21 ideas
15557 | Verisimilitude has proved hard to analyse, and seems to have several components [Lewis] |
Full Idea: The analysis of verisimilitude has been much debated. Some plausible analyses have failed disastrously, others conflict with one another. One conclusion is that verisimilitude seems to consist of several distinguishable virtues. | |
From: David Lewis (Causal Explanation [1986], V n7) | |
A reaction: Presumably if it is complex, you can approach truth in one respect while receding from it in another. It seems clear enough if you are calculating pi by some iterative process. |
17884 | Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner] |
Full Idea: There are many coherent stopping points in the hierarchy of increasingly strong mathematical systems, starting with strict finitism, and moving up through predicativism to the higher reaches of set theory. | |
From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], Intro) |
17893 | 'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner] |
Full Idea: Roughly speaking, 'reflection principles' assert that anything true in V [the set hierarchy] falls short of characterising V in that it is true within some earlier level. | |
From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], 2.1) |
17894 | We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner] |
Full Idea: There is at present no solid argument to the effect that a given statement is absolutely undecidable. | |
From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], 5.3) |
17890 | There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner] |
Full Idea: Some of the standard large cardinals (in order of increasing (logical) strength) are: inaccessible, Mahlo, weakly compact, indescribable, Erdös, measurable, strong, Wodin, supercompact, huge etc. (...and ineffable). | |
From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], 1.4) | |
A reaction: [I don't understand how cardinals can have 'logical strength', but I pass it on anyway] |
17887 | PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner] |
Full Idea: To the extent that we are justified in accepting Peano Arithmetic we are justified in accepting its consistency, and so we know how to expand the axiom system so as to overcome the limitation [of Gödel's Second Theorem]. | |
From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], 1.1) | |
A reaction: Each expansion brings a limitation, but then you can expand again. |
17891 | Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner] |
Full Idea: The arithmetical instances of undecidability that arise at one stage of the hierarchy are settled at the next. | |
From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], 1.4) |
15554 | A disposition needs a causal basis, a property in a certain causal role. Could the disposition be the property? [Lewis] |
Full Idea: I take for granted that a disposition requires a causal basis: one has the disposition iff one has a property that occupies a certain causal role. Shall we then identify the disposition with its basis? That makes the disposition cause its manifestations. | |
From: David Lewis (Causal Explanation [1986], III) | |
A reaction: Introduce the concept of a 'power' and I see no problem with his proposal. Fundamental dispositions are powerful, and provide the causal basis for complex dispositions. Something had better be powerful. |
15560 | We can explain a chance event, but can never show why some other outcome did not occur [Lewis] |
Full Idea: I think we are right to explain chance events, yet we are right also to deny that we can ever explain why a chance process yields one outcome rather than another. We cannot explain why one event happened rather than the other. | |
From: David Lewis (Causal Explanation [1986], VI) | |
A reaction: This misses out an investigation which slowly reveals that a 'chance' event wasn't so chancey after all. Failure to explain confirms chance, so the judgement of chance shouldn't block attempts to explain. |
22449 | When we say 'is red' we don't mean 'seems red to most people' [Foot] |
Full Idea: One might think that 'is red' means the same as 'seems red to most people', forgetting that when asked if an object is red we look at it to see if it is red, and not in order to estimate the reaction that others will have to it. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Moral Relativism [1979], p.23) | |
A reaction: True, but we are conscious of our own reliability as observers (e.g. if colourblind, or with poor hearing or eyesight). I don't take my glasses off, have a look, and pronounce that the object is blurred. Ordinary language philosophy in action. |
15559 | Does a good explanation produce understanding? That claim is just empty [Lewis] |
Full Idea: It is said that a good explanation ought to produce understanding, ...but this just says that a good explanation produces possession of that which it provide, so this desideratum is empty. It adds nothing to our understanding of explanation. | |
From: David Lewis (Causal Explanation [1986], V) | |
A reaction: I am not convinced by this dismissal. If you are looking for a test of whether an explanation is good, the announcement that the participants feel they have achieved a good understanding sounds like success. |
