Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Particulars in Particular Clothing', 'How free does the will need to be?' and 'Prcis of 'Ruling Passions''

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4 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes

18431	Internal relations combine some tropes into a nucleus, which bears the non-essential tropes [Simons, by Edwards]
	Full Idea: Simons's 'nuclear' option blends features of the substratum and bundle theories. First we have tropes collected by virtue of their internal relations, forming the essential kernel or nucleus. This nucleus then bears the non-essential tropes.
	From: report of Peter Simons (Particulars in Particular Clothing [1994], p.567) by Douglas Edwards - Properties 3.5
	A reaction: [compression of Edwards's summary] This strikes me as being a remarkably good theory. I am not sure of the ontological status of properties, such that they can (unaided) combine to make part of an object. What binds the non-essentials?

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory

11911	Some philosophers always want more from morality; for others, nature is enough [Blackburn]
	Full Idea: The history of moral theory is largely a history of battles between people who want more (truth, absolutes...) - Plato, Locke, Cudworth, Kant, Nagel - and people content with what we have (nature) - Aristotle, Epicurus, Hobbes, Hume, Stevenson.
	From: Simon Blackburn (Précis of 'Ruling Passions' [2002], p.133)
	A reaction: [Thanks to Neil Sinclair for this one] As a devotee of Aristotle, I like this. I'm always impressed, though, by people who go the extra mile in morality, because they are in the grips of purer and loftier ideals than I am. They also turn into monsters!

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility

20168	Blame usually has no effect if the recipient thinks it unjustified [Williams,B]
	Full Idea: One of the most obvious facts about blame is that in many cases it is effective only if the recipient thinks that it is justified.
	From: Bernard Williams (How free does the will need to be? [1985], 5)
	A reaction: The point of the blame might not be reform of the agent, but a public justification for punishment as deterrence, in which case who cares what the agent thinks? Is blame attribution of causes, or reasons to punish?

20167	Blame partly rests on the fiction that blamed agents always know their obligations [Williams,B]
	Full Idea: Blame rests, in part, on a fiction; the idea that ethical reasons, in particular the special kind of ethical reasons that are obligations, must, really, be available to the blamed agent.
	From: Bernard Williams (How free does the will need to be? [1985], 5)
	A reaction: In blaming someone, you may be telling them that they should know their obligations, rather than assuming that they do know them. How else can we give children a moral education?