple, solitary, regular natural life is good [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: Most of our ills are of our own making, and we could have avoided nearly all of them by preserving the simple, regular and solitary lifestyle prescribed to us by nature. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part I) | |
A reaction: It is important that he is not really disagreeing with Hobbes's pessimistic view of natural life as 'nasty'. Rousseau attributes that to a later stage, when people are ineptly beginning to emerge from the state of nature. I'm an optimist here. |
19779 | Primitive man was very gentle [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: Nothing is so gentle as man in his primitive state. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part II) | |
A reaction: This summarises Rousseau's view of the earliest stage of mankind, when there was little rivalry, and little motivation or opportunity for viciousness. |
19762 | Is language a pre-requisite for society, or might it emerge afterwards? [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: Which was more necessary: an already formed society for the invention of languages, or an already invented language for the establishment of society? | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part I) | |
A reaction: Rousseau declines to attempt an answer. Ants and bees seem to do well, but have some means of communication. Ape colonies are quite sophisticated. |
19763 | I doubt whether a savage person ever complains of life, or considers suicide [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: I ask if anyone has ever heard tell of a savage who was living in liberty ever dreaming of complaining about his life and of killing himself. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part I) | |
A reaction: Rousseau's state of nature is much too remote from any current tribal life for this to be tested. It is a nice speculation. Do apes ever attempt suicide? |
19765 | Savages avoid evil because they are calm, and never think of it (not because they know goodness) [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: We could say that savages are not evil because they do not know what is good; for it is neither enlightenment nor legal restraint, but the calm of the passions and the ignorance of vice which prevents them from doing evil. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part I) | |
A reaction: Suggests one of my favourite ideas (Idea 519). While his hopes for savages and the state of nature may be optimistic, the idea that you won't do evil if it never crosses your mind (and it won't if you are a calm person) is very powerful. |
19771 | Savage men quietly pursue desires, without the havoc of modern frenzied imagination [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: Imagination, which wreaks so much havoc among us, does not speak to savage hearts; each man peacefully awaits the impetus of nature, gives himself over to it without choice, and with more pleasure than frenzy; then all desire is snuffed out. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part I) | |
A reaction: Interesting to identify imagination as a source of trouble. The idea that the savage lacks imagination seems implausible. Better to say that modern imagination has been poisoned by competition. |
19778 | Leisure led to envy, inequality, vice and revenge, which we now see in savages [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: People developed leisure pursuits, and wanted esteem, which was the first step towards inequality, and at the same time towards vice. Vanity, contempt, shame and envy were born, and acts of revenge. This is the stage of savage people we know of. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part II) | |
A reaction: [very compressed] This is important in understanding Rousseau, because his happier 'state of nature' is prior to what is described here, which is the violent warlike state which impressed Hobbes. |
19751 | Our two starting principles are concern for self-interest, and compassion for others [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: One principle prior to reason makes us ardently interested in our well-being and self-preservation; the other inspires a natural repugnance to seeing any sentient being, especially our fellow man, perish or suffer. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Pref) | |
A reaction: This is strikingly like Hume's nascent utilitarianism. These two principles are the key to Rousseau's vision of the state of nature, from which the union around a general will leads to the formation of a state. Note that animals get included here. |
19774 | A savage can steal fruit or a home, but there is no means of achieving obedience [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: A savage man could well lay hold of the fruit another has gathered, the cave that served as his shelter. But how will he ever succeed in making himself obeyed? What can be the chain of dependence among men who possess nothing? | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part I) | |
A reaction: You'd certainly need language to express an enduring threat, like excluding someone from all of the local caves. You need to be able to say 'I'll be back', which animals can't say. Huge muscular men must have dominated in some way. |
19772 | In a state of nature people are much more equal; it is society which increases inequalities [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: There must be much less difference between one man and another in the state of nature than in that of society, and natural inequality must increase in the human species through inequality occasioned by social institutions. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part I) | |
A reaction: This is the main idea of his essay - the answer to the question set by the essay prize. Slavery is common in fairly basic societies, but that is at a much more advanced stage than Rousseau is thinking of. It's hard to disagree with him. |
19789 | It is against nature for children to rule old men, fools to rule the wise, and the rich to hog resources [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: It is obviously contrary to the law of nature, however it is defined, for a child to command an old man, for an imbecile to lead a wise man, and for a handful of people to gorge themselves on superfluities while the starving multitude lack necessities. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part II) | |