15556 | Science may well pursue generalised explanation, rather than laws [Lewis] |
Full Idea: The pursuit of general explanations may be very much more widespread in science than the pursuit of general laws. | |
From: David Lewis (Causal Explanation [1986], IV) | |
A reaction: Nice. I increasingly think that the main target of all enquiry is ever-widening generality, with no need to aspire to universality. |
15558 | A good explanation is supposed to show that the event had to happen [Lewis] |
Full Idea: It is said that a good explanation ought to show that the explanandum event had to happen, given the laws and circumstances. | |
From: David Lewis (Causal Explanation [1986], V) | |
A reaction: I cautiously go along with this view. Given that there are necessities in nature (a long story), we should aim to reveal them. There is no higher aspiration open to us than successful explanation. Lewis says good explanations can reveal falsehoods. |
4809 | Lewis endorses the thesis that all explanation of singular events is causal explanation [Lewis, by Psillos] |
Full Idea: Lewis endorses the thesis that all explanation of singular events is causal explanation. | |
From: report of David Lewis (Causal Explanation [1986]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation p.237 | |
A reaction: It is hard to challenge this. The assumption is that only nomological and causal explanations are possible, and the former are unobtainable for singular events. |
14321 | To explain an event is to provide some information about its causal history [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Here is my main thesis: to explain an event is to provide some information about its causal history. | |
From: David Lewis (Causal Explanation [1986], II) | |
A reaction: The obvious thought is that you might provide some tiny and barely relevant part of that causal history, such as a bird perched on the Titanic's iceberg. So how do we distinguish the 'important' causal information? |
22451 | All people need affection, cooperation, community and help in trouble [Foot] |
Full Idea: There is a great deal that all men have in common; all need affection, the cooperation of others, a place in a community, and help in trouble. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Moral Relativism [1979], p.33) | |
A reaction: There seem to be some people who don't need affection or a place in a community, though it is hard to imagine them being happy. These kind of facts are the basis for any sensible cognitivist view of ethics. They are basic to Foot's view. |
22452 | Do we have a concept of value, other than wanting something, or making an effort to get it? [Foot] |
Full Idea: Do we know what we mean by saying that anything has value, or even that we value it, as opposed to wanting it or being prepared to go to trouble to get it? | |
From: Philippa Foot (Moral Relativism [1979], p.35) | |
A reaction: Well, I value Rembrandt paintings, but have no aspiration to own one (and would refuse it if offered, because I couldn't look after it properly). And 'we' don't want to move the Taj Mahal to London. She has not expressed this good point very well. |
15555 | Explaining match lighting in general is like explaining one lighting of a match [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Explaining why struck matches light in general is not so very different from explaining why some particular struck match lit. ...We may generalize modestly, without laying claim to universality. | |
From: David Lewis (Causal Explanation [1986], IV) | |
A reaction: A suggestive remark, since particular causation and general causation seem far apart, but Lewis suggests that the needs of explanation bring them together. Lawlike and unlawlike explanations? |
15551 | Ways of carving causes may be natural, but never 'right' [Lewis] |
Full Idea: There is no one right way - though there may be more or less natural ways - of carving up a causal history. | |
From: David Lewis (Causal Explanation [1986], I) | |
A reaction: This invites a distinction between the 'natural' causes and the 'real' causes. Presumably if any causes were 'real', they would have a better claim to be 'right'. Is an earthquake the 'real' (correct?) cause of a tsunami? |
15552 | We only pick 'the' cause for the purposes of some particular enquiry. [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Disagreement about 'the' cause is only disagreement about which part of the causal history is most salient for the purposes of some particular inquiry. | |
From: David Lewis (Causal Explanation [1986], I) | |
A reaction: I don't believe this. In the majority of cases I see the cause of an event, without having any interest in any particular enquiry. It is just so obvious that there isn't even a disagreement. Maybe there is only one sensible enquiry. |
15553 | Causal dependence is counterfactual dependence between events [Lewis] |
Full Idea: I take causal dependence to be counterfactual dependence, of a suitably back-tracking sort, between distinct events. | |
From: David Lewis (Causal Explanation [1986], I) | |
A reaction: He quotes Hume in support. 'Counterfactual dependence' strikes me as too vague, or merely descriptive, for the job of explanation. 'If...then' is a logical relationship; what is it in nature that justifies the dependency? |