Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Particulars in Particular Clothing', 'The Central Questions of Philosophy' and 'Why Medieval Philosophy Matters'

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22 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Science rests on scholastic metaphysics, not on Hume, Kant or Carnap [Boulter]
     Full Idea: The metaphysical principles that allow the scientist to learn from experience are scholastic, not Humean or Kantian or those of twentieth-century positivism.
     From: Stephen Boulter (Why Medieval Philosophy Matters [2019], 2)
     A reaction: Love this. Most modern philosophers of science would be deeply outraged by this, but I reckon that careful and open-minded interviews with scientists would prove it to be correct. We want to know the essential nature of electrons.
2. Reason / E. Argument / 3. Analogy
You can't infer that because you have a hidden birth-mark, everybody else does [Ayer]
     Full Idea: My knowing that I had a hidden birth-mark would not entitle me to infer with any great degree of confidence that the same was true of everybody else.
     From: A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], §VI.E)
     A reaction: This is the notorious 'induction from a single case' which was used by Mill to prove that other minds exist. It is a very nice illustration of the weakness of arguments from analogy. Probably analogy on its own is useless, but is a key part of induction.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
It is currently held that quantifying over something implies belief in its existence [Ayer]
     Full Idea: It is currently held that we are committed to a belief in the existence of anything over which we quantify.
     From: A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], IX.C)
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
Internal relations combine some tropes into a nucleus, which bears the non-essential tropes [Simons, by Edwards]
     Full Idea: Simons's 'nuclear' option blends features of the substratum and bundle theories. First we have tropes collected by virtue of their internal relations, forming the essential kernel or nucleus. This nucleus then bears the non-essential tropes.
     From: report of Peter Simons (Particulars in Particular Clothing [1994], p.567) by Douglas Edwards - Properties 3.5
     A reaction: [compression of Edwards's summary] This strikes me as being a remarkably good theory. I am not sure of the ontological status of properties, such that they can (unaided) combine to make part of an object. What binds the non-essentials?
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
Thoughts are general, but the world isn't, so how can we think accurately? [Boulter]
     Full Idea: Our thoughts are full of generalities, but the world contains no generalities. So how can our thoughts accurately represent the world? This is the problem of universals.
     From: Stephen Boulter (Why Medieval Philosophy Matters [2019], 1)
     A reaction: I so love it when someone comes up with a really clear explanation of a problem, and this is a beauty from Stephen Boulter. Only a really clear explanation can motivate philosophical issues for non-philosophers.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual [Ayer]
     Full Idea: We can significantly ask what properties it is necessary for something to possess in order to be a thing of such and such a kind, since that asks what properties enter into the definition of the kind. But there is no such definition of the individual.
     From: A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], 9.A.5)
     A reaction: [Quoted, not surprisingly, by Wiggins] Illuminating. If essence is just about necessary properties, I begin to see why the sortal might be favoured. I take it to concern explanatory mechanisms, and hence the individual.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Logical possibility needs the concepts of the proposition to be adequate [Boulter]
     Full Idea: One can only be sure that a proposition expresses a genuine logical possibility if one can be sure that one's concepts are adequate to things referred to in the proposition.
     From: Stephen Boulter (Why Medieval Philosophy Matters [2019], 4)
     A reaction: Boulter says this is a logical constraint place on logical possibility by the scholastics which tends to be neglected by modern thinkers, who only worry about whether the proposition implies a contradiction. So we now use thought experiments.
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
Experiments don't just observe; they look to see what interventions change the natural order [Boulter]
     Full Idea: Experiments differ from observational studies in that experiments usually involve intervening in some way in the natural order to see if altering something about that order causes a change in the response of that order.
     From: Stephen Boulter (Why Medieval Philosophy Matters [2019], 2)
     A reaction: Not convinced by this. Lots of experiments isolate a natural process, rather than 'intervening'. Chemists constantly purify substances. Particle accelerators pick out things to accelerate. Does 'intervening' in nature even make sense?
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Science begins with sufficient reason, de-animation, and the importance of nature [Boulter]
     Full Idea: Three assumptions needed for the emergence of science are central to medieval thought: that the natural order is subject to the principle of sufficient reason, that nature is de-animated, and that it is worthy of study.
     From: Stephen Boulter (Why Medieval Philosophy Matters [2019], 2)
     A reaction: A very illuminating and convincing observation. Why did Europe produce major science? The answer is likely to be found in Christianity.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
The theory of other minds has no rival [Ayer]
     Full Idea: The theory that other people besides oneself have mental states is one that has no serious rival.
     From: A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], §VI.E)
     A reaction: See 3463, where Searle says there is no such thing as our "theory" about other minds. In a science fiction situation (see 'Blade Runner'), this unrivalled theory could quickly unravel. It could even be a fact that you are the only humanoid with a mind.
Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds [Ayer]
     Full Idea: In 1936 I combined a mentalistic analysis of the propositions in which one attributes experiences to oneself with a behaviouristic analysis of the propositions in which one attributes experiences to others.
