71 ideas
| 20186 | Unlike knowledge, wisdom cannot be misused [Zagzebski] |
| Full Idea: A distinctive mark of wisdom is that it cannot be misused, whereas knowledge surely can be misused. | |
| From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], I 1.2) | |
| A reaction: She will argue, with Aristotle, that this is because wisdom (and maybe 'true' knowledge) must include 'phronesis' (practical wisdom), which is the key to all the virtues, intellectual and moral. This idea is striking, and obviously correct. |
| 19694 | Wisdom is the property of a person, not of their cognitive state [Zagzebski, by Whitcomb] |
| Full Idea: Zagzebski takes wisdom as literally properties of persons, not persons' cognitive states. | |
| From: report of Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], p.59-60) by Dennis Whitcomb - Wisdom 'Twofold' | |
| A reaction: Not sure about this. Zagzebski uses this idea to endorse epistemic virtue. But knowledge and ignorance are properties of persons too. There can be, though, a precise mental state involved in knowledge, but not in wisdom. |
| 24146 | All the major problems were formulated before Socrates [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: All the major problems were formulated before Socrates. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 26[064]) | |
| A reaction: So much for it all being 'footnotes to Plato'! Nietzsche's lectures on the pre-Socratics are in print. Given how little survives, this idea is surprising. Nietzsche knew enough to infer a lot of what is lost. |
| 24142 | What matters is how humans can be developed [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: What can be made out of humans: this is what matters to superior human beings. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[435]) | |
| A reaction: That seems to sum up the main aim of Nietzsche's philosophy. What would we then do if the aim was somehow achieved? Does he seriously think that one magnificent ubermensch could achieve this aim? |
| 24143 | Thinkers might agree some provisional truths, as methodological assumptions [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: It is sufficient if we [thinkers] come to agree about a totality of methodological presuppositions - about 'provisional truths' that we want to use as a guideline for our work. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[449]) | |
| A reaction: Descartes attempted this. Maybe Frege is another attempt. Husserl, perhaps? Parmenides? Hume? Lewis? It is hard to imagine Nietzsche joining in a professional consensus! He has just rejected systems. |
| 24125 | Aristotle enjoyed the sham generalities of a system, as the peak of happiness! [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle probably had his best moments when he coldly and clearly (and joyfully) enjoyed the sensual sham of the highest generalities. To perceive the world as a system, and as the pinnacle of human happiness: how the schematic mind betrays itself then! | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[017]) | |
| A reaction: Painful, this. One of my heroes laughing at the other one. I love systems, and love John Richardson's suggestion that Nietzsche was very systematice, despite his protestations. |
| 24147 | Thoughts are uncertain, and are just occasions for interpretation [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: A thought is not taken to be immediately certain, but rather a sign, a question mark. That each thought is initially ambiguous and fluctuating, and is in itself only an occasion for multiple interpretations …is experienced by every deep observer. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 26[092]) | |
| A reaction: This idea makes me a little more sympathetic to the hermeneutic view of philosophy, as endless interpretations. I assumed it only referred to texts. A thought is not a done deal, but an occasion for further thought. He says the same of feelings. |
| 20221 | Precision is only one of the virtues of a good definition [Zagzebski] |
| Full Idea: Precision is but one virtue of a definition, one that must be balanced against simplicity, elegance, conciseness, theoretical illumination, and practical usefulness. | |
| From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], III 2.1) | |
| A reaction: Illumination looks like the dream virtue for a good definition. Otherwise it is just ticked as accurate and stowed away. 'True justified belief' is a very illuminating definition of knowledge - if it is right. But it's not very precise. |
| 20220 | Objection by counterexample is weak, because it only reveals inaccuracies in one theory [Zagzebski] |
| Full Idea: Objection by counterexample is the weakest sort of attack a theory can undergo. Even when the objection succeeds, it shows only that a theory fails to achieve complete accuracy. It does not distinguish among the various rival theories. | |
| From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], III 2.1) | |
| A reaction: Typically counterexamples are used to refute universal generalisations (i.e. by 'falsification'), but canny theorists avoid those, or slip in a qualifying clause. Counterexamples are good for exploring a theory's coverage. |
| 17884 | Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner] |
| Full Idea: There are many coherent stopping points in the hierarchy of increasingly strong mathematical systems, starting with strict finitism, and moving up through predicativism to the higher reaches of set theory. | |
| From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], Intro) |
