67 ideas
6200 | Wisdom is knowing the highest good, and conforming the will to it [Kant] |
Full Idea: Wisdom, theoretically regarded, means the knowledge of the highest good and, practically, the conformability of the will to the highest good. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason [1788], I.II.II.V) | |
A reaction: This seems a narrow account of wisdom, focusing entirely on goodness rather than truth. A mind that valued nothing but understood everything would have a considerable degree of wisdom, in the normal use of that word. |
6207 | What fills me with awe are the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me [Kant] |
Full Idea: Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing wonder and awe, the oftener and the more steadily we reflect on them: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason [1788], Concl) | |
A reaction: I am beginning to think that the two major issues of all philosophy are ontology and metaethics, and Kant is close to agreeing with me. He certainly wasn't implying that astronomy was a key aspect of philosophy. |
6184 | Consistency is the highest obligation of a philosopher [Kant] |
Full Idea: Consistency is the highest obligation of a philosopher and yet the most rarely found. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason [1788], I.1.1.§3) | |
A reaction: I agree with this, and it also strikes me as the single most important principle of Kant's philosophy, which is the key to his whole moral theory. |
6203 | Metaphysics is just a priori universal principles of physics [Kant] |
Full Idea: Metaphysics only contains the pure a priori principles of physics in their universal import. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason [1788], I.II.II.VI) | |
A reaction: 'Universal' seems to imply 'necessary'. If you thought that no a priori universal principles were possible, you would be left with physics. I quite like the definition, except that I think there would still be metaphysics even if there were no physics. |
15801 | Many philosophers aim to understand metaphysics by studying ourselves [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: Leibniz, Reid, Brentano and others have held that, by considering certain obvious facts about ourselves, we can arrive at an understanding of the general principles of metaphysics. The present book is intended to confirm that view. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], Intro 1) | |
A reaction: I sympathise, but don't really agree. I see metaphysics as a process of filtering ourselves out of the picture, leaving an account of how things actually are. |
15802 | I use variables to show that each item remains the same entity throughout [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: My use of variables is not merely pedantic; it indicates that the various items on our list pertain to one and the same entity throughout. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], Intro 2) | |
A reaction: I am one of those poor souls who finds modern analytic philosophy challenging simply because I think in terms of old fashioned words, instead of thinking like mathematicians and logicians. This is a nice defence of their approach. |
15832 | Events are states of affairs that occur at certain places and times [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: We will restrict events to those states of affairs which occur at certain places and times. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 4.6) | |
A reaction: If I say 'the bomb may explode sometime', that doesn't seem to refer to an event. Philosophers like Chisholm bowl along, defining left, right and centre, and never seem to step back from their system and ask obvious critical questions. |
15829 | The mark of a state of affairs is that it is capable of being accepted [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: We will say that the mark of a state of affairs is the fact that it is capable of being accepted. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 4.2) | |
A reaction: I find this a quite bewildering proposal. It means that it is impossible for there to be a state of affairs which is beyond human conception, but why commit to that? |
15809 | A state of affairs pertains to a thing if it implies that it has some property [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: A state of affairs pertains to a thing if it implies the thing to have a certain property. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 1.4) | |
A reaction: For this to work, we must include extrinsic and relational properties, and properties which are derived from mere predication. I think this is bad metaphysics, and leads to endless confusions. |
15828 | I propose that events and propositions are two types of states of affairs [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: I will propose that events are said to constitute one type of states of affairs, and propositions another | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 4.1) | |
A reaction: I would much prefer to distinguish between the static and the dynamic, so we have a static or timeless state of affairs, and a dynamic event or process. Propositions I take to be neither. He really means 'facts', which subsume the whole lot. |
15827 | Some properties, such as 'being a widow', can be seen as 'rooted outside the time they are had' [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: Some properties may be said to be 'rooted outside the times at which they are had'. Examples are the property of being a widow and the property of being a future President. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 3.4) | |