     From: A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], §VI.D)
     A reaction: He then criticises his view for inconsistency. Ryle preferred a behaviouristic account of introspection, but Ayer calls this 'ridiculous'. Ayer hunts for a compromise, but then settles for the right answer, which makes mentalism the 'best explanation'.
Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events [Ayer]
     Full Idea: The acceptance of physicalism undercuts the other minds problem by equating experiences with events in the brain, which are publicly observable.
     From: A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], §VI.E)
     A reaction: It strikes me that if we could actually observe the operations of one another's brains, a great many of the problems of philosophy would never have appeared in the first place. Imagine a transparent skull and brain, with coloured waves moving through it.
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
Our concepts can never fully capture reality, but simplification does not falsify [Boulter]
     Full Idea: While the natural order is richer than our conceptual representations of it, nonetheless our concepts can be adequate to real singulars because simplification is not falsification.
     From: Stephen Boulter (Why Medieval Philosophy Matters [2019], 1)
     A reaction: I don't know if 'simplification' is one of the faculties I am trying to identify. I suspect it is a common factor among most of our intellectual faculties. I love 'simplification is not falsification'. Vagueness isn't falsification either.
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 5. Self as Associations
Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements [Ayer]
     Full Idea: The ground for thinking that qualia are only experiences because they relate to a unifying subject is that they have to be identified, by being brought under concepts, and giving rise to judgements which usually go beyond them.
     From: A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], §VI.B)
     A reaction: Thus one of Hume's greatest fans gives the clearest objection to Hume. It strikes me as a very powerful objection, better than anything Carruthers offers (1394,1395,1396). The conceptual element is very hard to disentangle from the qualia.
Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject? [Ayer]
     Full Idea: Is the character of being an item of experience one that can accrue to a quale through its relation to other qualia, or must it consist in a relation to a subject, which is conscious of these elements and distinct from them?
     From: A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], §VI.B)
     A reaction: When nicely put like this, it is hard to see how qualia could be experiences just because they relate to one another. It begs the question of what is causing the relationship. There seems to be a Cogito-like assumption of a thinker.
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
Bodily identity and memory work together to establish personal identity [Ayer]
     Full Idea: In general the two criteria of memory and bodily identity work together.
     From: A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], §VI.B)
     A reaction: This seems better than any simplistic one-criterion approach. In life we use different criteria for our own identity, as when dreaming, or waking with a hangover, or wondering if we are dead after an accident.
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
Self-consciousness is not basic, because experiences are not instrinsically marked with ownership [Ayer]
     Full Idea: Self-consciousness is not a primitive datum, or in other words the observer's experiences are not intrinsically marked as his own.
     From: A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], §VI.A)
     A reaction: This is a very Humean, ruthlessly empiricist view of the matter. Plenty of philosophers (existentialists, or Charles Taylor) would say that our experiences have our interests or values built into them. Why are they experiences, and not just events?
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity
Temporal gaps in the consciousness of a spirit could not be bridged by memories [Ayer]
     Full Idea: If there were temporal gaps in the consciousness of disembodied spirits, the occurrences of memory-experiences would not be sufficient to bridge them.
     From: A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], §VI.C)
     A reaction: Ayer is very sympathetic to the idea that the body is a key ingredient in personal identity. Without a body, there would be no criteria at all for the continuity of a spirit which lost consciousness for a while, since consciousness is all it is.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Why shouldn't we say brain depends on mind? Better explanation! [Ayer]
     Full Idea: If mind and brain exactly correspond we have as good ground for saying the brain depends on the mind as the other way round; if predominance is given to the brain, the reason is that it fits into a wider explanatory system.
     From: A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], §VI.D)
     A reaction: A small but significant point. If an 'identity' theory is to be developed, then this step in the argument has to be justified. It is tempting here to move to the eliminativist view, because we no longer have to worry about a 'direction of priority'.
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences [Ayer]
     Full Idea: Our talk of propositions should not be regarded as anything more than a concise way of talking about equivalent sentences.
     From: A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], IX.C)
     A reaction: Wrong, though I can see why he says it. We struggle to express difficult propositions by offering several similar (but not equivalent) sentences. What is the criterion for deciding his 'equivalence'?
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
Aristotelians accept the analytic-synthetic distinction [Boulter]
     Full Idea: Aristotle and the scholastics accept the analytic/synthetic distinction, but do not take it to be particularly significant.
     From: Stephen Boulter (Why Medieval Philosophy Matters [2019], 5)
     A reaction: I record this because I'm an Aristotelian, and need to know what I'm supposed to think. Luckily, I accept the distinction.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
The facts about human health are the measure of the values in our lives [Boulter]
     Full Idea: The objective facts relating to human health broadly construed are the facts that measure the moral value of our actions, policies and institutions.
     From: Stephen Boulter (Why Medieval Philosophy Matters [2019], 6)
     A reaction: This is the Aristotelian approach to facts and values, which I thoroughly endorse. To say there is nothing instrinsically wrong with being unhealthy is an absurd attitude.