| 17893 | 'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner] |
| Full Idea: Roughly speaking, 'reflection principles' assert that anything true in V [the set hierarchy] falls short of characterising V in that it is true within some earlier level. | |
| From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], 2.1) |
| 24137 | Mathematics is just accurate inferences from definitions, and doesn't involve objects [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Mathematics contains axioms (definitions) and conclusions from definitions. Its objects do not exist. The truth of its conclusions rests on the accuracy of logical thought. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[307]) | |
| A reaction: Not suprising to find Nietzsche defying platonism. This is evidence that he was a systematic philosopher, who knew mathematics could be a challenge to his naturalism. |
| 17894 | We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner] |
| Full Idea: There is at present no solid argument to the effect that a given statement is absolutely undecidable. | |
| From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], 5.3) |
| 17890 | There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner] |
| Full Idea: Some of the standard large cardinals (in order of increasing (logical) strength) are: inaccessible, Mahlo, weakly compact, indescribable, Erdös, measurable, strong, Wodin, supercompact, huge etc. (...and ineffable). | |
| From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], 1.4) | |
| A reaction: [I don't understand how cardinals can have 'logical strength', but I pass it on anyway] |
| 17887 | PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner] |
| Full Idea: To the extent that we are justified in accepting Peano Arithmetic we are justified in accepting its consistency, and so we know how to expand the axiom system so as to overcome the limitation [of Gödel's Second Theorem]. | |
| From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], 1.1) | |
| A reaction: Each expansion brings a limitation, but then you can expand again. |
| 17891 | Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner] |
| Full Idea: The arithmetical instances of undecidability that arise at one stage of the hierarchy are settled at the next. | |
| From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], 1.4) |
| 24131 | There is no 'being'; it is just the opposition to nothingness [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: 'Being' is unprovable, because there is no 'being'. The concept of being is formed out of the opposition to 'nothingness'. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[185]) | |
| A reaction: Presumably a comment on Hegel's most basic idea. I find both thoughts bewildering. 'Being' is just a generalised (and unhelpful) way of referring to the self-evident existence of stuff. |
| 24151 | I only want thinking that is anchored in body, senses and earth [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: I am not interested …in ways of thinking that are not anchored in the body and the senses and in the earth. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 26[352]) | |
| A reaction: Exhibit A for Nietzsche as Naturalist. Indeed, this could be a manifesto for the whole school. I totally and completely and utterly agree with Nietzsche's assertion!. I see the 'anchor' as two-way: thought connects to earth, and thought arises from it. |
| 24150 | We can only understand through concepts, which subsume particulars in generalities [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: We have only one form of understanding - concept, the more general case that subsumes the particular case. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 26[156]) | |
| A reaction: This is precisely Aristotle's problem with scientific explanation - that we aim to understand each particular, but accounts and definitions have to be expressed with universals. |
| 20188 | Modern epistemology is too atomistic, and neglects understanding [Zagzebski] |
| Full Idea: There are complaints that contemporary epistemology is too atomistic, and that the value of understanding has been neglected. | |
| From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], I 2) | |
| A reaction: This is because of the excessive influence of logic in contemporary analytic philosophy, which has to reduce knowledge to K(Fa), rather than placing it in a human context. |
| 20223 | Epistemology is excessively atomic, by focusing on justification instead of understanding [Zagzebski] |
| Full Idea: The present obsession with justification and the neglect of understanding has resulted in a feature of epistemology already criticised by several epistemologists: its atomism. | |
| From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], III 2.2) | |
| A reaction: All analytic philosophy has become excessively atomic, because it relies too heavily on logic for its grounding and rigour. There are other sorts of rigour, such as AI, peer review, programming. Or rigour is an idle dream. |
| 20217 | Truth is valuable, but someone knowing the truth is more valuable [Zagzebski] |
| Full Idea: Of course we value the truth, but the value we place on knowledge is more than the value of the truth we thereby acquire. …It also involves a valuabe relation between the knower and the truth. | |
| From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], III 1) | |
| A reaction: Hard to assess this. I take truth to be a successful relationship between a mind and a fact. Knowledge needs something extra, to avoid lucky true beliefs. Does a truth acquire greater and greater value as more people come to know it? Doubtful. |
