63 ideas
16539 | A definition of a circle will show what it is, and show its generating principle [Lowe] |
Full Idea: If the definition of a circle is based on 'locus of a point', this tells us what a circle is, and it does so by revealing its generating principle, what it takes for a circle to come into being. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 6) | |
A reaction: Lowe says that real definitions, as essences, do not always have to spell out a 'generating principle', but they do in this case. Another approach would be to try to map dependence relations between truths about circles, and see what is basic. |
16540 | Defining an ellipse by conic sections reveals necessities, but not the essence of an ellipse [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Defining an ellipse in terms of the oblique intersection of a cone and a plane (rather than in terms of the sum of the distance between the foci) gives us a necessary property, but not the essence, because the terms are extrinsic to its nature. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 6) | |
A reaction: [compressed wording] Helpful and illuminating. If you say some figure is what results when one thing intersects another, that doesn't tell you what the result actually is. Geometrical essences may be a bit vague, but they are quite meaningful. |
16548 | An essence is what an entity is, revealed by a real definition; this is not an entity in its own right [Lowe] |
Full Idea: An entity's essence is just what that entity is, revealed by its real definition. This isn't a distinct entity, but either the entity itself, or (my view) no entity at all. ..We should not reify essence, as that leads to an infinite regress of essences. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 6) | |
A reaction: The regress problem is a real one, if we wish to treat an essence as some proper and distinct part of an entity. If it is a mechanism, for example, the presumably a mechanism has an essence. No, it doesn't! Levels of explanation! |
16549 | Simple things like 'red' can be given real ostensive definitions [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Is it true that we cannot say, non-circularly, what red is? We cannot find a complex synonym for it, but I think we can provide red with an ostensive real definition. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 6) | |
A reaction: I'm not quite sure how 'real' this definition would be, if it depends on observers (some of whom may be colourblind). In what sense is this act of ostensions a 'definition'? You must distinguish the colour from the texture or shape. |
14227 | We could refer to tables as 'xs that are arranged tablewise' [Inwagen] |
Full Idea: We could paraphrase 'some chairs are heavier than some tables' as 'there are xs that are arranged chairwise and there are ys that are arranged tablewise and the xs are heavier than the ys'. | |
From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 11) | |
A reaction: Liggins notes that this involves plural quantification. Being 'arranged tablewise' has become a rather notorious locution in modern ontology. We still have to retain identity, to pick out the xs. |
10662 | Mereology is 'nihilistic' (just atoms) or 'universal' (no restrictions on what is 'whole') [Inwagen, by Varzi] |
Full Idea: Van Ingwagen writes of 'mereological nihilism' (that only mereological atoms exist) and of 'mereological universalism' (adhering to the principle of Unrestricted Composition). | |
From: report of Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], p.72-) by Achille Varzi - Mereology 4.3 | |
A reaction: They both look mereologically nihilistic to me, in comparison with an account that builds on 'natural' wholes and their parts. You can only be 'unrestricted' if you view the 'wholes' in your vast ontology as pretty meaningless (as Lewis does, Idea 10660). |
17587 | The 'Law' of Excluded Middle needs all propositions to be definitely true or definitely false [Inwagen] |
Full Idea: I think the validity of the 'Law' of Excluded Middle depends on the assumption that every proposition is definitely true or definitely false. | |
From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 18) | |
A reaction: I think this is confused. He cites vagueness as the problem, but that is a problem for Bivalence. If excluded middle is read as 'true or not-true', that leaves the meaning of 'not-true' open, and never mentions the bivalent 'false'. |
17558 | Variables are just like pronouns; syntactic explanations get muddled over dummy letters [Inwagen] |
Full Idea: Explanations in terms of syntax do not satisfactorily distinguish true variables from dummy or schematic letters. Identifying variables with pronouns, however, provides a genuine explanation of what variables are. | |
From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 02) | |
