36 ideas
| 5331 | You can't infer that because you have a hidden birth-mark, everybody else does [Ayer] |
| Full Idea: My knowing that I had a hidden birth-mark would not entitle me to infer with any great degree of confidence that the same was true of everybody else. | |
| From: A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], §VI.E) | |
| A reaction: This is the notorious 'induction from a single case' which was used by Mill to prove that other minds exist. It is a very nice illustration of the weakness of arguments from analogy. Probably analogy on its own is useless, but is a key part of induction. |
| 23853 | Truth is not a object we love - it is the radiant manifestation of reality [Weil] |
| Full Idea: Love of truth is not a correct form of expression. Truth is not an object of love. It is not an object at all. …Truth is the radiant manifestation of reality. | |
| From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], III 'Growing') | |
| A reaction: Wow! Love that one! |
| 23855 | Creation produced a network or web of determinations [Weil] |
| Full Idea: What is sovereign in this world is determinateness, limit. Eternal Wisdom imprisons this universe in a network, a web of determinations. | |
| From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], III 'Growth') | |
| A reaction: Love this, because I take 'determination' to be the defining relationship in ontology. It covers both physical causation and abstract necessities. |
| 2611 | It is currently held that quantifying over something implies belief in its existence [Ayer] |
| Full Idea: It is currently held that we are committed to a belief in the existence of anything over which we quantify. | |
| From: A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], IX.C) |
| 16520 | We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual [Ayer] |
| Full Idea: We can significantly ask what properties it is necessary for something to possess in order to be a thing of such and such a kind, since that asks what properties enter into the definition of the kind. But there is no such definition of the individual. | |
| From: A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], 9.A.5) | |
| A reaction: [Quoted, not surprisingly, by Wiggins] Illuminating. If essence is just about necessary properties, I begin to see why the sortal might be favoured. I take it to concern explanatory mechanisms, and hence the individual. |
| 2613 | The theory of other minds has no rival [Ayer] |
| Full Idea: The theory that other people besides oneself have mental states is one that has no serious rival. | |
| From: A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], §VI.E) | |
| A reaction: See 3463, where Searle says there is no such thing as our "theory" about other minds. In a science fiction situation (see 'Blade Runner'), this unrivalled theory could quickly unravel. It could even be a fact that you are the only humanoid with a mind. |
| 5328 | Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds [Ayer] |
| Full Idea: In 1936 I combined a mentalistic analysis of the propositions in which one attributes experiences to oneself with a behaviouristic analysis of the propositions in which one attributes experiences to others. | |
| From: A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], §VI.D) | |
| A reaction: He then criticises his view for inconsistency. Ryle preferred a behaviouristic account of introspection, but Ayer calls this 'ridiculous'. Ayer hunts for a compromise, but then settles for the right answer, which makes mentalism the 'best explanation'. |
| 5330 | Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events [Ayer] |
| Full Idea: The acceptance of physicalism undercuts the other minds problem by equating experiences with events in the brain, which are publicly observable. | |
| From: A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], §VI.E) | |
| A reaction: It strikes me that if we could actually observe the operations of one another's brains, a great many of the problems of philosophy would never have appeared in the first place. Imagine a transparent skull and brain, with coloured waves moving through it. |
| 5326 | Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements [Ayer] |
| Full Idea: The ground for thinking that qualia are only experiences because they relate to a unifying subject is that they have to be identified, by being brought under concepts, and giving rise to judgements which usually go beyond them. | |
| From: A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], §VI.B) | |
| A reaction: Thus one of Hume's greatest fans gives the clearest objection to Hume. It strikes me as a very powerful objection, better than anything Carruthers offers (1394,1395,1396). The conceptual element is very hard to disentangle from the qualia. |
| 5325 | Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject? [Ayer] |
| Full Idea: Is the character of being an item of experience one that can accrue to a quale through its relation to other qualia, or must it consist in a relation to a subject, which is conscious of these elements and distinct from them? | |