| 20191 | Some beliefs are fairly voluntary, and others are not at all so [Zagzebski] |
| Full Idea: My position is that beliefs, like acts, arrange themselves on a continuum of degrees of voluntariness, ranging from quite a bit to none at all. | |
| From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], I 4.2) | |
| A reaction: I'm sure we have no idea how we came to hold many of our beliefs, and if we see a cat, nothing seems to intervene between the seeing and the believing. But if you adopt a religion, believing its full creed is a big subsequent effort. |
| 20222 | Knowledge either aims at a quantity of truths, or a quality of understanding of truths [Zagzebski] |
| Full Idea: Getting knowledge can be a matter either of reaching more truths or of gaining understanding of truths already believed. So it may be a way of increasing either the quality of true belief (cognitive contact with reality) or the quantity. | |
| From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], III 2.1) | |
| A reaction: I'm not sure how one would increase understanding of currently believed truths if it didn't involve adding some new truths to the collection. There is only the discovery of connections or structures, but those are new facts. |
| 24138 | Strongly believed a priori is not certain; it may just be a feature of our existence [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: What we believe the most, everything a priori, is not for that reason more certain, just because it is so strongly believed. Rather, it is perhaps a consequence of the condition for the existence of our species. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[307]) | |
| A reaction: This is in defiance of Leibniz and Kant. His proposed explanation is not very convincing. Russell agreed with Nietzsche. |
| 24130 | An affirmative belief is present in every basic sense impression [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Belief is already present in every sense impression going back to the very moment it begins: a kind of Yes-saying first intellectual activity! | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[168]) | |
| A reaction: He seems right that there is an intrinsic commitment to believing sense impressions, even in animals. Presumably more of a default setting than an intellectual choice. |
| 20225 | For internalists Gettier situations are where internally it is fine, but there is an external mishap [Zagzebski] |
| Full Idea: In internalist theories the grounds for justification are accessible to the believer, and Gettier problems arise when there is nothing wrong with the internally accessible aspects of the situation, but there is a mishap inaccessible to the believer. | |
| From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], III 3.1) | |
| A reaction: I'm sure we could construct an internal mishap which the believer was unaware of, such as two confusions of the meanings of words cancelling one another out. |
| 20226 | Gettier problems are always possible if justification and truth are not closely linked [Zagzebski] |
| Full Idea: As long as the concept of knowledge closely connects the justification component and the truth component but permits some degree of independence between them, justified true belief will never be sufficient for knowledge. | |
| From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], III 3.1) | |
| A reaction: Out of context this sounds like an advertisement for externalism. Or maybe it just says we have to live with Gettier threats. Zagzebski has other strategies. |
| 20228 | We avoid the Gettier problem if the support for the belief entails its truth [Zagzebski] |
| Full Idea: The way to avoid the Gettier problem is to define knowledge in such a way that truth is entailed by the other component(s) of the definition. | |
| From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], III 3.1) | |
| A reaction: Thus she defines virtuous justification as being successful, as virtues tend to be. This smacks of cheating. Surely we can be defeated in a virtuous way? If the truth is entailed then of course Gettier can be sent packing. |
| 20227 | Gettier cases arise when good luck cancels out bad luck [Zagzebski] |
| Full Idea: The procedure for generating Gettier cases involves 'double luck': an instance of good luck cancels out an instance of bad luck. | |
| From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], III 3.2) | |
| A reaction: You can end up with the right answer in arithmetic if you make two mistakes rather than one. I'm picturing a life of one blundering error after another, which to an outsider seems to be going serenely well. |
| 20194 | Intellectual virtues are forms of moral virtue [Zagzebski] |
| Full Idea: I argue that intellectual virtues are forms of moral virtue. | |
| From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], II Intro) | |
| A reaction: This contrasts with Sosa, who seems to think intellectual virtues are just the most efficient ways of reaching the truth. I like Zabzebski's approach a lot, though we are in a very small minority. I love her book. We have epistemic and moral duties. |
| 20206 | Intellectual and moral prejudice are the same vice (and there are other examples) [Zagzebski] |
| Full Idea: Maybe the intellectual and the moral forms of prejudice are the same vice, and this may also be true of other traits with shared names, such as humility, autonomy, integrity, perseverance, courage and trustworthiness. | |
| From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], II 3.1) | |