A reaction: This is the sort of mess you when you treat the category in which an object belongs as if it was one of its properties. We categorise because of properties. |
15830 | Some properties can never be had, like being a round square [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: There are properties which nothing can possibly have; an example is the property of being both round and square. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 4.2) | |
A reaction: This is a rather bizarre Meinongian claim. For a start it sounds like two properties not one. Is there a property of being both 'over here' and 'over there'? We might say the round-square property must exist, for God to fail to implement it (?) |
15804 | If some dogs are brown, that entails the properties of 'being brown' and 'being canine' [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: The state of affairs which is some dogs being brown may be said to entail (make it necessarily so) the property of 'being brown', as well as the properties of 'being canine' and 'being both brown and canine'. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 1.4) | |
A reaction: And the property of 'being such that it is both brown and canine and brown or canine'. Etc. This is dangerous nonsense. Making all truths entail the existence of some property means we can no longer get to grips with real properties. |
18431 | Internal relations combine some tropes into a nucleus, which bears the non-essential tropes [Simons, by Edwards] |
Full Idea: Simons's 'nuclear' option blends features of the substratum and bundle theories. First we have tropes collected by virtue of their internal relations, forming the essential kernel or nucleus. This nucleus then bears the non-essential tropes. | |
From: report of Peter Simons (Particulars in Particular Clothing [1994], p.567) by Douglas Edwards - Properties 3.5 | |
A reaction: [compression of Edwards's summary] This strikes me as being a remarkably good theory. I am not sure of the ontological status of properties, such that they can (unaided) combine to make part of an object. What binds the non-essentials? |
15810 | Maybe we can only individuate things by relating them to ourselves [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: It may well be that the only way we have, ultimately, of individuating anything is to relate it uniquely to ourselves. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 1.5) | |
A reaction: I'm guessing that Chisholm is thinking of 'ourselves' as meaning just himself, but I'm thinking this is plausible if he means the human community. I doubt whether there is much a philosopher can say on individuation that is revealing or precise. |
15805 | Being the tallest man is an 'individual concept', but not a haecceity [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: Being the tallest man and being President of the United States are 'individual concepts', but not haecceities. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 1.4) | |
A reaction: Chisholm introduces this term, to help him explain his haecceity more clearly. (His proposal on that adds a lot of fog to this area of metaphysics). |
15807 | A haecceity is a property had necessarily, and strictly confined to one entity [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: An individual essence or haecceity is a narrower type of individual concept. This is a property which is had necessarily, and which it is impossible for any other thing to have. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 1.4) | |
A reaction: [Apologies to Chisholm for leaving out the variables from his definition of haecceity. See Idea 15802] See also Idea 15805. The tallest man is unique, but someone else could become the tallest man. No one else could acquire 'being Socrates'. |
15814 | A peach is sweet and fuzzy, but it doesn't 'have' those qualities [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: Our idea of a peach is not an idea of something that 'has' those particular qualities, but the concrete thing that 'is' sweet and round and fuzzy. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 1.6) | |
A reaction: This is the beginnings of his 'adverbial' account of properties, with which you have to sympathise. It tries to eliminate the possibility of some propertyless thing, to which properties can then be added, like sprinkling sugar on it. |
12852 | If x is ever part of y, then y is necessarily such that x is part of y at any time that y exists [Chisholm, by Simons] |
Full Idea: Chisholm has an axiom: if x is a proper part of y, then necessarily if y exists then x is part of it. If x is ever part of y, they y is necessarily such that x is part of y at any time that y exists. | |
From: report of Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], p.149) by Peter Simons - Parts 5.3 | |
A reaction: This is Chisholm's notorious mereological essentialism, that all parts are necessary, and change of part means change of thing. However, it looks to me more like a proposal about what properties are necessary, not what are essential. |
15808 | A traditional individual essence includes all of a thing's necessary characteristics [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: According to the traditional account of individual essence, each thing has only one individual essence and it includes all the characteristics that the thing has necessarily. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 1.4) | |
