6 ideas
6564 | To affirm 'p and not-p' is to have mislearned 'and' or 'not' [Quine] |
Full Idea: To affirm a compound of the form 'p and not-p' is just to have mislearned one or both of these particles. | |
From: Willard Quine (From Stimulus to Science [1995], p.23), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.1 | |
A reaction: Quoted by Fogelin. This summarises the view of logic developed by the young Wittgenstein, that logical terms are 'operators', rather than referring terms. Of course the speaker may have a compartmentalised mind, or not understand 'p' properly. |
14596 | Call 'nominalism' the denial of numbers, properties, relations and sets [Dorr] |
Full Idea: Just as there are no numbers or properties, there are no relations (like 'being heavier than' or 'betweenness'), or sets. I will provisionally use 'nominalism' for the conjunction of these four claims. | |
From: Cian Dorr (There Are No Abstract Objects [2008], 1) | |
A reaction: If you are going to be a nominalist, do it properly! My starting point in metaphysics is strong sympathy with this view. Right now [Tues 22nd Nov 2011, 10:57 am GMT] I think it is correct. |
14597 | Natural Class Nominalism says there are primitive classes of things resembling in one respect [Dorr] |
Full Idea: Natural Class Nominalists take as primitive the notion of a 'natural' class - a class of things that all resemble one another in some one respect and resemble nothing else in that respect. | |
From: Cian Dorr (There Are No Abstract Objects [2008], 4) | |
A reaction: Dorr rejects this view because he doesn't believe in 'classes'. How committed to classes do you have to be before you are permitted to talk about them? All vocabulary (such as 'resemble') seems metaphysically tainted in this area. |
14598 | Abstracta imply non-logical brute necessities, so only nominalists can deny such things [Dorr] |
Full Idea: If there are abstract objects, there are necessary truths about these things that cannot be reduced to truths of logic. So only the nominalist, who denies that there are any such things, can adequately respect the idea that there are no brute necessities. | |
From: Cian Dorr (There Are No Abstract Objects [2008], 4) | |
A reaction: This is where two plates of my personal philosophy grind horribly against one another. I love nominalism, and I love natural necessities. They meet like a ring-species in evolution. I'll just call it a 'paradox', and move on (swiftly). |
22745 | Pherecydes said the first principle and element is earth [Pherecydes, by Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Pherecydes of Syros said that the principle and element of all things is earth. | |
From: report of Pherecydes (fragments/reports [c.600 BCE]) by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Physicists (two books) I.360 | |
A reaction: Sextus is giving the history, and mentions it before saying that Thales thought it was water. Earth seems a sensible starting point, and I am guessing that Thales was trying to think a bit more deeply than Pherecydes about it. |
5883 | Pherecydes was the first to say that the soul is eternal [Pherecydes, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: As far as the literature tells us, Pherecydes of Syros was the first who pronounced the souls of men to be eternal. | |
From: report of Pherecydes (fragments/reports [c.600 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - Tusculan Disputations I.xvi.38 | |
A reaction: Presumably before that it was the physical person who arrived in the Underworld. The Hindu tradition seems to require the soul to be very long-lived, if not eternal. Why did Pherecydes come up with this idea? |