A reaction: I wonder if gregarious animals ever starve to death during a time of plenty, because of social exclusion? I bet this idea was quoted widely in 1780s Paris. The massive inequality is not just nasty, but 'contrary to the law of nature'. |
23109 | The veil of ignorance is only needed because people have bad motivations [Kekes] |
Full Idea: If the darker aspects of human motivation did not exist, there would be no need for Rawls to place his people behind the veil of ignorance. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 07.2) | |
A reaction: All the critics observe that Rawls's blind choosers are nothing like as simple as the mere specks of rationality he seems to imagine. The usual objection is that they are already liberals, but this objection says they are already benevolent. |
23114 | The chief function of the state is to arbitrate between contending visions of the good life [Kekes] |
Full Idea: The chief function of the state is seen to be to maintain what is referred to as the dialogue or conversation among the contending visions of how life should be lived. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 08.4) | |
A reaction: This is Kekes's defence of 'pluralism'. It is not liberal, because liberal freedom, autonomy and equality is only one of the competing visions of the good life. Almost every state suppresses some such visions. |
19787 | People accept the right to be commanded, because they themselves wish to command [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: Citizens allow themselves to be oppressed only insofar as they are driven by blind ambition; ...they consent to wear chains in order to be able to give them in turn to others. It is difficult to reduce to obedience someone who does not wish to command. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part II) | |
A reaction: Beautiful. This produces what I call the 'military model of management', where people love tree diagrams showing chains of command, and their place in the hierarchy. Life becomes 'either give orders, or obey'. I like democratic teams. |
23116 | Citizenship is easier than parenthood [Kekes] |
Full Idea: It is much easier to be a good citizen than it is to be a good parent. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 09.4) | |
A reaction: A nice observation. It is shocking how many people are bad citizens, given the limited demands. I think philosophers have some responsibility for beliefs and values which people bring to their citizenship. Parents need communal support. |
19780 | We seem to have made individual progress since savagery, but actually the species has decayed [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: Evidence confirms that the savage state is the youth of the world, and all subsequent progress has been in appearance so many steps toward the perfection of the individual, and in fact toward the decay of the species. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part II) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as an attack on the new rising philosophy of liberalism, and a plea for communitarianism. We should judge humanity as a whole, and not just look at some individual lives which seem to be going well. |
23103 | Power is meant to be confined to representatives, and subsequent delegation [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Universal adult suffrage and representative government are intended to give everyone equal initial political power, and assure that delegation is the only legitimate means to acquiring greater power. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 05.1) | |
A reaction: The delegation bit is where it all goes wrong. Once you've packed your representative off to the capital, you lose nearly all control over what sort of delegation happens next. It is hard to trust representatives voters have barely met. |
19747 | Revolutionaries usually confuse liberty with total freedom, and end up with heavier chains [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: If people try to shake off a yoke, they put more distance between themselves and liberty, because in mistaking for liberty an unbridled licence which is its opposite, their revolutions usually deliver them over to seducers who make their chains heavier. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Intro letter) | |
A reaction: This 'Animal Farm' thought was presumably ignored in 1789 and 1917. There must be basic rules for revolutionaries, of which priorities they must never drop from sight, and which priorities are dangerous and misleading. |
23107 | Prosperity is a higher social virtue than justice [Kekes] |
Full Idea: If social institutions were to have a first virtue, …prosperity would be a much stronger candidate that justice. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 06.3) | |
A reaction: Kekes occasionally pays lip service to ecological issues, but this shows he is not serious. Endless economic growth will kill our planet, so it should never be our prime virtue. Also the impplication that you can't be too prosperous is plainly false. |
19748 | Plebiscites are bad, because they exclude the leaders from crucial decisions [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: I would not approve of plebiscites like those of the Romans where the state's leaders and those most interested in its preservation were excluded from the deliberations on which its safety often depended. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Intro letter) | |
A reaction: I wish David Cameron had read this before 2016. This is exactly what happened with the Brexit referendum, where the people voted for an action entirely opposed to the preference of the majority of their elected representatives. Chaos ensued. |
19749 | In a direct democracy, only the leaders should be able to propose new laws [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: In order to stop ...the dangerous innovations that finally ruined Athens, no one would have the power to propose new laws according to his fancy; this right belongs exclusively to the magistrates. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Intro letter) | |