| From: A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], §VI.B) | |
| A reaction: When nicely put like this, it is hard to see how qualia could be experiences just because they relate to one another. It begs the question of what is causing the relationship. There seems to be a Cogito-like assumption of a thinker. |
| 5324 | Bodily identity and memory work together to establish personal identity [Ayer] |
| Full Idea: In general the two criteria of memory and bodily identity work together. | |
| From: A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], §VI.B) | |
| A reaction: This seems better than any simplistic one-criterion approach. In life we use different criteria for our own identity, as when dreaming, or waking with a hangover, or wondering if we are dead after an accident. |
| 5322 | Self-consciousness is not basic, because experiences are not instrinsically marked with ownership [Ayer] |
| Full Idea: Self-consciousness is not a primitive datum, or in other words the observer's experiences are not intrinsically marked as his own. | |
| From: A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], §VI.A) | |
| A reaction: This is a very Humean, ruthlessly empiricist view of the matter. Plenty of philosophers (existentialists, or Charles Taylor) would say that our experiences have our interests or values built into them. Why are they experiences, and not just events? |
| 5327 | Temporal gaps in the consciousness of a spirit could not be bridged by memories [Ayer] |
| Full Idea: If there were temporal gaps in the consciousness of disembodied spirits, the occurrences of memory-experiences would not be sufficient to bridge them. | |
| From: A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], §VI.C) | |
| A reaction: Ayer is very sympathetic to the idea that the body is a key ingredient in personal identity. Without a body, there would be no criteria at all for the continuity of a spirit which lost consciousness for a while, since consciousness is all it is. |
| 5329 | Why shouldn't we say brain depends on mind? Better explanation! [Ayer] |
| Full Idea: If mind and brain exactly correspond we have as good ground for saying the brain depends on the mind as the other way round; if predominance is given to the brain, the reason is that it fits into a wider explanatory system. | |
| From: A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], §VI.D) | |
| A reaction: A small but significant point. If an 'identity' theory is to be developed, then this step in the argument has to be justified. It is tempting here to move to the eliminativist view, because we no longer have to worry about a 'direction of priority'. |
| 2610 | Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences [Ayer] |
| Full Idea: Our talk of propositions should not be regarded as anything more than a concise way of talking about equivalent sentences. | |
| From: A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], IX.C) | |
| A reaction: Wrong, though I can see why he says it. We struggle to express difficult propositions by offering several similar (but not equivalent) sentences. What is the criterion for deciding his 'equivalence'? |
| 22481 | There is no restitution after a dilemma, if it only involved the agent, or just needed an explanation [Foot, by PG] |
| Full Idea: The 'remainder' after a dilemma can't be a matter of apology and restitution, because the dilemma may only involve the agent's own life, and in the case of broken promises we only owe an explanation, if the breaking is justifiable. | |
| From: report of Philippa Foot (Moral Dilemmas Revisited [1995], p.183) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
| A reaction: But what if someone has been financially ruined by it? If the agent feels guilty about that, is getting over it the rational thing to do? (Foot says that is an new obligation, and not part of the original dilemma). |
| 22482 | I can't understand how someone can be necessarily wrong whatever he does [Foot] |
| Full Idea: I do not see how …we can know how to interpret the idea of a situation in which someone will necessarily be wrong whatever he does. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Moral Dilemmas Revisited [1995], p.188) | |
| A reaction: Seems right. If you think of hideous dilemmas (frequent in wartime), there must always be a right thing to do (or two equally right things to do), even if the outcome is fairly hideous. Just distinguish the right from the good. |
| 23848 | The aesthete's treatment of beauty as amusement is sacreligious; beauty should nourish [Weil] |
| Full Idea: The aesthete's point of view is sacreligious, not only in matters of religion but even in those of art. It consists in amusing oneself with beauty by handling it and looking at it. Beauty is something to be eaten: it is a food. | |
| From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], II 'Country') | |