A reaction: I like this because it shows that our ordinary thought and speech use variables all the time ('I've forgotten something - what was it?'). He says syntax is fine for maths, but not for ordinary understanding. |
17583 | There are no heaps [Inwagen] |
Full Idea: Fortunately ....there are no heaps. | |
From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 18) | |
A reaction: This is the nihilist view of (inorganic) physical objects. If a wild view solves all sorts of problems, one should take it serious. It is why I take reductive physicalism about the mind seriously. (Well, it's true, actually) |
17578 | I reject talk of 'stuff', and treat it in terms of particles [Inwagen] |
Full Idea: I have a great deal of difficulty with an ontology that includes 'stuffs' in addition to things. ...I prefer to replace talk of sameness of matter with talk of sameness of particles. | |
From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 14) | |
A reaction: Van Inwagen is wedded to the idea that reality is composed of 'simples' - even if physicists seem now to talk of 'fields' as much as they do about objects in the fields. Has philosophy yet caught up with Maxwell? |
17582 | Singular terms can be vague, because they can contain predicates, which can be vague [Inwagen] |
Full Idea: Since singular terms can contain predicates, and since vague predicates are common, vague singular terms are common. For 'the tallest man that Sally knows' there are lots of men for whom it is unclear whether Sally knows them. | |
From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 17) |
17556 | Material objects are in space and time, move, have a surface and mass, and are made of some stuff [Inwagen] |
Full Idea: A thing is a material object if it occupies space and endures through time and can move about in space (literally move, unlike a shadow or wave or reflection) and has a surface and has a mass and is made of a certain stuff or stuffs. | |
From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 01) | |
A reaction: It is not at all clear what electrons (which must count for him as 'simples') are made of. |
8264 | Maybe table-shaped particles exist, but not tables [Inwagen, by Lowe] |
Full Idea: Van Ingwagen holds that although table-shaped collections of particles exist, tables do not. | |
From: report of Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], Ch.13) by E.J. Lowe - The Possibility of Metaphysics 2.3 | |
A reaction: I find this idea appealing. See the ideas of Trenton Merricks. When you get down to micro-level, it is hard to individuate a table among the force fields, and hard to distinguish a table from a smashed or burnt table. An ontology without objects? |
17565 | Nihilism says composition between single things is impossible [Inwagen] |
Full Idea: Nihilism about objects says there is a Y such that the Xs compose it if and only if there is only one of the Xs. | |
From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 08) | |
A reaction: He says that Unger, the best known 'nihilist' about objects, believes a different version - claiming there are composites, but they never make up the ordinary objects we talk about. |
14228 | If there are no tables, but tables are things arranged tablewise, the denial of tables is a contradiction [Liggins on Inwagen] |
Full Idea: Van Inwagen says 'there are no tables', and 'there are tables' means 'there are some things arranged tablewise'. Presumably 'there are no tables' negates the latter claim, saying no things are arranged tablewise. But he should think that is false. | |
From: comment on Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 10) by David Liggins - Nihilism without Self-Contradiction 3 | |
A reaction: Liggins's nice paper shows that Van Inwagen is in a potential state of contradiction when he starts saying that there are no tables, but that there are things arranged tablewise, and that they amount to tables. Liggins offers him an escape. |
14468 | Actions by artefacts and natural bodies are disguised cooperations, so we don't need them [Inwagen] |
Full Idea: All the activities apparently carried out by shelves and stars and other artefacts and natural bodies can be understood as disguised cooperative activities. And, therefore, we are not forced to grant existence to any artefacts or natural bodies. | |
From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 12) | |
A reaction: In 'the crowd tore her to pieces' are we forced to accept the existence of a crowd? We can't say 'Jack tore her to pieces' and 'Jill tore her to pieces'. If a plural quantification is unavoidable, we have to accept the plurality. Perhaps. |
17571 | Every physical thing is either a living organism or a simple [Inwagen] |
Full Idea: The thesis about composition and parthood that I am advocating has far-reaching ontological consequences: that every physical thing is either a living organism or a simple. | |
From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 10) | |
