Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Particulars in Particular Clothing', 'Precepts for Advancing Science and Arts' and 'Modal and Anti-Luck Epistemology'

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4 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes

18431	Internal relations combine some tropes into a nucleus, which bears the non-essential tropes [Simons, by Edwards]
	Full Idea: Simons's 'nuclear' option blends features of the substratum and bundle theories. First we have tropes collected by virtue of their internal relations, forming the essential kernel or nucleus. This nucleus then bears the non-essential tropes.
	From: report of Peter Simons (Particulars in Particular Clothing [1994], p.567) by Douglas Edwards - Properties 3.5
	A reaction: [compression of Edwards's summary] This strikes me as being a remarkably good theory. I am not sure of the ontological status of properties, such that they can (unaided) combine to make part of an object. What binds the non-essentials?

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues

19729	'Modal epistemology' demands a connection between the belief and facts in possible worlds [Black,T]
	Full Idea: In 'modal epistemologies' a belief counts as knowledge only if there is a modal connection - a connection not only to the actual world, but also to other non-actual possible worlds - between the belief and the facts of the matter.
	From: Tim Black (Modal and Anti-Luck Epistemology [2011], 1)
	A reaction: [Pritchard 2005 seems to be a source for this] This sounds to me a bit like Nozick's tracking or sensitivity theory. Nozick is, I suppose, diachronic (time must pass, for the tracking), where this theory is synchronic.

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem

19728	Gettier and lottery cases seem to involve luck, meaning bad connection of beliefs to facts [Black,T]
	Full Idea: The protagonists in Gettier cases and in lottery cases fail to have knowledge because their beliefs are true simply as a matter of luck, where this means that their beliefs themselves are not appropriately connected to the facts.
	From: Tim Black (Modal and Anti-Luck Epistemology [2011], 1)
	A reaction: The lottery problem is you correctly believe 'my ticket won't win the lottery' even though you don't seem to actually know it won't. Is the Gettier problem simply the problem of lucky knowledge? 'Luck' is a rather vague concept.

13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique

19392	I don't recommend universal doubt; we constantly seek reasons for things which are indubitable [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: I do not think it necessary to recommend to people universal doubt ...in fact, we are constantly seeking reasons for thoughts about which there is no doubt at all.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Precepts for Advancing Science and Arts [1680], p.34)
	A reaction: Such confidence is, of course, asking for trouble. I prefer Peirce's fallibilism - that robust realism is the most coherent view, and the only one worth pursuing and relying on, but you never know....