A reaction: Chisholm is steeped in medieval theology, but I don't think this is quite what Aristotle meant. Everyone nowadays has to exclude the 'trivial' necessary properties, for a start. But why? I'm contemplating things which survive the loss of their essence. |
12851 | Intermittence is seen in a toy fort, which is dismantled then rebuilt with the same bricks [Chisholm, by Simons] |
Full Idea: Chisholm poses the problem of intermittence with the case of a toy fort which is built from toy bricks, taken apart, and then reassembled with the same bricks in the same position. | |
From: report of Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], p.90) by Peter Simons - Parts 5.3 | |
A reaction: You could strengthen the case, or the problem, by using those very bricks to build a ship during the interval. Or building a fort with a different design. Most people would be happy to say that same object (token) has been rebuilt. |
15806 | The property of being identical with me is an individual concept [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: I wish to urge that the property of being identical with me is an individual concept. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 1.4) | |
A reaction: I can just about live with the claim (for formal purposes) that I am identical with myself, but I strongly resist my then having a 'property' consisting of 'being identical with myself' (or 'not being identical with somone else' etc.). |
15826 | There is 'loose' identity between things if their properties, or truths about them, might differ [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: I suggest that there is a 'loose' sense of identity that is consistent with saying 'A has a property that B does not have', or 'some things are true of A but not of B'. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 3.2) | |
A reaction: He is trying to explicate Bishop Butler's famous distinction between 'strict and philosophical' and 'loose and popular' senses. We might want to claim that the genuine identity relation is the 'loose' one (pace the logicians and mathematicians). |
6181 | Necessity cannot be extracted from an empirical proposition [Kant] |
Full Idea: It is a clear contradiction to try to extract necessity from an empirical proposition. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason [1788], Pref) | |
A reaction: This is precisely the idea which Kripke challenged, claiming that the necessary essences of natural kinds such as gold have to be discovered empirically. All my intuitions are with Kant (and Hume) on this, but it is a complex issue… |
15819 | Do sense-data have structure, location, weight, and constituting matter? [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: Does a red sense-datum or appearance have a back side as well as a front? Where is it located? Does it have any weight? What is it made of? | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 1.8) | |
A reaction: A reductive physicalist like myself is not so troubled by questions like this, which smack of Descartes's non-spatial argument for dualism. |
15816 | 'I feel depressed' is more like 'he runs slowly' than like 'he has a red book' [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: The sentences 'I feel depressed' and 'I feel exuberant' are related in the way in which 'He runs slowly' and 'He runs swiftly' are related, and not in the way in which 'He has a red book' and 'He has a brown book' are related. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 1.8) | |
A reaction: Ducasse 1942 and Chisholm 1957 seem to be the sources of the adverbial theory. I gather Chisholm gave it up late in his career. The adverbial theory seems sort of right, but it doesn't illuminate what is happening. |
15818 | So called 'sense-data' are best seen as 'modifications' of the person experiencing them [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: We may summarise my way of looking at appearing by saying that so-called appearances or sense-data are 'affections' or 'modifications' of the person who is said to experience them. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 1.8) | |
A reaction: Hm. That seems to transfer the ontological problem of the redness of the tomato from the tomato to the perceiver, but leave the basic difficulty untouched. I think we need to pull apart the intrinsic and subjective ingredients here. |
15817 | If we can say a man senses 'redly', why not also 'rectangularly'? [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: If we say a man 'senses redly', may we also say that he 'senses rhomboidally' or 'senses rectangularly'? There is no reason why not. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 1.8) | |
A reaction: This is Chisholm replying to one of the best known objections to the adverbial theory. Can we sense 'wobblyrhomboidallywithpinkdots-ly'? Can we perceive 'landscapely'? The problem is bigger than he thinks. |
15831 | Explanations have states of affairs as their objects [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: I suggest that states of affairs constitute the objects of the theory of explanation. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 4.4) | |
A reaction: It is good to ask what the constituents of a theory of explanation might be. He has an all-embracing notion of state of affairs, whereas I would say that events and processes are separate. See Idea 15828. |
15811 | I am picked out uniquely by my individual essence, which is 'being identical with myself' [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: What picks me out uniquely, without relating me to some other being? It can only be the property of 'being me' or 'being identical with myself', which can only be an individual essence or haecceity, a property I cannot fail to have. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 1.5) | |
