Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Particulars in Particular Clothing', 'Human Nature' and 'Protrepticus (frags)'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

8 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / d. Philosophy as puzzles
17949 Inquiry is the cause of philosophy [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Inquiry is the cause of philosophy.
     From: Aristotle (Protrepticus (frags) [c.334 BCE]), quoted by Alexander Nehamas - Eristic,Antilogic,Sophistic,Dialectic p.120
     A reaction: The earlier part of the quote says philosophical thinking is inescapable (even if philosophy is impossible). I suppose we would call it 'curiosity'.
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 8. Humour
6211 Laughter is a sudden glory in realising the infirmity of others, or our own formerly [Hobbes]
     Full Idea: The passion of laughter is nothing else but sudden glory arising from some sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmity of others, or with our own formerly.
     From: Thomas Hobbes (Human Nature [1640], Ch.IX.13)
     A reaction: Laughter tends to involve something unusual. We don't just burst out with a glory of vanity whenever we meet some inferiority in another person.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
18431 Internal relations combine some tropes into a nucleus, which bears the non-essential tropes [Simons, by Edwards]
     Full Idea: Simons's 'nuclear' option blends features of the substratum and bundle theories. First we have tropes collected by virtue of their internal relations, forming the essential kernel or nucleus. This nucleus then bears the non-essential tropes.
     From: report of Peter Simons (Particulars in Particular Clothing [1994], p.567) by Douglas Edwards - Properties 3.5
     A reaction: [compression of Edwards's summary] This strikes me as being a remarkably good theory. I am not sure of the ontological status of properties, such that they can (unaided) combine to make part of an object. What binds the non-essentials?
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
6213 A man cannot will to will, or will to will to will, so the idea of a voluntary will is absurd [Hobbes]
     Full Idea: The will is not voluntary: for a man can no more say he will will, than he will will will, and so make an infinite repetition of the word 'will', which is absurd and insignificant.
     From: Thomas Hobbes (Human Nature [1640], Ch.XII.5)
     A reaction: A nice simple point, allied to Nietzsche's notion that thoughts are uncontrollable (Idea 2291). Even Aquinas, who is quite a fan of free will, spotted the problem (Idea 1854). Personally I agree with Hobbes. Free will is a shibboleth.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
6208 Conceptions and apparitions are just motion in some internal substance of the head [Hobbes]
     Full Idea: Conceptions and apparitions are nothing really, but motion in some internal substance of the head.
     From: Thomas Hobbes (Human Nature [1640], Ch.VII.1)
     A reaction: Note that he carefully covers both thought in concepts and thought in images, and also that he is not saying that thought is the substance, but that it is a 'motion'. This strikes me as an excellent word, and I think Hobbes is right.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
6209 There is no absolute good, for even the goodness of God is goodness to us [Hobbes]
     Full Idea: There is no such thing as absolute goodness, considered without relation: for even the goodness which we apprehend in God Almighty, is his goodness to us.
     From: Thomas Hobbes (Human Nature [1640], Ch.VII.3)
     A reaction: Plato's view of goodness is much more absolute than that of religion, as he proposes the Good as the eternal underpinning of nature. I agree with Hobbes that if God is the source of goodness, that will prevent goodness from being truly absolute.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / c. Value of happiness
6210 Life has no end (not even happiness), because we have desires, which presuppose a further end [Hobbes]
     Full Idea: For an utmost end, in which the ancient philosophers have placed felicity, there is no such thing in this world, nor way to it: for while we live, we have desires, and desire presupposeth a further end.
     From: Thomas Hobbes (Human Nature [1640], Ch.VII.6)
     A reaction: Kant's definition of happiness (Idea 1452) seems to be the underlying idea, and hence with the same implication (of impossibility). However, an alcoholic locked in a brewery would seem to have all that Hobbes requires for happiness.
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 5. Sexual Morality
6212 Lust involves pleasure, and also the sense of power in pleasing others [Hobbes]
     Full Idea: Lust consists of two appetites together, to please, and to be pleased, and the delight men take in delighting is not sensual, but a pleasure or joy of the mind consisting in the imagination of the power they have so much to please.
     From: Thomas Hobbes (Human Nature [1640], Ch.IX)
     A reaction: Hobbes would rather burst a blood-vessel than admit any altruism. If you take pleasure in pleasing someone else, why can't that simply be because of the other person's pleasure, with which we sympathise, rather than relishing our own 'power'?