A reaction: A 'simple' is a placeholder for anything considered to be a fundamental unit of existence (such as an electron or a quark). This amazingly sharp distinction strikes me as utterly implausible. There is too much in the middle ground. |
17562 | The statue and lump seem to share parts, but the statue is not part of the lump [Inwagen] |
Full Idea: Those who believe that the statue is distinct from the lump should concede that whatever shares a part with the statue shares a part with the lump but deny that the statue is a part of the lump. | |
From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 05) | |
A reaction: Standard mereology says if they share all their parts then they are the same thing, so it is hard to explain how they are 'distinct'. The distinction is only modal - that they could be separated (by squashing, or by part substitution). |
17574 | If you knead clay you make an infinite series of objects, but they are rearrangements, not creations [Inwagen] |
Full Idea: If you can make a (random) gollyswoggle by accident by kneading clay, then you must be causing the generation and corruption of a series of objects of infinitesimal duration. ...We have not augmented the furniture of the world but only rearranged it. | |
From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 13) | |
A reaction: Van Inwagen's final conclusion is a bit crazy, but I am in sympathy with his general scepticism about what sorts of things definitively constitute 'objects'. He overrates simples, and he overrates lives. |
16545 | The essence of lumps and statues shows that two objects coincide but are numerically distinct [Lowe] |
Full Idea: It is a metaphysically necessary truth, obtaining in virtue of the essences of such objects (of what a bronze statue and a lump of bronze are) that when it exists a bronze statue coincides with a lump of bronze, which is numerically distinct from it. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 6) | |
A reaction: I think it is nonsense to treat the lump and statue as two objects. It is essential that a statue be made of a lump, and essential that a lump have a shape, so to treat the lump and the shape as two different objects is a failure to grasp the essence. |
16546 | The essence of a bronze statue shows that it could be made of different bronze [Lowe] |
Full Idea: It is a metaphysical possibility, obtaining in virtue of the essences of such objects, that the same bronze statue should coincide with different lumps of bronze at different times. (..they have different persistence conditions). | |
From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 6) | |
A reaction: If the fame of a statue were that it had been made by melting down the shield of Achilles (say), then the bronze it was made of would be its most important feature. Essences are more contextual than Lowe might wish. |
17531 | I assume matter is particulate, made up of 'simples' [Inwagen] |
Full Idea: I assume in this book that matter is ultimately particulate. Every material being is composed of things that have no proper parts: 'elementary particles' or 'mereological atoms' or 'metaphysical simples'. | |
From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], Pref) | |
A reaction: It may be that modern physics doesn't support this, if 'fields' is the best term for what is fundamental. Best to treat his book as hypothetical - IF there are just simples, proceed as follows. |
17560 | If contact causes composition, do two colliding balls briefly make one object? [Inwagen] |
Full Idea: If composition just requires contact, if I cause the cue ball to rebound from the eight ball, do I thereby create a short-lived object shaped like two slightly flattened spheres in contact? | |
From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 03) | |
A reaction: [compressed] |
17561 | If bricks compose a house, that is at least one thing, but it might be many things [Inwagen] |
Full Idea: If composition just requires contact, that tells us that the bricks of a house compose at least one thing; it does not tell us that they also compose at most one thing. | |
From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 04) |
17566 | I think parthood involves causation, and not just a reasonably stable spatial relationship [Inwagen] |
Full Idea: I propose that parthood essentially involves causation. Too many philosophers have supposed that objects compose something when and only when they stand in some (more or less stable) spatial relationship to one another. | |
From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 09) | |
A reaction: I have to say that I like this, even though it comes from a thinker who is close to nihilism about ordinary non-living objects. He goes on to say that only a 'life' provides the right sort of causal relationship. |
14230 | We can deny whole objects but accept parts, by referring to them as plurals within things [Inwagen, by Liggins] |