A reaction: Aristotle says (somewhere!) that control of the agenda for meetings is the key issue in democracies. I assume any citizen can propose a law, but only a magistrate can put it on the agenda. Maybe a separate 'citizen's committee' could filter suggestions. |
23081 | Liberal basics are pluralism, freedom, rights, equality, and distributive justice - for autonomy [Kekes] |
Full Idea: The basic liberal values are pluralism, freedom, rights, equality, and distributive justice. What makes them basically valuable is that they enable individuals to live autonomously. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 01.2) | |
A reaction: Helpful. Kekes identifies respect for autonomy as the single value which unites all liberal doctrines (and he traces it back to Kant). |
23085 | The key liberal values are explained by the one core value, which is autonomy [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Liberals regard pluralism, freedom, rights, equality and distributive justice as basic …but this particular group of values is explained by the true core of liberalism, the inner citadel for whose protection all the liberal battles are waged: autonomy. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 01.5) | |
A reaction: Given that children, soldiers, monks and nuns, and people in old folks homes have very limited autonomy, it is reasonable to query whether it really is so important. I like autonomy if I have external power over my life; not so good when in hospital. |
23092 | Agents have little control over the capacities needed for liberal autonomy [Kekes] |
Full Idea: It is important [for liberals] to realise that agents have no control over their possession of the capacities and opportunities on which their autonomy depends. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 03.2) | |
A reaction: It can be replied to Kekes that they also have little control over the capacities upon which his prized 'desert' depends. It may be an axiom of all modern political thought that people have less control than we imagine. |
23102 | Liberals are egalitarians, but in varying degrees [Kekes] |
Full Idea: All liberals are egalitarians, though they may be more or less so. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 05.1) | |
A reaction: In the broadest view, this may be the one thing which distinguishes generalised liberals from the rest. To reject it needs a basis for the rejection, and every basis for its flat rejection is anathema to liberals. |
23084 | Are egalitarians too coercive, or not egalitarian enough, or lax over morality? [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Egalitarian liberalism is criticised by classical [freedom] liberals for its coercive redistribution, by socialist liberals for not being egalitarian enough, and by conservative liberals for abandoning moral standards in the guise of neutrality. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 01.4) | |
A reaction: Income tax is 'coercive' distribution, but it is done with general consent in most liberal democracies. An interesting line between the needs of the state and the needs of its most needy citizens. |
23079 | Liberal justice ignores desert, which is the essence of justice [Kekes] |
Full Idea: The liberal conception of justice …excludes the essence of justice: desert. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], Pref) | |
A reaction: Certainly our normal concept of justice includes such thoughts as 'serves him right'. The trouble with the Kekes view is his society is continually morally judging people, and most people's grounds for that are fairly irrational. It's why we have courts. |
23091 | Why do liberals not see a much wider range of values as basic? [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Why are prosperity, order, civility, peace, a healthy environment, security, happiness, and law-abidingness not as important as those thought of by liberals as basic? | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 02.5) | |
A reaction: This presumes that liberals only see a narrow core of values as basic to the structure of the society. Presumably every society should be well disposed towards the nice features listed here. Would their absence wreck the society? |
23112 | Liberals ignore contingency, and think people are good and equal, and institutions cause evil [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Liberals comfortably believe that autonomy minimises contingency, that humans are disposed to the good, that wickedness is due to remediable institutions, and that humans are morally equal because of their autonomy. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 07.4) | |
A reaction: In a nutshell, Kekes thinks liberals are naďve. That institutions cause evil sounds more Marxist than liberal. When individuals become evil, it is reasonable for us to think that this need not have been the case. |
23082 | Liberal distribution cares more about recipients than donors [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Liberal distribution cares more about the rights of the recipients than the rights of the donors. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 01.2) | |
A reaction: Even if you are very left wing indeed, this is an important point. A society dominated by a powerful Robin Hood (steal from the rich, for the poor) is quite likely to end in civil war. But should society allow huge individual wealths to accumulate? |
19775 | People must be made dependent before they can be enslaved [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: It is impossible to enslave a man without having first put him in the position of being incapable of doing without another. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part I) | |
A reaction: Ah yes. The key to running a slave plantation is not the threat of violence, but control of the shelter and food supply. |
19784 | Enslaved peoples often boast of their condition, calling it a state of 'peace' [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: Enslaved peoples do nothing but boast of the peace and tranquillity they enjoy in their chains and they give the name 'peace' to the most miserable slavery. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part II) | |
