Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Particulars in Particular Clothing', 'Molyneux's Question' and 'Reality and Representation'

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3 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
Internal relations combine some tropes into a nucleus, which bears the non-essential tropes [Simons, by Edwards]
     Full Idea: Simons's 'nuclear' option blends features of the substratum and bundle theories. First we have tropes collected by virtue of their internal relations, forming the essential kernel or nucleus. This nucleus then bears the non-essential tropes.
     From: report of Peter Simons (Particulars in Particular Clothing [1994], p.567) by Douglas Edwards - Properties 3.5
     A reaction: [compression of Edwards's summary] This strikes me as being a remarkably good theory. I am not sure of the ontological status of properties, such that they can (unaided) combine to make part of an object. What binds the non-essentials?
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
Belief truth-conditions are normal circumstances where the belief is supposed to occur [Papineau]
     Full Idea: The truth condition of the belief is the 'normal' circumstances in which, given the learning process, it is biologically supposed to be present.
     From: David Papineau (Reality and Representation [1987], p.67), quoted by Christopher Peacocke - A Study of Concepts 5.2
     A reaction: How do we account for a belief in ghosts in this story? The notion of 'normal' circumstances and what is 'biologically supposed' to happen don't seem very appropriate. This is the 'teleological' view of belief.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
The Homunculus Fallacy explains a subject perceiving objects by repeating the problem internally [Evans]
     Full Idea: The 'homunculus fallacy' attempts to explain what is involved in a subject's being related to objects in the external world by appealing to the existence of an inner situation which recapitulates the essential features of the original situation.
     From: Gareth Evans (Molyneux's Question [1978], p.397)
     A reaction: This is obviously right, but we aren't forced to settle for direct realism. Inner perception may be very different, or we may employ the idea of Dennett and Lycan, that the homunculi don't regress, they deteriorate steadily down into mechanisms.