Full Idea: Van Inwagen's claim that nothing has parts causes incredulity. ..But the problem is not with endorsing the sentence 'Some things have parts'; it is with interpreting this sentence by means of singular resources rather than plural ones. | |
From: report of Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 7) by David Liggins - Nihilism without Self-Contradiction | |
A reaction: Van Inwagen notoriously denies the existence of normal physical objects. Liggins shows that modern formal plural quantification gives a better way of presenting his theory, by accepting tables and parts of tables as plurals of basic entities. |
17557 | Special Composition Question: when is a thing part of something? [Inwagen] |
Full Idea: The Special Composition Question asks, In what circumstances is a thing a (proper) part of something? | |
From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 02) | |
A reaction: [He qualifies this formulation as 'misleading'] It's a really nice basic question for the metaphysics of objects. |
16551 | Grasping an essence is just grasping a real definition [Lowe] |
Full Idea: All that grasping an essence amounts to is understanding a real definition, that is, understanding a special kind of proposition. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 7) | |
A reaction: He refuses to 'reify' an essence, and says it is not an entity, so he seems to think that the definition is the essence, but Aristotle and I take the essence to be what is picked out by the correct definition - not the definition itself. |
17564 | The essence of a star includes the released binding energy which keeps it from collapse [Inwagen] |
Full Idea: I think it is part of the essence of a star that the radiation pressures that oppose the star's tendency to gravitational collapse has its source in the release of no-longer-needed nuclear binding energy when colliding nuclei fuse in the star's hot core. | |
From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 07) | |
A reaction: A perfect example of giving the essence of something as the bottom level of its explanation. This even comes from someone who doesn't really believe in stars! |
16542 | Explanation can't give an account of essence, because it is too multi-faceted [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Explanation is a multifaceted one, with many species (logical, mathematical, causal, teleological, and psychological), ..so it is not a notion fit to be appealed to in order to frame a perspicuous account of essence. That is one species of explanation. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 6) | |
A reaction: This directly attacks the core of my thesis! His parenthetical list does not give types of explanation. If I say this explanation is 'psychological', that says nothing about what explanation is. All of his instances could rest on essences. |
17575 | The persistence of artifacts always covertly involves intelligent beings [Inwagen] |
Full Idea: Statements that are apparently about the persistence of artifacts make covert reference to the dispositions of intelligent beings to maintain certain arrangements of matter. | |
From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 13) | |
A reaction: If you build a self-sustaining windmill that pumps water, that seems to have an identity of its own, apart from the intentions of whoever makes it and repairs it. The function of an artefact is not just the function we want it to have. |
16552 | If we must know some entity to know an essence, we lack a faculty to do that [Lowe] |
Full Idea: If knowledge of essence were by acquaintance of a special kind of entity, we would doubt our ability to grasp the essence of things. For what faculty could be involved in this special kind of acquaintance? | |
From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 7) | |
A reaction: This is Lockean empirical scepticism about essences, but I take the view that sometimes you can be acquainted with an essence, but more often you correctly infer it from you acquaintance - and this is just what scientists do. |
17577 | When an electron 'leaps' to another orbit, is the new one the same electron? [Inwagen] |
Full Idea: Is the 'new' electron in the lower orbit the one that was in the higher orbit? Physics, as far as I can tell, has nothing to say about this. | |
From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 14) | |
A reaction: I suspect that physicists would say that philosophers are worrying about such questions because they haven't grasped the new conceptual scheme that emerged in 1926. The poor mutts insist on hanging on to 'objects'. |
17589 | If you reject transitivity of vague identity, there is no Ship of Theseus problem [Inwagen] |
Full Idea: If you have rejected the Principle of the Transitivity of (vague) Identity, it is hard to see how the problem of the Ship of Theseus could arise. | |
From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 18) | |
