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All the ideas for 'Particulars in Particular Clothing', 'What is Analytic Philosophy?' and 'Reply to Fourth Objections'

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6 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
Analysis must include definitions, search for simples, concept analysis, and Kant's analysis [Glock]
     Full Idea: Under 'analysis' a minimum would include the Socratic quest for definitions, Descartes' search for simple natures, the empiricists' psychological resolution of complex ideas, and Kant's 'transcendental' analysis of our cognitive capacities.
     From: Hans-Johann Glock (What is Analytic Philosophy? [2008], 6.1)
     A reaction: This has always struck me, and I find the narrow focus on modern logic a very distorted idea of the larger project. The aim, I think, is to understand by taking things apart, in the spirit of figuring out how a watch works.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
Internal relations combine some tropes into a nucleus, which bears the non-essential tropes [Simons, by Edwards]
     Full Idea: Simons's 'nuclear' option blends features of the substratum and bundle theories. First we have tropes collected by virtue of their internal relations, forming the essential kernel or nucleus. This nucleus then bears the non-essential tropes.
     From: report of Peter Simons (Particulars in Particular Clothing [1994], p.567) by Douglas Edwards - Properties 3.5
     A reaction: [compression of Edwards's summary] This strikes me as being a remarkably good theory. I am not sure of the ontological status of properties, such that they can (unaided) combine to make part of an object. What binds the non-essentials?
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
German and British idealism is not about individual ideas, but the intelligibility of reality [Glock]
     Full Idea: Neither German nor British Idealism reduced reality to episodes in the minds of individuals. Instsead, they insisted that reality is intelligible only because it is a manifestation of a divine spirit or rational principle.
     From: Hans-Johann Glock (What is Analytic Philosophy? [2008], 5.2)
     A reaction: They standardly reject Berkeley. Such Idealism seems either to be the design argument for God's existence, or neo-Stoicism (in its claim that nature is rational). Why not just say that nature seems to be intelligible, and stop there?
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 6. Conceptual Dualism
The concept of mind excludes body, and vice versa [Descartes]
     Full Idea: The concept of body includes nothing at all which belongs to the mind, and the concept of mind includes nothing at all which belongs to the body.
     From: René Descartes (Reply to Fourth Objections [1641], 225)
     A reaction: A headache? Hunger? The mistake, I think, is to regard the mind as entirely conscious, thus creating a sharp boundary between two aspects of our lives. As shown by blindsight, I take many of my central mental operations to be pre- or non-conscious.
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / h. Family resemblance
We might say that the family resemblance is just a consequence of meaning-as-use [Glock]
     Full Idea: Against Wittgenstein's family resemblance view one might evoke his own idea that the meaning of a word is its use, and that diversity of use entails diversity of meaning.
     From: Hans-Johann Glock (What is Analytic Philosophy? [2008], 8.2)
     A reaction: Wittgenstein might just accept the point. Diversity of concepts reflects diversity of usage. But how do you distinguish 'football is a game' from 'oy, what's your game?'. How does usage distinguish metaphorical from literal (if it does)?
The variety of uses of 'game' may be that it has several meanings, and isn't a single concept [Glock]
     Full Idea: The proper conclusion to draw from the fact that we explain 'game' in a variety of different ways is that it is not a univocal term, but has different, albeit related, meanings.
     From: Hans-Johann Glock (What is Analytic Philosophy? [2008], 8.2)
     A reaction: [He cites Rundle 1990] Potter says Wittgenstein insisted that 'game' is a single concept. 'Game' certainly slides off into metaphor, as in 'are you playing games with me?'. The multivocal view would still meet family resemblance on a narrower range.