| A reaction: I find this claim very persuasive. The virtue of 'integrity' rather obviously embraces groups of both intellectually and morally desirable traits. |
| 20208 | We can name at least thirteen intellectual vices [Zagzebski] |
| Full Idea: Some examples of intellectual vices: pride, negligence, idleness, cowardice, conformity, carelessness, rigidity, prejudice, wishful thinking, closed-mindedness, insensitivity to detail, obtuseness (in seeing relevance), and lack of thoroughness. | |
| From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], II 3.1) | |
| A reaction: There are thousands of vices for which we don't have names, like thinking about football when you should be doing metaphysics. The other way round is also a vice too, because football needs concentration. Discontent with your chair is bad too. |
| 20215 | A justified belief emulates the understanding and beliefs of an intellectually virtuous person [Zagzebski] |
| Full Idea: A justified belief is what a person who is motivated by intellectual virtue, and who has the understanding of his cognitive situation a virtuous person would have, might believe in like circumstances. | |
| From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], II 6.1) | |
| A reaction: This is a whole-hearted definition of justification in terms of a theory of intellectual virtues. Presumably this would allow robots to have justified beliefs, if they managed to behave the way intellectually virtuous persons would behave. |
| 20210 | A reliable process is no use without the virtues to make use of them [Zagzebski] |
| Full Idea: It is not enough that a process is reliable; a person will not reliably use such a process without certain virtues. | |
| From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], II 4.1.2) | |
| A reaction: This is a point against Sosa's reliabilist account of virtues. Of course, all theories of epistemic justification (or of morality) will fail if people can't be bothered to implement them. |
| 20187 | Epistemic perfection for reliabilism is a truth-producing machine [Zagzebski] |
| Full Idea: Just as a utility-calculating machine would be the ideal moral agent according to utilitarianism, a truth-producing machine would be the ideal epistemic agent according to reliabilism, | |
| From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], I 1.2) | |
| A reaction: Love this one! For consequentialists a successful robot is morally superior to an average human being. The reliabilist dream is just something that churns out truths. But what is the role of these truths in subsequent life? |
| 24124 | We now have innumerable perspectives to draw on [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: We have been granted perspectives in all directions, broader than any humans have ever been granted, everywhere we look there is no end in sight. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[013]) | |
| A reaction: Clearly perspectivism is not the simple relativism of being trapped in our own private perspective. What strikes me as missing from Nietzsche's brief thoughts is the question of consensus, and even rational and objective consensus. |
| 24145 | Mind is a mechanism of abstraction and simplification, aimed at control [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The entire cognitive mechanism is a mechanism of abstraction and simplification - not aimed at knowing, but taking control of things. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 26[061]) | |
| A reaction: It is my view that we can explain our metaphysics in this way, though I am more realist than Nietzsche, because I think the world has created these capacities within us, so they fit the world. To control, you must know. |
| 20218 | The self is known as much by its knowledge as by its action [Zagzebski] |
| Full Idea: It seems to me that the concept of the self is constituted as much by what we know as by what we do. | |
| From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], III 1) | |
| A reaction: People take pride in what they know, which indicates that it is of central importance to a person's nature. Hard to evaluate ideas such as this. |
| 24144 | A cognitive mechanism wanting to know itself is absurd! [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: A cognitive mechanism that wants to know itself!! We definitely should have moved beyond this absurd goal! (The stomach that consumes itself! -) | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 26[018]) | |
| A reaction: We see his point, but Nietzsche learns a huge amount about himself by introspection. To know the Self is a cat chasing its tail. I don't have to leave England to study England. |
| 24139 | A 'person' is just one possible abstraction from a bundle of qualities [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Individuals contain many more persons than they think. 'Person' is merely a point of emphasis, synopsis of characteristics and qualities | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[363]) | |
| A reaction: He makes similar remarks abour character. For Locke 'person'' is a forensic and legal concept, and so must be enduring and unique. |
| 24133 | I have perfected fatalism, as recurrence and denial of the will [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: I have perfected fatalism, through eternal recurrence and preexistence, and through the elimination of the concept 'will'. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[214]) | |
| A reaction: 'Amor fati' - love of fate - was his oft repeated slogan. We can all understand 'go with the flow', but I'm not sure about anything more universal than that. |