A reaction: I think this may well be the best solution to the whole problem |
17588 | We should talk of the transitivity of 'identity', and of 'definite identity' [Inwagen] |
Full Idea: In some contexts, the principle of 'the transitivity of identity' should be called 'the transitivity of definite identity'. | |
From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 18) | |
A reaction: He is making room for a person to retain identity despite having changed. Applause from me. |
16533 | Logical necessities, based on laws of logic, are a proper sub-class of metaphysical necessities [Lowe] |
Full Idea: If logically necessary truths are consequences of the laws of logic, then I think they are only a proper sub-class of the class of metaphysically necessary truths. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 1) | |
A reaction: The problem for this is unusual and bizarre systems of logic, or systems that contradict one another. This idea is only plausible if you talk about the truths derived from some roughly 'classical' core of logic. 'Tonk' won't do it! |
16531 | 'Metaphysical' necessity is absolute and objective - the strongest kind of necessity [Lowe] |
Full Idea: By 'metaphysical' necessity I mean necessity of the strongest possible kind - absolute necessity - and I take it to be an objective kind of necessity, rather than being something mind-dependent. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 1) | |
A reaction: See Bob Hale for the possibility that 'absolute' and 'metaphysical' necessity might come apart. I think I believe in metaphysical necessity, but I'm uneasy about 'absolute' necessity. That may be discredited by the sceptics. |
16532 | 'Epistemic' necessity is better called 'certainty' [Lowe] |
Full Idea: 'Epistemic' necessity is more properly to be called 'certainty'. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 1) | |
A reaction: Sounds wrong. Surely I can be totally certain of a contingent truth? |
17572 | Actuality proves possibility, but that doesn't explain how it is possible [Inwagen] |
Full Idea: A proof of actuality is a proof of possibility, but that does not invariably explain the possibility whose existence it demonstrates, for we may know that a certain thing is actual (and hence possible) but have no explanation of how it could be possible. | |
From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 12) | |
A reaction: I like this, because my project is to see all of philosophy in terms of explanation rather than of description. |
16543 | If an essence implies p, then p is an essential truth, and hence metaphysically necessary [Lowe] |
Full Idea: If we can truly affirm that it is part of the essence of some entity that p is the case, then p is an essential truth and so a metaphysically necessary truth. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 6) | |
A reaction: This feels too quick. He is trying to expound the idea (which I like) that necessity derives from essences, and not vice versa. Is it a metaphysical necessity that there are no moths in my wardrobe, because mothballs have driven them away? Maybe. |
16544 | Metaphysical necessity is either an essential truth, or rests on essential truths [Lowe] |
Full Idea: A metaphysically necessary truth is a truth which is either an essential truth or a truth that obtains in virtue of the essences of two or more distinct things. Hence all metaphysical necessity is grounded in essence. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 6) | |
A reaction: Lowe is endeavouring to give an exposition of the approach advocated by Kit Fine. I divide necessities 'because of' things (such as essences) from necessities 'for' things, such as situations or events. |
16538 | We could give up possible worlds if we based necessity on essences [Lowe] |
Full Idea: If we explicate the notion of metaphysical necessity in terms of the notion of essence, rather than vice versa, this may enable us to dispense with the language of possible worlds as a means of explicating modal statements. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 6) | |
A reaction: This is the approach I favour, though I am not convinced that the two approaches are in competition, since essentialism gives the driving force for necessity, whereas possible worlds map the logic and semantics of it. |
17579 | Counterparts reduce counterfactual identity to problems about similarity relations [Inwagen] |
Full Idea: Counterpart Theory essentially reduces all problems about counterfactual identity to problems about choosing appropriate similarity relations. That is, Counterpart Theory essentially eliminates problems of counterfactual identity as such. | |
From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 14) |
17590 | A merely possible object clearly isn't there, so that is a defective notion [Inwagen] |
Full Idea: The notion of a merely possible object is an even more defective notion than the notion of a borderline object; after all, a merely possible object is an object that definitely isn't there. | |
