Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Particulars in Particular Clothing', 'Conceptions of Truth' and 'Essays on Active Powers 3: Princs of action'

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6 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 12. Paraphrase
18491 The idea of 'making' can be mere conceptual explanation (like 'because') [Künne]
     Full Idea: If we say 'being a child of our parent's sibling makes him your first cousin', that can be paraphrased using 'because', and this is the 'because' of conceptual explanation: the second part elucidates the sense of the first part.
     From: Wolfgang Künne (Conceptions of Truth [2003], 3.5.2)
     A reaction: Fans of truth-making are certainly made uncomfortable by talk of 'what makes this a good painting' or 'this made my day'. They need a bit more sharpness to the concept of 'making' a truth.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
18431 Internal relations combine some tropes into a nucleus, which bears the non-essential tropes [Simons, by Edwards]
     Full Idea: Simons's 'nuclear' option blends features of the substratum and bundle theories. First we have tropes collected by virtue of their internal relations, forming the essential kernel or nucleus. This nucleus then bears the non-essential tropes.
     From: report of Peter Simons (Particulars in Particular Clothing [1994], p.567) by Douglas Edwards - Properties 3.5
     A reaction: [compression of Edwards's summary] This strikes me as being a remarkably good theory. I am not sure of the ontological status of properties, such that they can (unaided) combine to make part of an object. What binds the non-essentials?
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
23674 If an attempted poisoning results in benefits, we still judge the agent a poisoner [Reid]
     Full Idea: If a man should give to his neighbour a potion which he really believes will poison him, but which, in the event, proves salutary, and does much good; in moral estimation, he is a poisoner, and not a benefactor.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 3: Princs of action [1788], 5)
     A reaction: I take Reid to mean that morality concerns how we assess the agent, and not the results of his actions. Mill and Bentham concede that we judge people this way, but don't think morality mainly concerns judging people.
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
23675 We shouldn't do to others what would be a wrong to us in similar circumstances [Reid]
     Full Idea: It is a first principle of morals, that we ought not to do to another what we should think wrong to be done to us in like circumstances.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 3: Princs of action [1788], 6)
     A reaction: This negative form of the rule is more plausible than the positive form, presumably because there is more consensus about what we all dislike than what we all prefer. But presents for people that they would like, not that you like.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
23672 To be virtuous, we must care about duty [Reid]
     Full Idea: A man cannot be virtuous, if he has no regard to duty.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 3: Princs of action [1788], 5)
     A reaction: Thus are Aristotle and Kant united in a simple sentence. Aristotle thinks that a virtuous person thereby sees what is the right thing to do, but I take 'duty' to imply a requirement which comes not from good character but from external society.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / e. Honour
23673 Every worthy man has a principle of honour, and knows what is honourable [Reid]
     Full Idea: I presume it will be granted, that, in every man of real worth, there is a principle of honour, a regard to what is honourable or dishonourable, very distinct from a regard to his interest.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 3: Princs of action [1788], 5)
     A reaction: Note that there is a 'principle' of honour in a person's character, and there are also actions which are intrinsically honourable or not. I fear that only the worthy are honourable, and only the honourable are worthy!