22 ideas
3972 | Truth and objectivity depend on a community of speakers to interpret what they mean [Davidson] |
Full Idea: The basis on which the concepts of truth and objectivity depend for application is a community of understanding, agreement among speakers on how each is to be understood. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.233) | |
A reaction: Obviously all understanding is, in practice, an interpretation by a community, but that isn't what 'truth' means. We mean 'true independently of any community'. |
3969 | There are no ultimate standards of rationality, since we only assess others by our own standard [Davidson] |
Full Idea: It makes no sense to speak of comparing or agreeing on ultimate standards of rationality, since it is our own standards in each case to which we must turn in interpreting others. This is not a failure of objectivity, but where 'questions come to an end'. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.232) | |
A reaction: This seems wrong, given the commitment to truth and charity in interpretation. He could have said the same about perception, but I doubt if he would. |
17884 | Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner] |
Full Idea: There are many coherent stopping points in the hierarchy of increasingly strong mathematical systems, starting with strict finitism, and moving up through predicativism to the higher reaches of set theory. | |
From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], Intro) |
17893 | 'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner] |
Full Idea: Roughly speaking, 'reflection principles' assert that anything true in V [the set hierarchy] falls short of characterising V in that it is true within some earlier level. | |
From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], 2.1) |
17894 | We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner] |
Full Idea: There is at present no solid argument to the effect that a given statement is absolutely undecidable. | |
From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], 5.3) |
17890 | There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner] |
Full Idea: Some of the standard large cardinals (in order of increasing (logical) strength) are: inaccessible, Mahlo, weakly compact, indescribable, Erdös, measurable, strong, Wodin, supercompact, huge etc. (...and ineffable). | |
From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], 1.4) | |
A reaction: [I don't understand how cardinals can have 'logical strength', but I pass it on anyway] |
17887 | PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner] |
Full Idea: To the extent that we are justified in accepting Peano Arithmetic we are justified in accepting its consistency, and so we know how to expand the axiom system so as to overcome the limitation [of Gödel's Second Theorem]. | |
From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], 1.1) | |
A reaction: Each expansion brings a limitation, but then you can expand again. |
17891 | Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner] |
Full Idea: The arithmetical instances of undecidability that arise at one stage of the hierarchy are settled at the next. | |
From: Peter Koellner (On the Question of Absolute Undecidability [2006], 1.4) |
3960 | There are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties [Davidson] |
Full Idea: There are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.231) | |
A reaction: I think this is right. It fits with Searle's notion of consciousness as a property, like the liquidity of water. I don't panic if I think "I have no mind, but I have extraordinary properties". |
3964 | If the mind is an anomaly, this makes reduction of the mental to the physical impossible [Davidson] |
Full Idea: If there are no strict psychophysical laws, this rules out reductionism, either by definition of mental predicates in physical terms, or by way of bridging laws. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.231) | |
A reaction: But it is by no means clear that there are no psycho-physical laws. How could this be known a priori? |
3961 | Obviously all mental events are causally related to physical events [Davidson] |
Full Idea: All mental events are causally related to physical events. ..This seems obvious. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.231) | |
A reaction: All mental events are physically caused. Some bodily physical events result from mental events. Probably all mental events have some effect of other mental events (all of which are in some sense physical). |
3963 | There are no strict psychophysical laws connecting mental and physical events [Davidson] |
Full Idea: There are no strict psychophysical laws (that is, laws connecting mental events under their mental descriptions with physical events under their physical descriptions). | |
From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.231) | |
A reaction: This is clearly open to question. It may be just that no human mind could ever grasp such laws, given their probable complexity. |
3965 | Mental entities do not add to the physical furniture of the world [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Mental entities do not add to the physical furniture of the world. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.231) | |
A reaction: This seems to me clearly true, however we propose to characterise mental events. |
3966 | The correct conclusion is ontological monism combined with conceptual dualism [Davidson] |
Full Idea: My basic premises lead to the conclusion of ontological monism coupled with conceptual dualism (like Spinoza, except that he denied mental causation). | |
From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.231) | |
A reaction: 'Conceptual dualism' implies no real difference, but 'property dualism' is better, suggesting different properties when viewed from different angles. |
3967 | Absence of all rationality would be absence of thought [Davidson] |
Full Idea: To imagine a totally irrational animal is to imagine an animal without thought. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.232) | |
A reaction: This wouldn't be so clear without the theory of evolution, which suggests that only the finders of truth last long enough to breed. |
3974 | Our meanings are partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant [Davidson] |
Full Idea: What we mean by what we say is partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.235) | |
A reaction: There is 'strict and literal meaning', which is fixed by the words, even if I don't know what I am saying. But 'speaker's meaning' is surely a pure matter of a state of mind? |
3968 | Propositions explain nothing without an explanation of how sentences manage to name them [Davidson] |
Full Idea: The idea of a proposition is unhelpful, until it is explained how exactly the words in the contained sentence manage to name or describe a proposition (which even Frege failed to achieve). | |
From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.232) | |
A reaction: It seems obvious to me that there are brain events best labelled as propositions, even if their fit with language is puzzling. |
3970 | Thought is only fully developed if we communicate with others [Davidson] |
Full Idea: We would have no fully-fledge thoughts if we were not in communication with others. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.233) | |
A reaction: This seems a plausible empirical observation, though I would doubt any a priori proof of it. If animals could speak, they would become intellectuals? |
18285 | All translation loses some content (but language does not create reality) [Carnap] |
Full Idea: I do not believe in translatability without loss of content, and therefore I think that the content of a world description is influenced to a certain degree by choice of a language form. But that does not mean that reality is created through language. | |
From: Rudolph Carnap (Letters to Schlick [1935], 1935.12.04), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 19 'Truth' | |
A reaction: It is a mistake to think Quine was the first to spot the interest of translation in philosophy of language. 'Does translation always lose content?' is a very nice question for focusing the problem. |
3971 | There is simply no alternative to the 'principle of charity' in interpreting what others do [Davidson] |
Full Idea: The 'principle of charity' is a misleading term, since there is no alternative if we want to make sense of the attitudes and actions of the agents around us. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.233) | |
A reaction: I suppose so, but only with a background of evolutionary theory. I would necessarily assume charity if a robot spoke to me. |
3973 | Without a teacher, the concept of 'getting things right or wrong' is meaningless [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Without a 'teacher', nothing would give content to the idea that there is a difference between getting things right and getting them wrong. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.234) | |
A reaction: Seems right. A group of speculators with no one in the role of 'teacher' would seem to be paralysed with uncertain (except where judgements are very obvious). |
3962 | Cause and effect relations between events must follow strict laws [Davidson] |
Full Idea: If two events are related as cause and effect, there is a strict law under which they may be subsumed. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.231) | |
A reaction: Davidson admits that this is open to challenge (though Hume and Kant supported it). It does seem to be central to our understanding of nature. |