Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Particulars in Particular Clothing', 'The Rationalists' and 'Things'

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5 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes

18431	Internal relations combine some tropes into a nucleus, which bears the non-essential tropes [Simons, by Edwards]
	Full Idea: Simons's 'nuclear' option blends features of the substratum and bundle theories. First we have tropes collected by virtue of their internal relations, forming the essential kernel or nucleus. This nucleus then bears the non-essential tropes.
	From: report of Peter Simons (Particulars in Particular Clothing [1994], p.567) by Douglas Edwards - Properties 3.5
	A reaction: [compression of Edwards's summary] This strikes me as being a remarkably good theory. I am not sure of the ontological status of properties, such that they can (unaided) combine to make part of an object. What binds the non-essentials?

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta

7783	Bodies, properties, relations, events, numbers, sets and propositions are 'things' if they exist [Lowe]
	Full Idea: Not only material bodies but also properties, relations, events, numbers, sets, and propositions are—if they are acknowledged as existing—to be accounted ‘things’.
	From: E.J. Lowe (Things [1995])
	A reaction: There might be lots of borderline cases here. Is the sky a thing? Is air a thing? How is transparency a thing? Is minus-one a thing? Is an incomplete proposition a thing? Etc.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance

4304	Descartes says there are two substance, Spinoza one, and Leibniz infinitely many [Cottingham]
	Full Idea: Descartes was a dualist about substance, Spinoza was a monist, and Leibniz was a pluralist (an infinity of substances).
	From: John Cottingham (The Rationalists [1988], p.76)
	A reaction: Spinoza is appealing. We posit a substance, as the necessary basis for existence, but it is unclear how more than one substance can be differentiated. If mind is a separate substance, why isn't iron? Why aren't numbers?

12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism

4303	The notion of substance lies at the heart of rationalist metaphysics [Cottingham]
	Full Idea: The notion of substance lies at the heart of rationalist metaphysics.
	From: John Cottingham (The Rationalists [1988], p.75)
	A reaction: The idea of 'substance' has had an interesting revival in modern philosophy (though not, obviously, in physics). Maybe physics and philosophy have views of reality which are not complementary, but are rivals.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity

4306	For rationalists, it is necessary that effects be deducible from their causes [Cottingham]
	Full Idea: The rationalist view of causation takes it that to make effects intelligible, it must be shown that they are in principle deducible from their causes.
	From: John Cottingham (The Rationalists [1988], p.92)
	A reaction: This has intuitive appeal, but deduction is only possible with further premises, such as the laws of physics. The effects of human behaviour look a bit tricky, even if we cause them.