A reaction: It seems to be a sad truth that enslaved peoples are less upset about their condition than outside observers are, especially in modern times, where slavery is usually deemed unacceptable. Slavery might be the best you can hope for. |
19785 | If the child of a slave woman is born a slave, then a man is not born a man [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: The jurists who have gravely pronounced that the child of a slave woman is born a slave, have decided, in other words, that a man is not born a man. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part II) | |
A reaction: The hidden premise of this enthymeme is that man is born free. A key issue of liberalism is the status of children. Are the children of religious believers automatically members of that sect? Can I be born a West Ham supporter? |
19746 | Like rich food, liberty can ruin people who are too weak to cope with it [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: Liberty is like those solid foods or full-bodied wines appropriate for strengthening robust constitutions that are used to them, but which overpower, ruin and intoxicate the weak and delicate who are not suited to them. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Intro letter) | |
A reaction: Rousseau vision of a successful society involves robustly self-sufficient citizens (as in the American ideal), rather than people who are free, but easily led into dependence (in a 'nanny state'). |
19786 | Three stages of the state produce inequalities of wealth, power, and enslavement [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: Stage one gives law and property (producing inequalities of rich and poor), stage two gives a magistracy (producing weak and strong), and stage three is legitimate power becoming arbitrary (producing master and slave). | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part II) | |
A reaction: This is the final answer to the prize essay question (with Idea 19772). What a beautiful analysis - and he didn't even win the prize this time! |
23106 | To rectify the undeserved equality, we should give men longer and women shorter lives [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Redistribution ought to aim to equalise the life expectancy of men and women, by making men have longer and women shorter lives. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 05.4) | |
A reaction: This is a nice satirical counterexample to the Rawlsian claim that 'undeserved inequalities should somehow be compensated for' [Rawls 1971: 100]. See also Kurt Vonnegut's story 'Harrison Bergeron'. |
23121 | It is just a fact that some people are morally better than others [Kekes] |
Full Idea: It is an obviolus fact that some people are morally better than others and that some are morally worse. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 10.4) | |
A reaction: This could be conceded, without then asserting that the moral ones are superior, or more deserving. That is a social strategy, rather than a fact. We can challenge the criteria for 'morally better', but we can't deny a rankng once it is agreed. |
19788 | The pleasure of wealth and power is largely seeing others deprived of them [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: If one sees a handful of powerful and rich men at the height of greatness and fortune while the mob grovels in obscurity and misery, it is because the former prize the things they enjoy only to the extent that the others are deprived of them. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part II) | |
A reaction: This seems to be an accurate picture of ancien régime France, and it still applies to modern plutocrats. The pleasure of a nice house is not that it is very good, but that it is better than other houses. Inequality gives a lot of pleasure! |
23120 | The problem is basic insufficiency of resources, not their inequality [Kekes] |
Full Idea: If everyone has sufficient resources, it is not objectionable that some have more than others. What is objectionable is that some do not have enough. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 10.3) | |
A reaction: Reasonable, but there seems to be sharp disagreement between the haves and the have-nots over what counts as 'enough'. In an affluent country, does enough include a car, restaurant dining, and foreign holidays? Or just food and shelter? |
23105 | It is not deplorable that billionaires have more than millionaires [Kekes] |
Full Idea: It is certainly not intuitively deplorable that billionaires have more money than millionaires. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 05.3) | |
A reaction: Nice point. His claim is that sufficiency is the important feature, and equality is largely irrelevant. The reality, though, is that the billionaires, unlike the millionaires, could solve the insufficiency problem. |
19777 | Persuading other people that some land was 'owned' was the beginning of society [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: The first person who, having enclosed a plot of land, took it into his head to say 'this is mine' and found people simple enough to believe him, was the true founder of civil society. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part II) | |
A reaction: A wonderful riposte to Locke, who thought political legitimacy was based on property! Locke is way too simplistic about whether someone has a true right to their property. Highy dubious claims become ossified after a generation or two. |
19782 | What else could property arise from, but the labour people add to it? [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: It is impossible to conceive of the idea of property arising from anything but manual labour, for it is not clear what man can add, beyond his own labour, in order to appropriate things he has not made. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part II) | |
A reaction: A thorough endorsement of Locke's labour theory of value. It is not clear to me why you have to 'add' something in order to achieve ownership. Don't you own firewood just by picking it up? Golfers give ownership of a lost ball to the first one to see it. |
