10 ideas
| 17884 | Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner] |
| Full Idea: There are many coherent stopping points in the hierarchy of increasingly strong mathematical systems, starting with strict finitism, and moving up through predicativism to the higher reaches of set theory. | |
| From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], Intro) |
| 17893 | 'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner] |
| Full Idea: Roughly speaking, 'reflection principles' assert that anything true in V [the set hierarchy] falls short of characterising V in that it is true within some earlier level. | |
| From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], 2.1) |
| 17894 | We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner] |
| Full Idea: There is at present no solid argument to the effect that a given statement is absolutely undecidable. | |
| From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], 5.3) |
| 17890 | There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner] |
| Full Idea: Some of the standard large cardinals (in order of increasing (logical) strength) are: inaccessible, Mahlo, weakly compact, indescribable, Erdös, measurable, strong, Wodin, supercompact, huge etc. (...and ineffable). | |
| From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], 1.4) | |
| A reaction: [I don't understand how cardinals can have 'logical strength', but I pass it on anyway] |
| 17887 | PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner] |
| Full Idea: To the extent that we are justified in accepting Peano Arithmetic we are justified in accepting its consistency, and so we know how to expand the axiom system so as to overcome the limitation [of Gödel's Second Theorem]. | |
| From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], 1.1) | |
| A reaction: Each expansion brings a limitation, but then you can expand again. |
| 17891 | Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner] |
| Full Idea: The arithmetical instances of undecidability that arise at one stage of the hierarchy are settled at the next. | |
| From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], 1.4) |
| 2427 | Maybe understanding doesn't need consciousness, despite what Searle seems to think [Searle, by Chalmers] |
| Full Idea: Searle originally directed the Chinese Room against machine intentionality rather than consciousness, arguing that it is "understanding" that the room lacks,….but on Searle's view intentionality requires consciousness. | |
| From: report of John Searle (Minds, Brains and Science [1984]) by David J.Chalmers - The Conscious Mind 4.9.4 | |
| A reaction: I doubt whether 'understanding' is a sufficiently clear and distinct concept to support Searle's claim. Understanding comes in degrees, and we often think and act with minimal understanding. |
| 7389 | A program won't contain understanding if it is small enough to imagine [Dennett on Searle] |
| Full Idea: There is nothing remotely like genuine understanding in any hunk of programming small enough to imagine readily. | |
| From: comment on John Searle (Minds, Brains and Science [1984]) by Daniel C. Dennett - Consciousness Explained 14.1 | |
| A reaction: We mustn't hide behind 'complexity', but I think Dennett is right. It is important to think of speed as well as complexity. Searle gives the impression that he knows exactly what 'understanding' is, but I doubt if anyone else does. |
| 7390 | If bigger and bigger brain parts can't understand, how can a whole brain? [Dennett on Searle] |
| Full Idea: The argument that begins "this little bit of brain activity doesn't understand Chinese, and neither does this bigger bit..." is headed for the unwanted conclusion that even the activity of the whole brain won't account for understanding Chinese. | |
| From: comment on John Searle (Minds, Brains and Science [1984]) by Daniel C. Dennett - Consciousness Explained 14.1 | |
| A reaction: In other words, Searle is guilty of a fallacy of composition (in negative form - parts don't have it, so whole can't have it). Dennett is right. The whole shebang of the full brain will obviously do wonderful (and commonplace) things brain bits can't. |
| 21650 | No language is semantically referential; it all occurs at the level of thought or utterance [Pietroski, by Hofweber] |
| Full Idea: For Paul Pietroski no expression in natural language is semantically referential. ....Reference to objects occurs not at the level of semantics, but at the level of thought or utterance. | |
| From: report of Paul M. Pietroski (Events and Semantic Architecture [2004]) by Thomas Hofweber - Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics 07.2 | |
| A reaction: Love this. It has always struck me that reference is what speakers do. Try taking any supposedly referential description and sticking 'so-called' in front of it. That seems to leave you with the reference even though you have denied the description. |