A reaction: Only a philosopher (and a modern analytic one at that) would imagine that this was some crucial insight into how we know our own identities. |
15815 | Sartre says the ego is 'opaque'; I prefer to say that it is 'transparent' [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: Sartre says the ego is 'opaque'; I would think it better to say that the ego is 'transparent'. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 1.8) | |
A reaction: Insofar as we evidently have a self, I would say it is neither. It is directly experienced, through willing, motivation, and mental focus. |
15813 | People use 'I' to refer to themselves, with the meaning of their own individual essence [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: Each person uses the first person pronoun to refer to himself, and in such a way that its reference (Bedeutung) is to himself and its intention (Sinn) is his own individual essence. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 1.5) | |
A reaction: I think this is exactly right, and may be the basis of the way we essentialise in our understanding of the rest of reality. I have a strong notion of what is essential in me and what is not. |
15803 | Bad theories of the self see it as abstract, or as a bundle, or as a process [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: Some very strange theories of the self suggest it is an abstract object, such as a class, or a property, or a function. Some theories imply that I am a collection, or a bundle, or a structure, or an event, or a process (or even a verb!). | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], Intro 4) | |
A reaction: I certainly reject the abstract lot, but the second lot doesn't sound so silly to me, especially 'structure' and 'process'. I don't buy the idea that the Self is an indivisible monad. It is a central aspect of brain process - the prioritiser of thought. |
15821 | Determinism claims that every event has a sufficient causal pre-condition [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: Determinism is the proposition that, for every event that occurs, there occurs a sufficient causal condition of that event. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 2.2) | |
A reaction: You need an ontology of events to put it precisely this way. Doesn't it also work the other way: that there is an event for every sufficient causal condition? The beginning and the end of reality pose problems. |
6183 | Can pure reason determine the will, or are empirical conditions relevant? [Kant] |
Full Idea: This is the first question: Is pure reason sufficient of itself to determine the will, or is it only as empirically conditioned that it can do so? | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason [1788], Intro) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the core question of intellectualism, which goes back to Socrates. You can only accept the question if you accept the concept of 'pure' reason. Values seem to be needed for action, as well as empirical circumstances. |
6191 | The will is the faculty of purposes, which guide desires according to principles [Kant] |
Full Idea: The will could be defined as the faculty of purposes, since they are always determining grounds of the faculty of desire according to principles. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason [1788], I.1.II) | |
A reaction: Do animals have wills? Kant implies that you can only have a will if you have principles. Compare Hobbes' rather less elevated definition of the will (Idea 2362). |
6190 | The sole objects of practical reason are the good and the evil [Kant] |
Full Idea: The sole objects of a practical reason are thus those of the good and the evil. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason [1788], I.1.II) | |
A reaction: Of course, you may aim to achieve x because it is good, while I judge x to be evil. |
15824 | There are mere omissions (through ignorance, perhaps), and people can 'commit an omission' [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: If a man does not respond to a greeting, if he was unaware that he was addressed then his failure to respond may be a mere omission. But if he intended to snub the man, then he could be said to have 'committed the omission'. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 2.6) | |
A reaction: Chisholm has an extensive knowledge of Catholic theology. These neat divisions are subject to vagueness and a continuum of cases in real life. |
18235 | Only human reason can confer value on our choices [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
Full Idea: Kant argues that only human reason is in a position to confer value on the objects of human choice. | |
From: report of Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason [1788]) by Christine M. Korsgaard - Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value 8 'Kant' | |
A reaction: If the source of value is humans, then it is not immediately clear why it is only our reason that does the conferring. What is the status of a choice on which reason fails to confer value? The idea is that reason, unlike desire, has intrinsic value. |
6196 | People cannot come to morality through feeling, because morality must not be sensuous [Kant] |
Full Idea: In the subject there is no antecedent feeling tending to morality; that is impossible, because all feeling is sensuous, and the drives of the moral disposition must be free from every sensuous condition. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason [1788], I.1.III) | |
