18 ideas
11223 | Definitions usually have a term, a 'definiendum' containing the term, and a defining 'definiens' [Gupta] |
Full Idea: Many definitions have three elements: the term that is defined, an expression containing the defined term (the 'definiendum'), and another expression (the 'definiens') that is equated by the definition with this expression. | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 2) | |
A reaction: He notes that the definiendum and the definiens are assumed to be in the 'same logical category', which is a right can of worms. |
11215 | Notable definitions have been of piety (Plato), God (Anselm), number (Frege), and truth (Tarski) [Gupta] |
Full Idea: Notable examples of definitions in philosophy have been Plato's (e.g. of piety, in 'Euthyphro'), Anselm's definition of God, the Frege-Russell definition of number, and Tarski's definition of truth. | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], Intro) | |
A reaction: All of these are notable for the extensive metaphysical conclusions which then flow from what seems like a fairly neutral definition. We would expect that if we were defining essences, but not if we were just defining word usage. |
11225 | A definition needs to apply to the same object across possible worlds [Gupta] |
Full Idea: In a modal logic in which names are non-vacuous and rigid, not only must existence and uniqueness in a definition be shown to hold necessarily, it must be shown that the definiens is satisfied by the same object across possible worlds. | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 2.4) |
11227 | The 'revision theory' says that definitions are rules for improving output [Gupta] |
Full Idea: The 'revision theory' of definitions says definitions impart a hypothetical character, giving a rule of revision rather than a rule of application. ...The output interpretation is better than the input one. | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 2.7) | |
A reaction: Gupta mentions the question of whether such definitions can extend into the trans-finite. |
11224 | Traditional definitions are general identities, which are sentential and reductive [Gupta] |
Full Idea: Traditional definitions are generalized identities (so definiendum and definiens can replace each other), in which the sentential is primary (for use in argument), and they involve reduction (and hence eliminability in a ground language). | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 2.2) |
11226 | Traditional definitions need: same category, mention of the term, and conservativeness and eliminability [Gupta] |
Full Idea: A traditional definition requires that the definiendum contains the defined term, that definiendum and definiens are of the same logical category, and the definition is conservative (adding nothing new), and makes elimination possible. | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 2.4) |
11221 | A definition can be 'extensionally', 'intensionally' or 'sense' adequate [Gupta] |
Full Idea: A definition is 'extensionally adequate' iff there are no actual counterexamples to it. It is 'intensionally adequate' iff there are no possible counterexamples to it. It is 'sense adequate' (or 'analytic') iff it endows the term with the right sense. | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 1.4) |
11217 | Chemists aim at real definition of things; lexicographers aim at nominal definition of usage [Gupta] |
Full Idea: The chemist aims at real definition, whereas the lexicographer aims at nominal definition. ...Perhaps real definitions investigate the thing denoted, and nominal definitions investigate meaning and use. | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 1.1) | |
A reaction: Very helpful. I really think we should talk much more about the neglected chemists when we discuss science. Theirs is the single most successful branch of science, the paradigm case of what the whole enterprise aims at. |
11216 | If definitions aim at different ideals, then defining essence is not a unitary activity [Gupta] |
Full Idea: Some definitions aim at precision, others at fairness, or at accuracy, or at clarity, or at fecundity. But if definitions 'give the essence of things' (the Aristotelian formula), then it may not be a unitary kind of activity. | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 1) | |
A reaction: We don't have to accept this conclusion so quickly. Human interests may shift the emphasis, but there may be a single ideal definition of which these various examples are mere parts. |
11218 | Stipulative definition assigns meaning to a term, ignoring prior meanings [Gupta] |
Full Idea: Stipulative definition imparts a meaning to the defined term, and involves no commitment that the assigned meaning agrees with prior uses (if any) of the term | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 1.3) | |
A reaction: A nice question is how far one can go in stretching received usage. If I define 'democracy' as 'everyone is involved in decisions', that is sort of right, but pushing the boundaries (children, criminals etc). |
11220 | Ostensive definitions look simple, but are complex and barely explicable [Gupta] |
Full Idea: Ostensive definitions look simple (say 'this stick is one meter long', while showing a stick), but they are effective only because a complex linguistic and conceptual capacity is operative in the background, of which it is hard to give an account. | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 1.2) | |
A reaction: The full horror of the situation is brought out in Quine's 'gavagai' example (Idea 6312) |
11222 | The ordered pair <x,y> is defined as the set {{x},{x,y}}, capturing function, not meaning [Gupta] |
Full Idea: The ordered pair <x,y> is defined as the set {{x},{x,y}}. This does captures its essential uses. Pairs <x,y> <u,v> are identical iff x=u and y=v, and the definition satisfies this. Function matters here, not meaning. | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 1.5) | |
A reaction: This is offered as an example of Carnap's 'explications', rather than pure definitions. Quine extols it as a philosophical paradigm (1960:§53). |
22445 | Morality shows murder is wrong, but not what counts as a murder [Foot] |
Full Idea: While one can determine from the concept of morality that there is an objection to murder one cannot determine completely what will count as murder. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Morality and Art [1972], p.7) | |
A reaction: She then refers to abortion, but there are military and criminal problem cases, and killings by neglect or side effect. |
22444 | A moral system must deal with the dangers and benefits of life [Foot] |
Full Idea: A moral system seems necessarily to be one aimed at removing particular dangers and securing certain benefits. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Morality and Art [1972], p.6) | |
A reaction: I thoroughly approve of this approach to morality, which anchors it in real life, rather than in ideals or principles of reason. |
22447 | Saying something 'just is' right or wrong creates an illusion of fact and objectivity [Foot] |
Full Idea: When we say that something 'just is' right or wrong we want to give the impression of some kind of fact or authority standing behind our words, ...maintaining the trappings of objectivity though the substance is not there. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Morality and Art [1972], p.9) | |
A reaction: Foot favours the idea that such a claim must depend on reasons, and that the reasons arise out of actual living. She's right. |
22448 | We sometimes just use the word 'should' to impose a rule of conduct on someone [Foot] |
Full Idea: It would be more honest to recognise that the 'should' of moral judgement is sometimes merely an instrument by which we (for our own very good reasons) try to impose a rule of conduct even on the uncaring man? | |
From: Philippa Foot (Morality and Art [1972], p.18) | |
A reaction: This is a good example, I think, of the ordinary language tradition that Foot grew up in. We load a word like 'should' with a mystical power, but the situations in which it is actually used bring us back down to earth. |
22446 | In the case of something lacking independence, calling it a human being is a matter of choice [Foot] |
Full Idea: In the problem of abortion there is a genuine choice as to whether or not to count as a human being, with the rights of a human being, what would become a human being but is not yet capable of independent life. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Morality and Art [1972], p.7) | |
A reaction: There must be some basis for the choice. We can't call a dead person a human being. Choosing to call a tiny zygote a human being seems very implausible. Pre-viability strikes me as implausible. |
14349 | If there are no finks or antidotes at the fundamental level, the laws can't be ceteris paribus [Burge, by Corry] |
Full Idea: Bird argues that there are no finks at the fundamental level, and unlikely to be any antidotes. It then follows that laws at the fundamental level will all be strict - not ceteris paribus - laws. | |
From: report of Tyler Burge (Intellectual Norms and Foundations of Mind [1986]) by Richard Corry - Dispositional Essentialism Grounds Laws of Nature? 3 | |
A reaction: [Bird's main target is Nancy Cartwright 1999] This is a nice line of argument. Isn't part of the ceteris paribus problem that two fundamental laws might interfere with one another? |