19781 | Land cultivation led to a general right of ownership, administered justly [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: From the cultivation of land, there necessarily followed the division of land; and from property once recognised, the first rules of justice. For in order to render everyone what is his, it is necessary that everyone can have something. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part II) | |
A reaction: This looks rather obviously correct. You don't plant crops if you are not protected in your right to reap what you have sown, and you would expect to re-sow from the proceeds. Other people will want you to do this. |
19754 | If we have a natural right to property, what exactly does 'belonging to' mean? [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: Others have spoken of the natural right that everyone has to preserve what belongs to him, without explaining what they mean by 'belonging'. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Pref) | |
A reaction: This is aimed at Locke. What Marxists will challenge is the legitimacy of property ownership, granted by patronage, enclosure, exploitation and conquest. These start as injustices, but that fades after a few generations. Locke has a labour-theory. |
23108 | Justice combines consistency and desert; treat likes alike, judging likeness by desert [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Justice is a combination of consistency and desert. Like cases should be treated alike, and likenesses should be evaluated according to desert. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 06.3) | |
A reaction: [compressed] He needs to add that at least the desert should be relevant to the events being assessed. Should people not get a fair trial if they are branded as generally 'undeserving'? Hence the case must be judged before the desert is identified. |
19750 | Writers just propose natural law as the likely useful agreements among people [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: Writers begin by seeking the rules on which, for the common utility, it would be appropriate for men to agree among themselves; they then give the name of 'natural law' to these rules, with no other proof than their presumed good results. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Pref) | |
A reaction: The arguments for natural law strike me as quite good, but pinning down its content looks incredibly elusive, and at the mercy of cultural influences. |
19770 | Primitive people simply redressed the evil caused by violence, without thought of punishing [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: More primitive men regarded the acts of violence that could befall them as an easily redressed evil and not as an offence that must be punished; they did not even dream of vengeance, except as a knee-jerk response. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part I) | |
A reaction: This may be Rousseau at his most optimistic, trying to deny a rather more aggressive streak in people, seen in children's playgrounds. |
19783 | A state of war remains after a conquest, if the losers don't accept the winners [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: The conqueror and conquered peoples always remain in a state of war with one another, unless the nation, returned to full liberty, were to choose voluntarily its conqueror as leader. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part II) | |
A reaction: Tricky if part of the conquered nation accepts the conqueror, and the other part doesn't, as in France in 1940. In a permanent conquest the state of war seems to fade away, as in England in 1066. |
23083 | Liberal welfare focuses on need rather than desert [Kekes] |
Full Idea: In welfare legislation, liberals concentrate on what people need rather than on what they deserve. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 01,2) | |
A reaction: He makes assessing what people 'deserve' sound easy. Do drowning people deserve to be rescued? Do billionaires deserve their wealth (which is not the same as 'did they acquire it legally')? What do rude people deserve? |
23113 | Sexual morality doesn't require monogamy, but it needs a group of sensible regulations [Kekes] |
Full Idea: A moral tradition need not be committed to monogamy, but it must regulate sexual conduct to prevent inbreeding, protect the sexually immature, prohibit some forms of coercion, and assign responsibility for raising children. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 08.1) | |
A reaction: Wise words, I would say. The sexual liberation which arose with the contraceptive pill rather swamped thoughts of this type. These are just sensible responses to the facts of life. |
19753 | Both men and animals are sentient, which should give the latter the right not to be mistreated [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: Since being sentient is common to both animals and men, that should at least give the former the right not to be needlessly mistreated by the latter. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Pref) | |
A reaction: This is why utilitarianism led to the founding of the RSPCA in Britain. There is a disturbing picture of people smashing up animals for fun, if they can only persuade themselves that the animals are not sentient. I've heard fishermen claim that. |
19761 | Men started with too few particular names, but later had too few natural kind names [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: Men at first unduly multiplied the names of individual things, owing to their failure to know the genera and species, but later made too few genera and species, owing to their failure to have considered beings in all their differences. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part I) | |
A reaction: The fact that two leopards differ is not a good enough reason to assign them to two different general terms. Adjectives can do all the necessary modification. The single general term acknowledges something important. |
19776 | Small uninterrupted causes can have big effects [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: Negligible causes may have surprising power when they act without interruption. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1754], Part I) | |
A reaction: A wonderfully simple observation that is a key idea of the theory of evolution. If life was created 6,000 years ago, evolution is impossible. If it appeared 500,000,000 years ago, how could evolution NOT occur? Little changes must occur. |