A reaction: I'm not quite clear (even after reading Kant) why moral drives 'must' be free of sensuousness. Aristotle gives a much better account, when he tells us that the sensuous drives must be trained in the right way, and must be in harmony with the reason. |
18675 | Kant may rate two things as finally valuable: having a good will, and deserving happiness [Orsi on Kant] |
Full Idea: In some interpretations it appears that for Kant two things are finally valuable: good will (unconditionally), and deserved happiness (conditionally on the value of good will). | |
From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason [1788]) by Francesco Orsi - Value Theory 2.2 | |
A reaction: It doesn't sound difficult to reconcile these two. Just ask 'what is required of someone to deserve happiness?'. |
22007 | An autonomous agent has dignity [Würde], which has absolute worth [Kant, by Pinkard] |
Full Idea: For Kant, there is something about beings that can act autonomously that is itself of 'absolute worth', which Kant calls the 'dignity' [Würde] of each such agent. | |
From: report of Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason [1788]) by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 02 | |
A reaction: This answers my puzzle about where Kant's fundamental values come from. Surely wicked actions can be autonomous? Autonomous actions aren't thereby good actions. A 'good' will, course, whatever that is. Rational? My problem with existentialist ethics. |
18234 | The good will is unconditionally good, because it is the only possible source of value [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
Full Idea: Kant argues that the good will is unconditionally good because it is the only thing able to be a source of value. | |
From: report of Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason [1788]) by Christine M. Korsgaard - Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value 8 'Kant' | |
A reaction: The obvious worry is the circularity of resting a theory of value on identifying a 'good' will as its source. |
6192 | Good or evil cannot be a thing, but only a maxim of action, making the person good or evil [Kant] |
Full Idea: If something is held to be absolutely good or evil in all respects and without qualification, it could not be a thing but only the manner of acting, i.e., it could only be the maxim of the will, and consequently the acting person himself is good or evil. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason [1788], I.1.II) | |
A reaction: It goes on to deny that pain is intrinsically evil, but his reason for the claim is not clear. Nevetheless, I think he is right. This remark is an important bridge between Enlightenment concerns with law and Greek concerns with character. |
6197 | Morality involves duty and respect for law, not love of the outcome [Kant] |
Full Idea: All the morality of actions may be placed in their necessity from duty and from respect for the law, and not from love for or leaning toward that which the action is to produce. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason [1788], I.1.III) | |
A reaction: Kant tries to reject consequentialism, but you cannot assess your duty or the universal law without an assessment of probable consequences, and we could never choose between laws if we did not already see value in the outcome. |
6193 | Our happiness is all that matters, not as a sensation, but as satisfaction with our whole existence [Kant] |
Full Idea: Our happiness is the only thing of importance, provided this is judged, as reason requires, not according to transitory sensation but according to the influence which this contingency has on our whole existence and our satisfaction with it. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason [1788], I.1.II) | |
A reaction: This is closer to the Greek eudaimonia than to the modern conception of happiness, which is largely just a feeling. Kant's view seems more like a private judgement on your whole life, where the Greek idea seems more public and objective. |
1452 | Happiness is the condition of a rational being for whom everything goes as they wish [Kant] |
Full Idea: Happiness is the condition of a rational being in the world with whom everything goes according to his wish and will. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason [1788], I.II.II.V) | |
A reaction: For such a sophisticated and rational philosopher this seems a rather crude notion. Reluctant alcoholics don't fit. Bradley has a much better definition (Idea 5655). |
1454 | Morality is not about making ourselves happy, but about being worthy of happiness [Kant] |
Full Idea: Morality is not properly the doctrine of how we should make ourselves happy, but how we should become worthy of happiness. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason [1788], I.II.II.V) | |
A reaction: Whatever else you think of Kant's moral theory, this remark is a clarion call we can all recognise. Suppose we all somehow ended up in a state of maximal happiness by systematically betraying one another. |
6194 | The highest worth for human beings lies in dispositions, not just actions [Kant] |
Full Idea: The highest worth which human beings can and should procure for themselves lies in dispositions and not in actions only. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason [1788], I.1.II) | |
A reaction: This leaves the problem of the well-meaning fool, who has wonderful dispositions but poor judgement. What Kant is describing here is better known as virtue. See Idea 58. |