From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 19) |
17591 | Merely possible objects must be consistent properties, or haecceities [Inwagen] |
Full Idea: Talk of merely possible objects may be redeemed in either maximally consistent sets of properties or in haecceities. | |
From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 19) |
16534 | 'Intuitions' are just unreliable 'hunches'; over centuries intuitions change enormously [Lowe] |
Full Idea: I suspect that 'intuitions' and 'hunches' are pretty much the same thing, and pretty useless as sources of knowledge. …Things that seemed intuitively true to our forebears a century or two ago often by no means seem intuitively true to us now. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 2) | |
A reaction: I don't accept this. Intuitions change a lot over the centuries because the reliable knowledge which informs intuitions has also changed a lot. Arguments and evidence may nail individual truths, but coherence must rest on intuition. |
6445 | You have knowledge if you can rule out all the relevant alternatives to what you believe [Dretske, by DeRose] |
Full Idea: The 'Relevant Alternatives' theory of knowledge said the main ingredient that must be added to true belief to make knowledge is that one be in a position to rule out all the relevant alternatives to what one believes. | |
From: report of Fred Dretske (Epistemic Operators [1970]) by Keith DeRose - Intro: Responding to Skepticism §6 | |
A reaction: Dretske and Nozick are associated with this strategy. There will obviously be a problem in defining 'relevant'. Otherwise it sounds quite close to Plato's suggestion that we need true belief with 'logos'. |
16535 | A concept is a way of thinking of things or kinds, whether or not they exist [Lowe] |
Full Idea: The nearest I can get to a quick definition is to say that a concept is a way of thinking of some thing or kind of things, whether or not a really existent thing or kind of things. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 2) | |
A reaction: The focus on 'things' seems rather narrow. Are relations things? He makes concepts sound adverbial, so that there is thinking going on, and then we add 'ways' of doing it. Thinking depends on concepts, not concepts on thinking. |
16550 | Direct reference doesn't seem to require that thinkers know what it is they are thinking about [Lowe] |
Full Idea: It may be objected that currently prevailing causal or 'direct' theories of reference precisely deny that a thinker must know what it is the he or she is thinking about in order to be able to think about it. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 7) | |
A reaction: Lowe says that at least sometimes we have to know that we are thinking about, so this account of reference can't be universally true. My solution is to pull identity and essence apart. You only need identity, not essence, for reference. |
16547 | H2O isn't necessary, because different laws of nature might affect how O and H combine [Lowe] |
Full Idea: It is not metaphysically necessary that water is composed of H2O molecules, because the natural laws governing the chemical behaviour of hydrogen and oxygen atoms could have been significantly different, so they might not have composed that substance. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 6) | |
A reaction: I fear this may be incoherent, as science. See Bird on why salt must dissolve in water. There can't (I suspect) be a law which keeps O and H the same, and yet makes them combine differently. |
17563 | The strong force pulls, but also pushes apart if nucleons get too close together [Inwagen] |
Full Idea: The strong force doesn't always pull nucleons together, but pushes them apart if they get too close. | |
From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 07) | |
A reaction: Philosophers tend to learn their physics from other philosophers. But that's because philosophers are brilliant at picking out the interesting parts of physics, and skipping the boring stuff. |
17559 | Is one atom a piece of gold, or is a sizable group of atoms required? [Inwagen] |
Full Idea: A physicist once told me that of course a gold atom was a piece of gold, and a physical chemist has assured me that the smallest possible piece of gold would have to be composed of sixteen or seventeen atoms. | |
From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 01) | |
A reaction: The issue is at what point all the properties that we normally begin to associate with gold begin to appear. One water molecule can hardly have a degree of viscosity or liquidity. |
17584 | Some events are only borderline cases of lives [Inwagen] |
Full Idea: There are events of which it is neither definitely true nor definitely false that those events are lives. I do not see how we can deny this. | |
From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 18) | |
