5 ideas
17813 | Löwenheim-Skolem says any theory with a true interpretation has a model in the natural numbers [White,NP] |
Full Idea: The Löwenheim-Skolem theorem tells us that any theory with a true interpretation has a model in the natural numbers. | |
From: Nicholas P. White (What Numbers Are [1974], V) |
17812 | Finite cardinalities don't need numbers as objects; numerical quantifiers will do [White,NP] |
Full Idea: Statements involving finite cardinalities can be made without treating numbers as objects at all, simply by using quantification and identity to define numerically definite quantifiers in the manner of Frege. | |
From: Nicholas P. White (What Numbers Are [1974], IV) | |
A reaction: [He adds Quine 1960:268 as a reference] |
18431 | Internal relations combine some tropes into a nucleus, which bears the non-essential tropes [Simons, by Edwards] |
Full Idea: Simons's 'nuclear' option blends features of the substratum and bundle theories. First we have tropes collected by virtue of their internal relations, forming the essential kernel or nucleus. This nucleus then bears the non-essential tropes. | |
From: report of Peter Simons (Particulars in Particular Clothing [1994], p.567) by Douglas Edwards - Properties 3.5 | |
A reaction: [compression of Edwards's summary] This strikes me as being a remarkably good theory. I am not sure of the ontological status of properties, such that they can (unaided) combine to make part of an object. What binds the non-essentials? |
13160 | To exist and be understood, a multitude must first be reduced to a unity [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: A plurality of things can neither be understood nor can exist unless one first understands the thing that is one, that to which the multitude necessarily reduces. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Notes on Comments by Fardella [1690], Prop 3) | |
A reaction: Notice that it is our need to understand which imposes the unity on the multitude. It is not just some random fiction, or a meaningless mechanical act of thought. |
13161 | Substances are everywhere in matter, like points in a line [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: There are substances everywhere in matter, just as points are everywhere in a line. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Notes on Comments by Fardella [1690], Clarif) | |
A reaction: Since Leibniz is unlikely to believe in the reality of the points, we must wonder whether he was really committed to this infinity of substances. The more traditional notion of substance is always called 'substantial form' by Leibniz. |