11 ideas
17884 | Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner] |
Full Idea: There are many coherent stopping points in the hierarchy of increasingly strong mathematical systems, starting with strict finitism, and moving up through predicativism to the higher reaches of set theory. | |
From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], Intro) |
17893 | 'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner] |
Full Idea: Roughly speaking, 'reflection principles' assert that anything true in V [the set hierarchy] falls short of characterising V in that it is true within some earlier level. | |
From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], 2.1) |
17879 | Axiomatising set theory makes it all relative [Skolem] |
Full Idea: Axiomatising set theory leads to a relativity of set-theoretic notions, and this relativity is inseparably bound up with every thoroughgoing axiomatisation. | |
From: Thoralf Skolem (Remarks on axiomatised set theory [1922], p.296) |
17878 | If a 1st-order proposition is satisfied, it is satisfied in a denumerably infinite domain [Skolem] |
Full Idea: Löwenheim's theorem reads as follows: If a first-order proposition is satisfied in any domain at all, it is already satisfied in a denumerably infinite domain. | |
From: Thoralf Skolem (Remarks on axiomatised set theory [1922], p.293) |
17894 | We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner] |
Full Idea: There is at present no solid argument to the effect that a given statement is absolutely undecidable. | |
From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], 5.3) |
17890 | There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner] |
Full Idea: Some of the standard large cardinals (in order of increasing (logical) strength) are: inaccessible, Mahlo, weakly compact, indescribable, Erdös, measurable, strong, Wodin, supercompact, huge etc. (...and ineffable). | |
From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], 1.4) | |
A reaction: [I don't understand how cardinals can have 'logical strength', but I pass it on anyway] |
17880 | Integers and induction are clear as foundations, but set-theory axioms certainly aren't [Skolem] |
Full Idea: The initial foundations should be immediately clear, natural and not open to question. This is satisfied by the notion of integer and by inductive inference, by it is not satisfied by the axioms of Zermelo, or anything else of that kind. | |
From: Thoralf Skolem (Remarks on axiomatised set theory [1922], p.299) | |
A reaction: This is a plea (endorsed by Almog) that the integers themselves should be taken as primitive and foundational. I would say that the idea of successor is more primitive than the integers. |
17887 | PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner] |
Full Idea: To the extent that we are justified in accepting Peano Arithmetic we are justified in accepting its consistency, and so we know how to expand the axiom system so as to overcome the limitation [of Gödel's Second Theorem]. | |
From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], 1.1) | |
A reaction: Each expansion brings a limitation, but then you can expand again. |
17891 | Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner] |
Full Idea: The arithmetical instances of undecidability that arise at one stage of the hierarchy are settled at the next. | |
From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], 1.4) |
17881 | Mathematician want performable operations, not propositions about objects [Skolem] |
Full Idea: Most mathematicians want mathematics to deal, ultimately, with performable computing operations, and not to consist of formal propositions about objects called this or that. | |
From: Thoralf Skolem (Remarks on axiomatised set theory [1922], p.300) |
16755 | The possible Aristotelian view that forms are real and active principles is clearly wrong [Fine,K, by Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Aristotle seems to have a possible basis for the belief [in individual forms], namely that forms are real and active principles in the world, which is denied by any right-minded modern. | |
From: report of Kit Fine (A Puzzle Concerning Matter and Form [1994], p.19) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.3 n8 | |
A reaction: Pasnau says this is the view of forms promoted by the scholastics, whereas Aristotle's own view should be understood as 'metaphysical'. |