Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Particulars in Particular Clothing', 'The Nature of Rationality' and 'Brainchildren'

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15 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
I do not care if my trivial beliefs are false, and I have no interest in many truths [Nozick]
     Full Idea: I find that I do not mind at all the thought that I have some false beliefs (of US state capitals), and there are many truths I do not care to know at all (total grains of sand on the beach).
     From: Robert Nozick (The Nature of Rationality [1993], p.67)
     A reaction: A useful corrective to anyone who blindly asserts that truth is the supreme human value. I would still be annoyed if someone taught me lies about these two types of truth.
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
Maybe James was depicting the value of truth, and not its nature [Nozick]
     Full Idea: We might see William James's pragmatic view that truth is what works as depicting the value of truth, and not its nature.
     From: Robert Nozick (The Nature of Rationality [1993], p.68)
     A reaction: James didn't think that he was doing this. He firmly says that this IS truth, not just the advantages of truth. Another view is that pragmatists are giving a test for truth.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
Internal relations combine some tropes into a nucleus, which bears the non-essential tropes [Simons, by Edwards]
     Full Idea: Simons's 'nuclear' option blends features of the substratum and bundle theories. First we have tropes collected by virtue of their internal relations, forming the essential kernel or nucleus. This nucleus then bears the non-essential tropes.
     From: report of Peter Simons (Particulars in Particular Clothing [1994], p.567) by Douglas Edwards - Properties 3.5
     A reaction: [compression of Edwards's summary] This strikes me as being a remarkably good theory. I am not sure of the ontological status of properties, such that they can (unaided) combine to make part of an object. What binds the non-essentials?
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
Philosophers regularly confuse failures of imagination with insights into necessity [Dennett]
     Full Idea: The besetting foible of philosophers is mistaking failures of imagination for insights into necessity.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainchildren [1998], Ch.25)
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
That every mammal has a mother is a secure reality, but without foundations [Dennett]
     Full Idea: Naturalistic philosophers should look with favour on the finite regress that peters out without foundations or thresholds or essences. That every mammal has a mother does not imply an infinite regress. Mammals have secure reality without foundations.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainchildren [1998], Ch.25)
     A reaction: I love this thought, which has permeated my thinking quite extensively. Logicians are terrified of regresses, but this may be because they haven't understood the vagueness of language.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
Does consciousness need the concept of consciousness? [Dennett]
     Full Idea: You can't have consciousness until you have the concept of consciousness.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainchildren [1998], Ch.6)
     A reaction: If you read enough Dennett this begins to sound vaguely plausible, but next day it sounds like an absurd claim. 'You can't see a tree until you have the concept of a tree?' When do children acquire the concept of consciousness? Are apes non-conscious?
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / c. Parts of consciousness
Maybe language is crucial to consciousness [Dennett]
     Full Idea: I continue to argue for a crucial role of natural language in generating the central features of consciousness.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainchildren [1998], Ch.25)
     A reaction: 'Central features' might beg the question. Dennett does doubt the consciousness of animals (1996). As I stare out of my window, his proposal seems deeply counterintuitive. How could language 'generate' consciousness? Would loss of language create zombies?
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Unconscious intentionality is the foundation of the mind [Dennett]
     Full Idea: It is on the foundation of unconscious intentionality that the higher-order complexities developed that have culminated in what we call consciousness.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainchildren [1998], Ch.25)
     A reaction: Sounds right to me. Pace Searle, I have no problem with unconscious intentionality, and the general homuncular picture of low levels building up to complex high levels, which suddenly burst into the song and dance of consciousness.
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Could a robot be made conscious just by software? [Dennett]
     Full Idea: How could you make a robot conscious? The answer, I think, is to be found in software.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainchildren [1998], Ch.6)
     A reaction: This seems to be a commitment to strong AI, though Dennett is keen to point out that brains are the only plausible implementation of such software. Most find his claim baffling.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Rationality is normally said to concern either giving reasons, or reliability [Nozick]
     Full Idea: The two themes permeating the philosophical literature are that rationality is a matter of reasons, or that rationality is a matter of reliability.
     From: Robert Nozick (The Nature of Rationality [1993], p.64)
     A reaction: Since a clock can be reliable, I would have thought it concerns reasons. Or an unthinking person could reliably recite truths from memory. There is also the instrumental view of rationality.
In the instrumental view of rationality it only concerns means, and not ends [Nozick]
     Full Idea: On the instrumental conception of rationality, it consists in the effective and efficient achievement of goals, ends, and desires. About the goals themselves it has little to say.
     From: Robert Nozick (The Nature of Rationality [1993], p.64)
     A reaction: [He quotes Russell 1954 p.viii as expressing this view] A long way from Greek logos, which obviously concerns the rational selection of right ends (for which, presumably, reasons can be given). In practice our ends may never be rational, of course.
Is it rational to believe a truth which leads to permanent misery? [Nozick]
     Full Idea: If a mother is presented with convincing evidence that her son has committed a grave crime, but were she to believe it that would make her life thereafter miserable, is it rational for her to believe her son is guilty?
     From: Robert Nozick (The Nature of Rationality [1993], p.69)
     A reaction: I assume there is a conflict of rationalities, because there are conflicting ends. Presumably most mothers love the truth, but most of us also aim for happy lives. It is perfectly rational to avoid discovering a horrible family truth.
Rationality needs some self-consciousness, to also evaluate how we acquired our reasons [Nozick]
     Full Idea: Rationality involves some degree of self-consciousness. Not only reasons are evaluated, but also the processes by which information arrives, is stored, and recalled.
     From: Robert Nozick (The Nature of Rationality [1993], p.74)
     A reaction: I defend the idea that animals have a degree of rationality, because they can make sensible judgements, but I cannot deny this idea. Rationality comes in degrees, and second-level thought is a huge leap forward in degree.
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
A language of thought doesn't explain content [Dennett]
     Full Idea: Postulating a language of thought is a postponement of the central problems of content ascription, not a necessary first step.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainchildren [1998], Ch.25)
     A reaction: If the idea of content is built on the idea of representation, then you need some account of what the brain does with its representations.
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / c. Concepts without language
Maybe there can be non-conscious concepts (e.g. in bees) [Dennett]
     Full Idea: Concepts do not require consciousness. As Jaynes says, the bee has a concept of a flower, but not a conscious concept.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainchildren [1998], Ch.6)
     A reaction: Does the flower have a concept of rain? Rain plays a big functional role in its existence. It depends, alas, on what we mean by a 'concept'.