11 ideas
| 18431 | Internal relations combine some tropes into a nucleus, which bears the non-essential tropes [Simons, by Edwards] |
| Full Idea: Simons's 'nuclear' option blends features of the substratum and bundle theories. First we have tropes collected by virtue of their internal relations, forming the essential kernel or nucleus. This nucleus then bears the non-essential tropes. | |
| From: report of Peter Simons (Particulars in Particular Clothing [1994], p.567) by Douglas Edwards - Properties 3.5 | |
| A reaction: [compression of Edwards's summary] This strikes me as being a remarkably good theory. I am not sure of the ontological status of properties, such that they can (unaided) combine to make part of an object. What binds the non-essentials? |
| 4988 | Folk psychology may not be reducible, but that doesn't make it false [Kirk,R on Churchland,PM] |
| Full Idea: It may well be that completed neuroscience will not include a reduction of folk psychology, but why should that be a reason to regard it as false? It would only be a reason if irreducibility entailed that they could not possibly both be true. | |
| From: comment on Paul M. Churchland (Eliminative Materialism and Prop. Attitudes [1981]) by Robert Kirk - Mind and Body §3.9 | |
| A reaction: If all our behaviour had been explained by a future neuro-science, this might not falsify folk psychology, but it would totally marginalise it. It is still possible that dewdrops are placed on leaves by fairies, but this is no longer a hot theory. |
| 4987 | Eliminative materialism says folk psychology will be replaced, not reduced [Churchland,PM] |
| Full Idea: Eliminative materialism says our common-sense conception of psychological phenomena is a radically false theory, so defective that both the principles and the ontology of that theory will eventually be displaced (rather than reduced). | |
| From: Paul M. Churchland (Eliminative Materialism and Prop. Attitudes [1981], Intro) | |
| A reaction: It is hard to see what you could replace the idea of a 'belief' with in ordinary conversation. We may reduce beliefs to neuronal phenomena, but we can't drop the vocabulary of the macro-phenomena. The physics of weather doesn't eliminate 'storms'. |
| 22809 | The social contract sees society as constituted by and for individuals [Taylor,C] |
| Full Idea: The social contract theory …has a vision of society as in some sense constituted by individuals for the fulfilment of ends which are primarily individual. | |
| From: Charles Taylor (Atomism [1979], p.29) | |
| A reaction: It seems to be initiated by individuals who are only motivated by what is in it for them. This presumes self-sufficient adults, rather than children, or parents with children, or dependent people. The epitome of liberalism, perhaps. |
| 22811 | Assigning a right based on a human capacity implies that the capacity should be developed [Taylor,C] |
| Full Idea: It would be incomprehensible and incoherent to ascribe rights to human beings in respect of the specifically human capacities (such as the right to beliefs or life-style) while at the same time denying that those capacities ought to be developed. | |
| From: Charles Taylor (Atomism [1979], p.33) | |
| A reaction: Developed by whom? The agent, their family, or the state? At what point has someone got a capacity, with no further requirement to develop it? Taylor pulls rather large rabbits out of small hats. |
| 22815 | If freedom depends on society and culture, the greatest freedom is in shaping them [Taylor,C] |
| Full Idea: If realising our freedom partly depends on the society and culture in which we live, then we exercise a fuller freedom if we can help determine the shape of this society and culture. | |
| From: Charles Taylor (Atomism [1979], p.47) | |
| A reaction: This is clearly in response to the critics of communitarianism who say that it is too conservative, because your values are created for you, by your community. |
| 22814 | Our reliance on other people close to us does not imply any political obligations [Taylor,C] |
| Full Idea: We must all be nurtures by others as children, and we only flourish as adults in relationship with friends, mates, children and so on. But this has nothing to do with any obligation to belong to political society. | |
| From: Charles Taylor (Atomism [1979], p.42) | |
| A reaction: He is defending community, but not at that minimal human level. Political obligations follows from our need for a wider society, to achieve justice, education, travel, health etc. There are no rights without a society |
| 22812 | For most people the primacy of rights mainly concerns freedom [Taylor,C] |
| Full Idea: Most of those who want to affirm the primacy of rights are more interested in asserting the right of freedom, and in a sense which can only be attributed to humans. | |
| From: Charles Taylor (Atomism [1979], p.40) | |
| A reaction: This is probably more pronounced in North America than in Europe. It may be that without freedom a lot of the other rights are impossible. |
| 22810 | A right is not just a rule, but also asserts certain ideas of moral worth [Taylor,C] |
| Full Idea: Asserting a right is more than issuing an injunction. It has an essential conceptual background, in some notion of the moral worth of certain properties or capacities, without which it would not make. | |
| From: Charles Taylor (Atomism [1979], p.33) | |
| A reaction: A simple right may arise from a contract, which could be quite trivial, and of no moral importance. The winner of the egg and spoon race has a right to the prize, which is an ice cream. I think he means legal rights in a state. |
| 22813 | Property is not essential for life, but it may be essential for independence [Taylor,C] |
| Full Idea: It is standardly said that we need the right to property as an essential underpinning of life, but this is patently not true. …In reality it is actually seen as an essential part of a life of independence. | |
| From: Charles Taylor (Atomism [1979], p.41) | |
| A reaction: Hence it has a high value for liberals, for whom an independent life is the prime social aspiration. The law of trespass will define the degree of independence provided by property. |
| 23417 | If the state is neutral, there won't be sufficient community to support a welfare state [Taylor,C, by Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Charles Taylor says the neutral [liberal] state undermines the sense of community which is required for citizens to accept the sacrifices demanded by the welfare state. | |
| From: report of Charles Taylor (Atomism [1979]) by Will Kymlicka - Community 'legitimacy' | |
| A reaction: As someone who believes in the welfare state, I think this is correct. Extreme individualistic liberalism is incompatible with a welfare state. A liberal society needs institutions which draw free individuals into the community. |