| 24152 | Fate is inspiring, if you understand you are part of it [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Fate is an inspiring thought for those who understand that they are part of it. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 26[442]) | |
| A reaction: Sounds a bit like the Niagara Falls being inspiring if you are being swept over it. I find the possibility of fatalism neutral, rather than inspiring. |
| 20205 | The feeling accompanying curiosity is neither pleasant nor painful [Zagzebski] |
| Full Idea: Most feelings are experienced as pleasant or painful, but it is not evident that they all are; curiosity may be one that is not. [note: 'curiosity' may not be the name of a feeling, but a feeling typically accompanies it] | |
| From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], II 3.1) | |
| A reaction: If a machine generates a sliding scale from pain to pleasure, is there a neutral feeling at the midpoint, or does all feeling briefly vanish there? Not sure. |
| 24129 | We start with images, then words, and then concepts, to which emotions attach [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Images first, the words applied to images. Finally concepts, not possible until there are words a summary of many images. When see similar images for which there is one word - this weak emotion is the common element, the foundation of the concept. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[168]) | |
| A reaction: Unusual to have an account of the origin of concepts in 1884. His theory entails that animals can't have concepts, but presumably they can combine images, and hence recognise things. I think he is wrong, but interestng. Mental files. |
| 20202 | Motives involve desires, but also how the desires connect to our aims [Zagzebski] |
| Full Idea: A motive does have an aspect of desire, but it includes something about why a state of affairs is desired, and that includes something about the way my emotions are tied to my aim. | |
| From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], II 2.6) | |
| A reaction: It is standard usage that a 'motive' involves some movement towards achieving the desire, and not merely having the desire. I'd quite like to stand on top of Everest, but have absolutely no motivation to try to achieve it. |
| 24127 | Judging actions by intentions - like judging painters by their thoughts! [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: To judge people by intentions! That would be like classifying artists, not according to their paintings, but according to their visions! | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[119]) | |
| A reaction: What is wrong is to judge an action by any simple single principle. Our nuanced attitude to excuses shows the true complexity of it. 'I didn't mean to do that'. |
| 20216 | Modern moral theory concerns settling conflicts, rather than human fulfilment [Zagzebski] |
| Full Idea: Modern ethics generally considers morality much less a system for fulfilling human nature than a set of principles for dealing with individuals in conflict. | |
| From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], II 7) | |
| A reaction: Historically I associate this move with Hugo Grotius around 1620. He was a great legalist, and eudaimonist virtue ethics gradually turned into jurisprudence. The Enlightenment sought rules for resolving dilemmas. Liberalism makes fulfilment private. |
| 24149 | Values need a perspective, of preserving some aspect of life [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: All value judgements involve a particular perspective: preservation of the individual, a community, a race, a state, a church, a belief, a culture. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 26[119]) | |
| A reaction: This chimes in with my Aristotelian view of value, as arising out of the thing valued, rather than descending on it from outside. I think more than mere 'preservaation' is at stake. Fostering, cherishing. |
| 24148 | If you love something, it is connected with everything, so all must be affirmed as good [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: To appreciate and love anything, I must understand it as absolutely necessarily connected with everything that is - therefore I must affirm the goodness of all existence for its own sake. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 26[117]) | |
| A reaction: For those of you out there imagining that Nietzsche was a nihilist…… It's a plausible idea. You could hardly love your dog, but hate the whole universe. A true misanthrope would struggle to love one exceptional person. |
| 24135 | Egoism should not assume that all egos are equal [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Egoism! But no one has ever asked: what kind of ego! Instead, every person automatically assumes that the ego of every ego is equal. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[287]) | |
| A reaction: This is his first step in his defence of some form of egoism. Presumably 'higher' people should be egoists, and the rest should join the herd. |
| 20193 | Moral luck means our praise and blame may exceed our control or awareness [Zagzebski] |
| Full Idea: Because of moral luck, the realm of the morally praiseworthy / blameworthy is not indisputably within one's voluntary control or accessible to one's consciousness. | |
| From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], I 4.2) | |
