Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Particulars in Particular Clothing', 'On the Basis of Morality' and 'At the Existentialist Caf'

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6 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 2. Phenomenology

21238	Later phenomenologists tried hard to incorporate social relationships [Bakewell]
	Full Idea: Ever since Husserl, phenomenologists and existentialists had been trying to stretch the definition of existence to incorporate our social lives and relationships.
	From: Sarah Bakewell (At the Existentialist Café [2016], 08)
	A reaction: I see a parallel move in Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument. Husserl's later work seems to have been along those lines. Putnam's Twin Earth too.

21237	Phenomenology begins from the immediate, rather than from axioms and theories [Bakewell]
	Full Idea: Traditional philosophy often started with abstract axioms or theories, but the German phenomenologists went straight for life as they experienced it, moment to moment.
	From: Sarah Bakewell (At the Existentialist Café [2016], 01)
	A reaction: Bakewell gives this as the gist of what Aron said to Sartre in 1933, providing the bridge from phenomenology to existentialism. The obvious thought is that everybody outside philosophy starts from immediate experience, so why is this philosophy?

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes

18431	Internal relations combine some tropes into a nucleus, which bears the non-essential tropes [Simons, by Edwards]
	Full Idea: Simons's 'nuclear' option blends features of the substratum and bundle theories. First we have tropes collected by virtue of their internal relations, forming the essential kernel or nucleus. This nucleus then bears the non-essential tropes.
	From: report of Peter Simons (Particulars in Particular Clothing [1994], p.567) by Douglas Edwards - Properties 3.5
	A reaction: [compression of Edwards's summary] This strikes me as being a remarkably good theory. I am not sure of the ontological status of properties, such that they can (unaided) combine to make part of an object. What binds the non-essentials?

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics

21375	Reason can be vicious, and great crimes have to be rational [Schopenhauer]
	Full Idea: Reasonable and vicious are quite consistent with each other, in fact, only through their union are great and far-reaching crimes possible.
	From: Arthur Schopenhauer (On the Basis of Morality [1841], p.83), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 7 'Against'
	A reaction: This is opposed to Kant, who always looks wildly optimistic in his hope that high rationality entails a morally good will. Good people seem to have a fairly irrational empathy with their fellow citizens.

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature

21379	Man's three basic ethical incentives are egoism, malice and compassion [Schopenhauer]
	Full Idea: Man's three fundamental ethical incentives, egoism, malice and compassion, are present in everyone in different and incredibly unequal proportions. In accordance with them, motives will operate on man and actions will ensue.
	From: Arthur Schopenhauer (On the Basis of Morality [1841], p.192), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 7 'Egoism'
	A reaction: A well chosen trio. Kant would be shocked that he has left out duty, which is supposed to rise above such feelings.

25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights

21376	Philosophy treats animals as exploitable things, ignoring the significance of their lives [Schopenhauer]
	Full Idea: In philosophical morals animals are mere 'things', mere means to any end whatsoever. ...Shame on such a morality, that fails to recognise the eternal essence that lives in every living thing, and shines forth with inscrutable significance from all eyes.
	From: Arthur Schopenhauer (On the Basis of Morality [1841], p.96), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 7 'Against'
	A reaction: Good. I find Kant's theoretical indifference to animals very creepy (despite his kind attitude to them). And I also think the utilitarians are wrong to only value animals for their pain, as if any animal could be shredded for fun, if it felt no pain.