6198 | Virtue is the supreme state of our pursuit of happiness, and so is supreme good [Kant] |
Full Idea: Virtue (as the worthiness to be happy) is the supreme condition of whatever appears to us to be desirable and thus of all our pursuit of happiness and, consequently, the supreme good. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason [1788], I.II.II) | |
A reaction: Thus Kant can claim to be a virtue theorist, but giving us a very different account of how virtue arises. He emphasises elsewhere (Idea 6197) that the supreme good must be in the will, not in the outcome. 'Virtue' is here a rather thin concept. |
1456 | Moral law is holy, and the best we can do is achieve virtue through respect for the law [Kant] |
Full Idea: The moral law is holy (unyielding), although all the moral perfection to which man can attain is still only virtue, that is, a rightful disposition arising from respect for the law. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason [1788], I.II.II.V) | |
A reaction: In comparison with Aristotle's view of virtue this is very passive and external. Aristotle doesn't need laws for virtue, he needs inner harmony and a grasp of what has high value. |
6185 | No one would lend money unless a universal law made it secure, even after death [Kant] |
Full Idea: If my maxim is 'augment my property by all safe means', I can't make that a law allowing me to keep a dead man's loan, because no one would make a loan if that were the moral law. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason [1788], I.1.1.§4) | |
A reaction: This is a simple illustration of Kant's strategy and it shows clearly how, for all his talk of 'pure reason', his moral law is strongly guided by consequences, and that these can only judged by prior values - for example, that loans are a good thing. |
6187 | Universality determines the will, and hence extends self-love into altruism [Kant] |
Full Idea: The form of universality is itself the determining ground of the will, …and from this limitation alone, and not from the addition of any exernal drive, the concept of obligation arises to extend the maxim of self-love also to the happiness of others. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason [1788], I.1.1.§8) | |
A reaction: This is the heroic and optimistic part of Kant's philosophy, the attempt to derive altruism from pure reason. The claim seems to be that maxims don't motivate until they have been universalised. I fear that only altruism could add such motivation. |
6201 | Everyone (even God) must treat rational beings as ends in themselves, and not just as means [Kant] |
Full Idea: In the order of ends, man (and every rational being) is an end in himself, i.e., he is never to be used merely as a means for someone (even for God) without at the same time being himself an end. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason [1788], I.II.II.V) | |
A reaction: The worry here is that Kant has set up an exam that you have to pass before you can be treated as a moral end. Animals and the ecosystem will fail the exam, and even some human beings will be borderline cases. We should respect everything. |
6186 | A holy will is incapable of any maxims which conflict with the moral law [Kant] |
Full Idea: A holy will is one which is incapable of any maxims which conflict with the moral law | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason [1788], I.1.1.§7) | |
A reaction: If such a will is 'incapable' of conflicting with moral law, it will not need to think or assess before action. This means that Kant's moral ideal can ultimately exclude the free-thinking intellect. Kant is describing a state of true Aristotelian virtue. |
6195 | Reason cannot solve the problem of why a law should motivate the will [Kant] |
Full Idea: How a law in itself can be the direct motive of the will (which is the essence of morality) is an insoluble problem for the human reason. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason [1788], I.1.III) | |
A reaction: If that is the great man's final word, then it is tempting to switch to an empirical moral theory, such as that of Hobbes or Hume or E.O. Wilson, which starts from what motivations are available, and builds morality up from that. |
6188 | A permanent natural order could not universalise a rule permitting suicide [Kant] |
Full Idea: The maxim of freely disposing of my life could not hold as a universal law of nature, …because no one could choose to end his life, for such an arrangement could not constitute a permanent natural order. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason [1788], I.1.1.I) | |
A reaction: This sort of claim brings out the advantanges of Aristotelian 'particularism' (expounded by Dancy). Obviously universal suicide isn't promising, but no one wants that. A few suicides in extreme cases will have no effect at all on the natural order. |
15822 | The concept of physical necessity is basic to both causation, and to the concept of nature [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: It is generally agreed, I think, that the concept of physical necessity, or a law of nature, is fundamental to the theory of causation and, more generally, to the concept of nature. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 2.3) | |
A reaction: This seems intuitively right, but we might be able to formulate a concept of nature that had a bit less necessity in it, especially if we read a few books on quantum theory first. |
