22 ideas
10571 | Concern for rigour can get in the way of understanding phenomena [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: It is often the case that the concern for rigor gets in the way of a true understanding of the phenomena to be explained. | |
From: Kit Fine (Replies on 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], 2) | |
A reaction: This is a counter to Timothy Williamson's love affair with rigour in philosophy. It strikes me as the big current question for analytical philosophy - of whether the intense pursuit of 'rigour' will actually deliver the wisdom we all seek. |
19053 | Logic would be more natural if negation only referred to predicates [Dummett] |
Full Idea: A better proposal for a formal logic closer to natural language would be one that had a negation-operator only for (simple) predicates. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Presupposition [1960], p.27) | |
A reaction: Dummett observes that classical formal logic was never intended to be close to natural language. Term logic does have that aim, but the meta-question is whether that end is desirable, and why. |
17884 | Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner] |
Full Idea: There are many coherent stopping points in the hierarchy of increasingly strong mathematical systems, starting with strict finitism, and moving up through predicativism to the higher reaches of set theory. | |
From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], Intro) |
17893 | 'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner] |
Full Idea: Roughly speaking, 'reflection principles' assert that anything true in V [the set hierarchy] falls short of characterising V in that it is true within some earlier level. | |
From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], 2.1) |
10565 | There is no stage at which we can take all the sets to have been generated [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: There is no stage at which we can take all the sets to have been generated, since the set of all those sets which have been generated at a given stage will itself give us something new. | |
From: Kit Fine (Replies on 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], 1) |
10564 | We might combine the axioms of set theory with the axioms of mereology [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: We might combine the standard axioms of set theory with the standard axioms of mereology. | |
From: Kit Fine (Replies on 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], 1) |
19052 | Natural language 'not' doesn't apply to sentences [Dummett] |
Full Idea: Natural language does not possess a sentential negation-operator. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Presupposition [1960], p.27) | |
A reaction: This is a criticism of Strawson, who criticises logic for not following natural language, but does it himself with negation. In the question of how language and logic connect, this idea seems important. Term Logic aims to get closer to natural language. |
10569 | If you ask what F the second-order quantifier quantifies over, you treat it as first-order [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: We are tempted to ask of second-order quantifiers 'what are you quantifying over?', or 'when you say "for some F" then what is the F?', but these questions already presuppose that the quantifiers are first-order. | |
From: Kit Fine (Replies on 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005]) |
10570 | Assigning an entity to each predicate in semantics is largely a technical convenience [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: In doing semantics we normally assign some appropriate entity to each predicate, but this is largely for technical convenience. | |
From: Kit Fine (Replies on 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], 2) |
17894 | We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner] |
Full Idea: There is at present no solid argument to the effect that a given statement is absolutely undecidable. | |
From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], 5.3) |
10573 | Dedekind cuts lead to the bizarre idea that there are many different number 1's [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Because of Dedekind's definition of reals by cuts, there is a bizarre modern doctrine that there are many 1's - the natural number 1, the rational number 1, the real number 1, and even the complex number 1. | |
From: Kit Fine (Replies on 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], 2) | |
A reaction: See Idea 10572. |
10575 | Why should a Dedekind cut correspond to a number? [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: By what right can Dedekind suppose that there is a number corresponding to any pair of irrationals that constitute an irrational cut? | |
From: Kit Fine (Replies on 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], 2) |
10574 | Unless we know whether 0 is identical with the null set, we create confusions [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: What is the union of the singleton {0}, of zero, and the singleton {φ}, of the null set? Is it the one-element set {0}, or the two-element set {0, φ}? Unless the question of identity between 0 and φ is resolved, we cannot say. | |
From: Kit Fine (Replies on 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], 2) |
17890 | There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner] |
Full Idea: Some of the standard large cardinals (in order of increasing (logical) strength) are: inaccessible, Mahlo, weakly compact, indescribable, Erdös, measurable, strong, Wodin, supercompact, huge etc. (...and ineffable). | |
From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], 1.4) | |
A reaction: [I don't understand how cardinals can have 'logical strength', but I pass it on anyway] |
17887 | PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner] |
Full Idea: To the extent that we are justified in accepting Peano Arithmetic we are justified in accepting its consistency, and so we know how to expand the axiom system so as to overcome the limitation [of Gödel's Second Theorem]. | |
From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], 1.1) | |
A reaction: Each expansion brings a limitation, but then you can expand again. |
17891 | Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner] |
Full Idea: The arithmetical instances of undecidability that arise at one stage of the hierarchy are settled at the next. | |
From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], 1.4) |
10560 | Set-theoretic imperialists think sets can represent every mathematical object [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Set-theoretic imperialists think that it must be possible to represent every mathematical object as a set. | |
From: Kit Fine (Replies on 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], 1) |
10568 | Logicists say mathematics can be derived from definitions, and can be known that way [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Logicists traditionally claim that the theorems of mathematics can be derived by logical means from the relevant definitions of the terms, and that these theorems are epistemically innocent (knowable without Kantian intuition or empirical confirmation). | |
From: Kit Fine (Replies on 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], 2) |
10563 | A generative conception of abstracts proposes stages, based on concepts of previous objects [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: It is natural to have a generative conception of abstracts (like the iterative conception of sets). The abstracts are formed at stages, with the abstracts formed at any given stage being the abstracts of those concepts of objects formed at prior stages. | |
From: Kit Fine (Replies on 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], 1) | |
A reaction: See 10567 for Fine's later modification. This may not guarantee 'levels', but it implies some sort of conceptual priority between abstract entities. |
10561 | Abstraction-theoretic imperialists think Fregean abstracts can represent every mathematical object [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Abstraction-theoretic imperialists think that it must be possible to represent every mathematical object as a Fregean abstract. | |
From: Kit Fine (Replies on 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], 1) |
10562 | We can combine ZF sets with abstracts as urelements [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: I propose a unified theory which is a version of ZF or ZFC with urelements, where the urelements are taken to be the abstracts. | |
From: Kit Fine (Replies on 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], 1) |
10567 | We can create objects from conditions, rather than from concepts [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Instead of viewing the abstracts (or sums) as being generated from objects, via the concepts from which they are defined, we can take them to be generated from conditions. The number of the universe ∞ is the number of self-identical objects. | |
From: Kit Fine (Replies on 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], 1) | |
A reaction: The point is that no particular object is now required to make the abstraction. |