| A reaction: [She particularly cites Thomas Nagel for this] It is a fact that we will be blamed (more strongly) when we have moral bad luck, but the question is whether we should be. It seems harsh, but you can't punish someone as if they had had bad luck. |
| 20199 | Nowadays we doubt the Greek view that the flourishing of individuals and communities are linked [Zagzebski] |
| Full Idea: Modern moral philosophers have been considerably more skeptical than were the ancient Greeks about the close association between the flourishing of the individual and that of the community. | |
| From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], II 2.2) | |
| A reaction: I presume this is not just a change in fashion, but a reflection of how different the two societies are. In a close community with almost no privacy, flourishing individuals are good citizens. In the isolations of modern liberalism they may be irrelevant. |
| 20196 | Virtue theory is hopeless if there is no core of agreed universal virtues [Zagzebski] |
| Full Idea: An analysis of virtue is hopeless unless we can assume that most of a selected list of traits count as virtues, in a way not strictly culture. ...These would include wisdom, courage, benevolence, justice, honesty, loyalty, integrity, and generosity. | |
| From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], II 2.1) | |
| A reaction: This requirement needs there to be a single core to human nature, right across the species. If we are infinitely flexible (as existentialists imply) then the virtues will have matching flexibility, and so will be parochial and excessively relative. |
| 20200 | A virtue must always have a corresponding vice [Zagzebski] |
| Full Idea: It is important for the nature of virtue that it have a corresponding vice (or two, in the doctrine of the mean). Claustrophobia is not a vice not only because it is involuntary, but also because there is no corresponding virtue. | |
| From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], II 2.3) | |
| A reaction: Presumably attaining a virtue is an achievement, so we would expect a label for failure in the same field of endeavour. The failure is not purely negative, because bad things ensue if the virtue is not present. |
| 20201 | Eight marks distingush skills from virtues [Zagzebski, by PG] |
| Full Idea: The difference between skills and virtues is that virtues must be enacted, are always desirable, can't be forgotten, and can be simulated, whereas skills are very specific, involve a technique, lack contraries, and lack intrinsic value. | |
| From: report of Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], II 2.4) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
| A reaction: [my summary of her II 2.4 discussion of the differences] She observes that Aristotle made insufficient effort to distinguish the two. It may be obscure to say that virtues go 'deeper' than skills, but we all know what is meant. 'Skills serve virtues'. |
| 20203 | Virtues are deep acquired excellences of persons, which successfully attain desire ends [Zagzebski] |
| Full Idea: A virtue can be defined as 'a deep and enduring acquired excellence of a person, involving a characteristic motivation to produce a certain desired end and reliable success in bringing about that end'. | |
| From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], II 2.7) | |
| A reaction: She puts this in bold, and it is the culminating definition of a long discussion. It rather obviously fails to say anything about the nature of the end that is desired. Learning the telephone book off by heart seems to fit the definition. |
| 20207 | Every moral virtue requires a degree of intelligence [Zagzebski] |
| Full Idea: Being reasonably intelligent within a certain area of life is part of having almost any moral virtue. | |
| From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], II 3.1) | |
| A reaction: The fact that this bars persons of very limited intelligence from acquiring the Aristotelian virtues is one of the attractions of the Christian enjoinder to merely achieve 'love'. Anyone can have a warm heart. So is virtue elitist? |
| 20214 | Virtue theory can have lots of rules, as long as they are grounded in virtues and in facts [Zagzebski] |
| Full Idea: A pure virtue theory can have as many rules as you like as long as they are understood as grounded in the virtuous motivations and understanding of the nonmoral facts that virtuous agents possess. | |
| From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], II 6.1) | |
| A reaction: It is important, I think, to see that a virtue theorist does not have to be a particularist. |
| 24132 | After Socrates virtue is misunderstood, as good for all, not for individuals [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: From Socrates onwards arete [virtue] is misunderstood - first it had to reestablish itself over and over, and yet it did not want to do this on an individual basis! But rather tyrannically 'good for all!'. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[208]) | |
| A reaction: Why not both? The virtues of a good citizen can't be private, but we are all allowed to develop virtues that concern us alone. |
| 24126 | We contain multitudes of characters, which can brought into the open [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: There is a multitude of characters hidden within each one of us: and attempts should be made to allow some of them to appear. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[021]) | |
| A reaction: So character is not fate, contrary to Heraclitus (his hero). We are more inclined now to see varied characters as social roles (as in Irving Goffman). This idea challenges it, with our intrinsic nature containing variety. |