15823 | Some propose a distinct 'agent causation', as well as 'event causation' [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: Sometimes a distinction is made between 'event causation' and 'agent causation' and it has been suggested that there is an unbridgeable gap between the two. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 2.5) | |
A reaction: Nope, don't buy that. I connect it with Davidson's 'anomalous monism', that tries to combine one substance with separate laws of action. The metaphysical price for such a theory is too high to pay. |
15820 | A 'law of nature' is just something which is physically necessary [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: When we say something is 'physically necessary' we can replace it with 'law of nature'. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 2.2) | |
A reaction: [plucked out of context even more than usual!] This is illuminating about what contemporary philosophers (such as Armstrong) seem to mean by a law of nature. It is not some grand equation, but a small local necessary connection. |
6199 | Obligation does not rest on the existence of God, but on the autonomy of reason [Kant] |
Full Idea: It is not to be understood that the assumption of the existence of God is necessary as a ground for all obligation in general (for this rests, as has been shown, solely on the autonomy of reason itself). | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason [1788], I.II.II.V) | |
A reaction: This shows that Kant agrees with Plato about the Euthyphro Question - that is, they both think that morality is logically and naturally prior to any gods. I agree. Why would we admire or worship or obey gods if we didn't think they were good? |
1453 | We have to postulate something outside nature which makes happiness coincide with morality [Kant] |
Full Idea: The existence must be postulated of a cause of the whole of nature, itself distinct from nature, which contains the ground of the exact coincidence of happiness with morality. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason [1788], I.II.II.V) | |
A reaction: I can see that we need a concept of how happiness could be made proportional to morality, but I can't make sense of the assumption that it is actually possible, and hence something must exist that would achieve it. |
1455 | Belief in justice requires belief in a place for justice (heaven), a time (eternity), and a cause (God) [Kant, by PG] |
Full Idea: To believe in justice in an unjust world, you have to believe in a place of perfect justice (heaven), a time for perfect justice (eternity), and a cause of perfect justice (God). | |
From: report of Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason [1788], I.II.II.V) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: Compare Boethius in Idea 5765. I can see that we might need to grasp the ideals of eternal justice in order to understand morality, but belief in their genuine possibility, or even actuality, doesn't seem to follow. |
6205 | To know if this world must have been created by God, we would need to know all other possible worlds [Kant] |
Full Idea: We can't infer the existence of God from knowledge of this world, because we should have to know all possible worlds in order to compare them - in short, we should have to be omniscient - in order to say that it is possible only through a God. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason [1788], I.II.II.VI) | |
A reaction: A nice remark, but not wholly convincing. This argument would block all attempts to work out necessities a priori, such as those of maths and logic. Must we know all possible worlds intimately to know that 2+2 is always 4? |
6204 | Using God to explain nature is referring to something inconceivable to explain what is in front of you [Kant] |
Full Idea: To have recourse to God in explaining the arrangements of nature is not a physical explanation but a confession that one has come to the end of philosophy, since one assumes something of which one has no concept to conceive what is before one's eyes. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason [1788], I.II.II.VI) | |
A reaction: Hume had many objections to the design argument, some of them positively sarcastic, but none as ruthless as this, since Kant (here) seems to find God to be a totally empty concept, and hence a complete non-starter as explanation for anything. |
6206 | From our limited knowledge we can infer great virtues in God, but not ultimate ones [Kant] |
Full Idea: Since we know only a small part of the world, and cannot compare it with all possible worlds, we can infer from the order, design and magnitude to a wise, beneficent and powerful Author, but not that He is all-knowing, all-good, and all-powerful. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason [1788], I.II.II.VI) | |
A reaction: This is very much in the spirit of David Hume, who inferred from the flaws in the world that God did not seem to be entirely competent. Hume is also more imaginative, in seeing that God might be a committee, or a hired workman. |
6202 | In all naturalistic concepts of God, if you remove the human qualities there is nothing left [Kant] |
Full Idea: One can confidently challenge all pretended natural theologians to cite one single definitive attribute of their object, of which one could not irrefutably show that, when everything anthropomorphic is removed, only the word remains. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason [1788], I.II.II.VI) | |
A reaction: This idea derives from Hume's very empiricist view of our understanding of God (Idea 2185), but Kant is (remarkably) more hostile than Hume, because he actually implies that most people's concept of God is totally vacuous. |