| A reaction: She is endorsing the 'food' view against the 'handling' view. Beauty should nourish, she says. |
| 23854 | Beauty is the proof of what is good [Weil] |
| Full Idea: When the subject in question is the good, beauty is a rigorous and positive proof. | |
| From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], III 'Growing') | |
| A reaction: Purest platonism! It is incomprehensible to say 'this thing is evil, but it is beautiful'. But there are plenty of things which strike me as beautiful, without connecting that in any way to moral goodness. |
| 23837 | Respect is our only obligation, which can only be expressed through deeds, not words [Weil] |
| Full Idea: Humans have only one obligation: respect. The obligation is only performed if the respect is effectively expressed in a real, not a fictitious, way; and this can only be done through the medium of Man's earthly needs. | |
| From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], I 'Needs') | |
| A reaction: She says man's 'eternal destiny' imposes this obligation. I read this as saying that you should not imagine that you treat people respectfully if you are merely polite to them. Col. Pickering and Eliza Doolittle! Respect is the supreme virtue. |
| 23844 | The most important human need is to have multiple roots [Weil] |
| Full Idea: To be rooted is perhaps the most important and least recognised need of the human soul. …Every human being needs to have multiple roots. | |
| From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], II 'Uprootedness') | |
| A reaction: Agree. I think we are just like trees, in that we need roots to grow well, and plenty of space to fully flourish. Identifying those roots is the main task of parents and teachers. |
| 23838 | The need for order stands above all others, and is understood via the other needs [Weil] |
| Full Idea: Order is the first need of all; it evens stands above all needs properly so-called. To be able to conceive it we must know what the other needs are. | |
| From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], I 'Order') | |
| A reaction: This may be music to conservative ears, but you should examine Weil's other ideas to see what she has in mind. |
| 23836 | Obligations only bind individuals, not collectives [Weil] |
| Full Idea: Obligations are only binding on human beings. There are no obligations for collectivities, as such. | |
| From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], I 'Needs') | |
| A reaction: I take it that 'as such' excludes the institutions created by collectivities, such as parliaments and courts. A nomadic tribe seems to have no duties, as a tribe, apart from mutual obligations among its members. Does this excuse crimes by the tribe? |
| 23840 | A citizen should be able to understand the whole of society [Weil] |
| Full Idea: A man needs to be able to encompass in thought the entire range of activity of the social organism to which he belongs. | |
| From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], I 'Responsibility') | |
| A reaction: She is urging the active involvement of citizens in decision making - for which they need appropriate knowledge. |
| 23843 | Even the poorest should feel collective ownership, and participation in grand display [Weil] |
| Full Idea: Participation in collective possessions is important. Where real civic life exists, each feels he has a personal ownership in the public monuments, gardens, ceremonial pomp and circumstances; sumptuousness is thus place within the reach of the poorest. | |
| From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], I 'Collective') | |
| A reaction: OK with gardens. Dubious about fobbing the poor off with pomp. Monuments are a modern controversy, when they turn out to commemorate slavery and colonial conquest. I agree with her basic thought. |
| 23846 | Culture is an instrument for creating an ongoing succession of teachers [Weil] |
| Full Idea: Culture - as we know it - is an instrument manipulated by teachers for manufacturing more teachers, who, in their turn, will manufacture still more teachers. | |
| From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], II 'Towns') | |
| A reaction: Lot of truth in this. We tend to view our greatest successes in students who become academics and teachers. Culture is very much seen as something which must be 'transmitted' to each new generation. |
| 23839 | A lifelong head of society should only be a symbol, not a ruler [Weil] |
| Full Idea: Wherever a man is placed for life at the head of a social organism, he ought to be a symbol and not a ruler, as is the case with the King of England. | |
| From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], I 'Obedience') | |
| A reaction: Nice to hear a radical French thinker endorsing an ancient British tradition! She may not be endorsing a lifelong head of state. Lifelong rulers are the main agents of totalitarianism. |
| 23842 | Party politics in a democracy can't avoid an anti-democratic party [Weil] |