| 20213 | We need phronesis to coordinate our virtues [Zagzebski] |
| Full Idea: We need phronesis (practical wisdom) to coordinate the various virtues into a single line of action or line of thought leading up to an act or to a belief. | |
| From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], II 5.2) | |
| A reaction: If I have a conflicting virtue and vice in a single situation, something must make sure that the virtue dominates. That sounds more like Kant's 'good will' than like phronesis. |
| 20209 | For the virtue of honesty you must be careful with the truth, and not just speak truly [Zagzebski] |
| Full Idea: It is not sufficient for honesty that a person tells whatever she happens to believe is the truth. An honest person is careful with the truth. | |
| From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], II 3.2) | |
| A reaction: Not sure about that. It matches what Aristotle says about courage, which also needs practical reason [phronesis]. But being sensitive and careful with truth seems to need other virtues. If total honesty is not a virtue, then is honesty a virtue at all? |
| 20197 | The courage of an evil person is still a quality worth having [Zagzebski] |
| Full Idea: In the case of a courageous Nazi soldier, my position is that a virtue is worth having even in those cases in which it makes a person worse overall. | |
| From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], II 2.2) | |
| A reaction: A brave claim, which seems right. If a nasty Nazi reforms, they will at least have one good quality which can be put to constructive use. |
| 24136 | Who can endure the thought of eternal recurrence? [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: I conduct the great test: who will endure the thought of eternal recurrence? | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[290]) | |
| A reaction: He sometimes talks as if eternal recurrence were a cosmic fact, but we should definitely ignore that. This idea captures his idea best, I think - that we should try to live with the prospect of recurrence always in mind. A type of existentialism. |
| 24154 | If you want one experience repeated, you must want all of them [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Whoever wants to have a single experience again must want all of them again. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 29[054]) | |
| A reaction: Nehemas says this is the main factual commitment of eternal recurrence (and certainly not that global recurrence actually occurs). It might be expressed in terms of possible worlds. We yearn for recurrence, then dread it? |
| 24153 | Humans are determined by community, so its preservation is their most valued drive [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: If a community is what absolutely determines the nature of humans, then the drive that allows the community to be preserved will be most forcefully developed in them. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 27[030]) | |
| A reaction: Nietzsche was a loner, who despised 'the herd' and its dull 'good and evil', but humans are obviously social creatures, who need to raise families, so it seems perverse to despise the values this requires. Note the Marxist view of human nature. |
| 24134 | There is always slavery, whether we like it or not [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: In truth there is always slavery - whether you want it or not; e.g. Prussian officials. Scholars. Monks. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[225]) | |
| A reaction: Not very persuasive examples. Monks are free to join and to leave. Maybe a lot of marriages are close to slavery for one side (usually the woman). Strict slavery has almost ceased in western civilisation (I think!). Nietzsche saw 'the herd' as slaves. |
| 24128 | After history following God, or a people, or an idea, we now see it in terms of animals [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Earlier we sought God's intentions in history: then an unconscious purposefulness, in a people or an idea. Only recently are we considering the history of animals, and the first insight is that no plan has so far existed. Coincidences have been dominant. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[127]) | |
| A reaction: Not a Whig historian then! Presumably Hegel is his main target. In 2024 there is a definite feeling that western democracies are regressing. |
| 24140 | Cause and effect is a hypothesis, based on our supposed willing of actions [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Cause and effect is not a truth but rather a hypothesis - and indeed the one which we use to anthropomorphise the world for ourselves, bringing it in closer proximity to our feelings ('willing' is projected into it). | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[371]) | |
| A reaction: That is (I think), we read the gap between thought and action onto natural external events, dividing them up. We treat the flow of events as if they were agent causation. Modern theories seem close to Nietzsche's unified view. |
| 24141 | Having a sense of time presupposes absolute time [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Our derivation of the sense of time etc. still presupposes time as absolute. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[406]) | |
| A reaction: 'Etc.'? I suppose this is meant to pre-empt whatever Bergson might have been planning to say. The idea that time actually is subjective strikes as very wrong. Whether physicists can reduce time to something else is above my pay scale. |