11 ideas
| 24069 | Much metaphysical debate concerns what is fundamental, rather than what exists [Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: Some of the most important debates in metaphysics or ontology do not concern existential questions, but focus on questions of fundamentality. | |
| From: Kathrin Koslicki (Form, Matter and Substance [2018], 5 Intro) | |
| A reaction: In modern times we have added the structure of existence to the mere ontological catalogue, and this idea makes another important addition to our concept of metaphysics. She gives disagreement over tropes as an example. |
| 17884 | Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner] |
| Full Idea: There are many coherent stopping points in the hierarchy of increasingly strong mathematical systems, starting with strict finitism, and moving up through predicativism to the higher reaches of set theory. | |
| From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], Intro) |
| 17893 | 'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner] |
| Full Idea: Roughly speaking, 'reflection principles' assert that anything true in V [the set hierarchy] falls short of characterising V in that it is true within some earlier level. | |
| From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], 2.1) |
| 17894 | We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner] |
| Full Idea: There is at present no solid argument to the effect that a given statement is absolutely undecidable. | |
| From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], 5.3) |
| 17890 | There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner] |
| Full Idea: Some of the standard large cardinals (in order of increasing (logical) strength) are: inaccessible, Mahlo, weakly compact, indescribable, Erdös, measurable, strong, Wodin, supercompact, huge etc. (...and ineffable). | |
| From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], 1.4) | |
| A reaction: [I don't understand how cardinals can have 'logical strength', but I pass it on anyway] |
| 17887 | PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner] |
| Full Idea: To the extent that we are justified in accepting Peano Arithmetic we are justified in accepting its consistency, and so we know how to expand the axiom system so as to overcome the limitation [of Gödel's Second Theorem]. | |
| From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], 1.1) | |
| A reaction: Each expansion brings a limitation, but then you can expand again. |
| 17891 | Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner] |
| Full Idea: The arithmetical instances of undecidability that arise at one stage of the hierarchy are settled at the next. | |
| From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], 1.4) |
| 18398 | Space, time, and some other basics, are not causal powers [Ellis] |
| Full Idea: Spatial, temporal, and other primary properties and relationships are not causal powers. | |
| From: Brian Ellis (Response to David Armstrong [1999], p.42), quoted by David M. Armstrong - Truth and Truthmakers 10.4 | |
| A reaction: It is hard to see how time and space could actually be powers, but future results in physics (or even current results about 'fields') might change that. |
| 24065 | Structured wholes are united by the teamwork needed for their capacities [Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: A structured whole derives its unity from the way in which its parts interact with other parts to allow both the whole and its parts to manifest those of their capacities which require 'team work' among the parts. | |
| From: Kathrin Koslicki (Form, Matter and Substance [2018], Intro) | |
| A reaction: This is a culminating thesis of her book. She defends it at length. It looks like a nice theory for things which are lucky enough to have capacities involving teamwork. Does this mean a pebble can't be unified? She wants a dynamic view. |
| 24066 | The form explains kind, structure, unity and activity [Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: Hylomorphists tend to agree that the form (rather than matter) explains 1) kind membership, 2) structure, 3) unity, 4) characteristic activities. | |
| From: Kathrin Koslicki (Form, Matter and Substance [2018], 3.2.1) | |
| A reaction: [compressed; she explains each of them] Personally I would add continuity through change (statue/clay). Glad to see that kind membership is not part of the form. And what about explaining observed properties? Does form=essence? |
| 24067 | Hylomorphic compounds need an individual form for transworld identity [Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: It is difficult to see how forms could serve as cross-world identity principles for hylomorphic compounds, unless these forms are particular or individual entities. | |
| From: Kathrin Koslicki (Form, Matter and Substance [2018], 3.4.3) | |
| A reaction: This is a key part of her objection to treating the form as universal or generic. I agree with her view. |