| Full Idea: A democracy where public life is made up of strife between political parties is incapable of preventing the formation of a party whose avowed aim is the overthrow of that democracy. | |
| From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], I 'Opinion') | |
| A reaction: We have seen this around 2020 in the USA and the UK. Freedom is compulsory? Weil hates political parties (as did Rousseau). |
| 23847 | Socialism tends to make a proletariat of the whole population [Weil] |
| Full Idea: What is called Socialism tends to force everybody without distinction into the proletarian condition. | |
| From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], II 'Towns') | |
| A reaction: For example, Weil favours maximising private house ownership, rather than communally owned housing. She is describing wholesale nationalisation. I would incline towards nationalisation only of all basic central services. |
| 23845 | The capitalists neglect the people and the nation, and even their own interests [Weil] |
| Full Idea: The capitalists have betrayed their calling by criminally neglecting not only the interests of the people, not only those of the nation, but even their own. | |
| From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], II 'Towns') | |
| A reaction: It is certainly true that the dedicated capitalist has little loyalty either to the people or to the nation. She doesn't spell out their failure of self-interest. I guess it produces a way of life they don't really want, deep down. |
| 23841 | By making money the sole human measure, inequality has become universal [Weil] |
| Full Idea: By making money the sole, or almost the sole, motive of all actions, the sole, or almost the sole, measure of all things, the poison of inequality has been introduced everywhere. | |
| From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], I 'Equality') | |
| A reaction: Presumably this dates right back to the invention of money, and then increases with the endless rise of capitalism. |
| 23835 | People have duties, and only have rights because of the obligations of others to them [Weil] |
| Full Idea: A right is effectual only in relation to its corresponding obligation, springing not from the individual who possesses it, but from others who consider themselves under an obligation to him. In isolation a man only has duties, and only others have rights. | |
| From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], I 'Needs') | |
| A reaction: This seems correct, and obviously refutes the idea that people have intrinsic natural rights. However, it may be our sense of what nature requires which gives rise to the obligations we feel towards others. |
| 23852 | To punish people we must ourselves be innocent - but that undermines the desire to punish [Weil] |
| Full Idea: In order to have the right to punish the guilty, we ought first of all to purify ourselves of their crimes. …But once this is accomplished we shall no longer feel the least desire to punish, or as little as possible and with extreme sorrow. | |
| From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], III 'Growing') | |
| A reaction: Elsewhere she endorses punishment, as a social necessity, and a redemption for the wicked. This idea looks like a bit of a change of heart. She may be thinking of Jesus on the mote in someone's eye. |
| 23850 | The soldier-civilian distinction should be abolished; every citizen is committed to a war [Weil] |
| Full Idea: The distinction between soldiers and civilians, which the pressure of circumstances has already almost obliterated, should be entirely abolished. Every individual in the population owes his country the whole of his strength, resources and life itself. | |
| From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], II 'Nation') | |
| A reaction: Written in London in 1943. The year carpet bombing seriously escalated. The facts of warfare can change the ethics. |
| 23851 | Education is essentially motivation [Weil] |
| Full Idea: Education - whether its object be children or adults, individuals or an entire people, or even oneself - consists in creating motives. | |
| From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], III 'Growing') | |
| A reaction: I can't disagree. Intellectual motivation is simply what we find interesting, and there is no formula for that. A teacher can teach a good session, and only 5% of the pupils find it interesting. A bad session could be life-changing for one student. |
| 23849 | Religion should quietly suffuse all human life with its light [Weil] |
| Full Idea: The proper function of religion is to suffuse with its light all secular life, public or private, without in any way dominating it. | |
| From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], II 'Nation') | |
| A reaction: Even for the non-religious there is something attractive about some view of the world which 'suffuses our lives with light'. It probably describes medieval Christendom, but that contained an awful lot of darkness. |