A reaction: Very frustrating, since this is my main objection to Van Inwagen's distinction between unified lives and mere collections of simples. Some boundaries are real enough, despite their vagueness, and others indicate that there is no real distinction. |
17586 | At the lower level, life trails off into mere molecular interaction [Inwagen] |
Full Idea: The lives of the lower links of the Great Chain of Being trail off into vague, temporary episodes of molecular interaction. | |
From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 18) | |
A reaction: His case involves conceding all sorts of vagueness to life, but asserting the utter distinctness of the full blown cases of more elaborate life. I don't really concede the distinction. |
17567 | A flame is like a life, but not nearly so well individuated [Inwagen] |
Full Idea: A flame, though it is a self-maintaining event, does not seem to be nearly so well individuated as a life. | |
From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 09) | |
A reaction: This is to counter the standard problem that if you attempt to define 'life', fire turns out to tick nearly all the same boxes. The concept of 'individuated' often strikes me as unsatisfactory. How does a bonfire fail to be individuated? |
17568 | A tumour may spread a sort of life, but it is not a life, or an organism [Inwagen] |
Full Idea: A tumour is not an organism (or a parasite) and there is no self-regulating event that is its life. It does not fill one space, but is a locus within which a certain sort of thing is happening: the spreading of a certain sort of (mass-term) life. | |
From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 09) |
17569 | Unlike waves, lives are 'jealous'; it is almost impossible for them to overlap [Inwagen] |
Full Idea: A wave is not a 'jealous' event. Lives, however, are jealous. It cannot be that the activities of the Xs constitute at one and the same time two lives. Only in certain special cases can two lives overlap. | |
From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 09) |
17580 | One's mental and other life is centred on the brain, unlike any other part of the body [Inwagen] |
Full Idea: One's life - not simply one's mental life - is centered in the activity of the simples that virtually compose one's brain in a way in which it is not centered in the activity of any of the other simples that compose one. | |
From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 15) | |
A reaction: This justifies the common view that 'one follows one's brain'. I take that to mean that my brain embodies my essence. I would read 'centered on' as 'explains'. |
17570 | The chemical reactions in a human life involve about sixteen elements [Inwagen] |
Full Idea: There are sixteen or so chemical elements involved in those chemical reactions that collectively constitute the life of a human being. | |
From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 09) |
17581 | Being part of an organism's life is a matter of degree, and vague [Inwagen] |
Full Idea: Being caught up in the life of an organism is, like being rich or being tall, a matter of degree, and is in that sense a vague condition. | |
From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 17) | |
A reaction: Van Inwagen is trying to cover himself, given that he makes a sharp distinction between living organisms, which are unified objects, and everything else, which isn't. There may be a vague centre to a 'life', as well as vague boundaries. |
17576 | If God were to 'reassemble' my atoms of ten years ago, the result would certainly not be me [Inwagen] |
Full Idea: If God were to 'reassemble' the atoms that composed me ten years ago, the resulting organism would certainly not be me. | |
From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 13) | |
A reaction: What is obvious to Van Inwagen is not obvious to me. He thinks lives are special. Such examples just leave us bewildered about what counts as 'the same', because our concept of sameness wasn't designed to deal with such cases. |
17585 | Life is vague at both ends, but could it be totally vague? [Inwagen] |
Full Idea: Individual human lives are infected with vagueness at both ends. ...But could there be a 'borderline life'? | |
From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 18) | |
A reaction: Van Inwagen says (p.239) that there may be wholly vague lives, though it would suit his case better if there were not. |
17573 | There is no reason to think that mere existence is a valuable thing [Inwagen] |
Full Idea: There is no reason to suppose - whatever Saint Anselm and Descartes may have thought - that mere existence is a valuable thing. | |
From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 12) | |
A reaction: This is one of the simplest and most powerful objections to the Ontological Argument. God's existence may be of great value, but the existence of Hitler wasn't. |