107 ideas
| 22496 | Wisdom only implies the knowledge achievable in any normal lifetime [Foot] |
| Full Idea: Wisdom implies no more knowledge and understanding than anyone of normal capacity can and should acquire in the course of an ordinary life. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 5) | |
| A reaction: Have philosophers stopped talking about wisdom precisely because you now need three university degrees to be considered even remotely good at phillosophy? Hence wisdom is an inferior attainment, because Foot is right. |
| 3722 | Metaphysics goes beyond the empirical, so doesn't need examples [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Metaphysics doesn't let itself be held back by anything empirical, and indeed goes right to Ideas, where examples themselves fail. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 412.36) |
| 10308 | Questions about objects are questions about certain non-vacuous singular terms [Hale] |
| Full Idea: I understand questions about the Fregean notion of an object to be inseparable from questions in the philosophy of language - questions of the existence of objects are tantamount to questions about non-vacuous singular terms of a certain kind. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: This view hovers somewhere between Quine and J.L. Austin, and Dummett is its originator. I am instinctively deeply opposed to the identification of metaphysics with semantics. |
| 3738 | The hallmark of rationality is setting itself an end [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Rational nature separates itself out from all other things by the fact that it sets itself an end. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 437.82) |
| 10314 | An expression is a genuine singular term if it resists elimination by paraphrase [Hale] |
| Full Idea: An expression ... should be reckoned a genuine singular term only if it resists elimination by paraphrase. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.2.II) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as extraordinarily optimistic. It will be relative to a language, and the resources of a given speaker, and seems open to the invention of new expressions to do the job (e.g. an equivalent adjective for every noun in the dictionary). |
| 10316 | We should decide whether singular terms are genuine by their usage [Hale] |
| Full Idea: The criteria for a genuine singular term should pick out not the singular terms themselves but their uses, since they may be genuine in one context and not another. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.2.II) | |
| A reaction: [rephrased] This will certainly meet problems with vagueness (e.g. as the reference of a singular term is gradually clarified). |
| 10312 | Often the same singular term does not ensure reliable inference [Hale] |
| Full Idea: In 'the whale is increasingly scarce' and 'the whale is much improved today' (our pet whale), we cannot infer that there is something that is much improved and increasingly scarce, so this singular term fails Dummett's criterion based on inference. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: [much rephrased] This is not just a problem for a few cunningly selected examples. With contortions almost any singular term can be undermined in this way. Singular terms are simply not a useful guide to the existence of abstracta. |
| 10313 | Plenty of clear examples have singular terms with no ontological commitment [Hale] |
| Full Idea: Some examples where a definite singular noun phrase is not 'genuine' (giving ontological commitment): 'left us in the lurch'; 'for my mother's sake'; 'given the sack'; 'in the nick of time', 'the whereabouts of the PM', 'the identity of the murderer'. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.2.II) | |
| A reaction: These are not just freakish examples. If I 'go on a journey', that doesn't involve extra entities called 'journeys', just because the meaning is clearer and a more commonplace part of the language. |
| 10322 | If singular terms can't be language-neutral, then we face a relativity about their objects [Hale] |
| Full Idea: If we lack any general, language-neutral characterization of singular terms, must not a parallel linguistic relativity infect the objects which are to be thought of as their non-linguistic correlates? | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.2.III) | |
| A reaction: Hale thinks he can answer this, but I would have thought that this problem dooms the linguistic approach from the start. There needs to be more imagination about how very different a language could be, while still qualifying as a language. |
| 10512 | The abstract/concrete distinction is based on what is perceivable, causal and located [Hale] |
| Full Idea: The 'concrete/abstract' distinction has a strong intuitive feel, and can seem to be drawable by familiar contrasts, between what can/cannot be perceived, what can/cannot be involved in causal interactions, and is/is not located in space and time. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.3.I) | |
| A reaction: Problems arise, needless to say. The idea of an abstraction can be causal, and abstractions seem to change. If universals are abstract, we seem to perceive some of them. They can hardly be non-spatial if they have a temporal beginning and end. |
| 10517 | Colours and points seem to be both concrete and abstract [Hale] |
| Full Idea: It might seem that colours would qualify both as concrete and as abstract objects. ...and geometrical points also seem to be borderline. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.3.II) | |
| A reaction: The theory of tropes exploits this uncertainty. Dummett (1973:ch.14) notes that we can point to colours, but also slip from an adjectival to a noun usage of colour-terms. He concludes that colours are concrete. I think I agree. |
| 10519 | The abstract/concrete distinction is in the relations in the identity-criteria of object-names [Hale] |
| Full Idea: Noonan suggests that the distinction between abstract and concrete objects should be seen as derivative from a difference between the relations centrally involved in criteria of identity associated with names of objects. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.3.III) | |
| A reaction: [He cites Noonan 1976, but I've lost it] I don't understand this, but collect it as a lead to something that might be interesting. A careful reading of Hale might reveal what Noonan meant. |
| 10520 | Token-letters and token-words are concrete objects, type-letters and type-words abstract [Hale] |
| Full Idea: In familiar, though doubtless not wholly problematic jargon, token-letters and token-words are concrete objects, type-letters and type-words abstract. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.3.III) | |
| A reaction: This is indeed problematic. The marks may be tokens, but the preliminary to identifying the type is to see that the marks are in fact words. To grasp the concrete, grasp the abstraction. An excellent example of the blurring of the distinction. |
| 10524 | There is a hierarchy of abstraction, based on steps taken by equivalence relations [Hale] |
| Full Idea: The domain of the abstract can be seen as exemplifying a hierarchical structure, with differences of level reflecting the number of steps of abstraction, via appropriate equivalence relations, required for recognition at different levels. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.3.III) | |
| A reaction: I think this is right, and so does almost everyone else, since people cheerfully talk of 'somewhat' abstract and 'highly' abstract. Don't dream of a neat picture though. You might reach a level by two steps from one direction, and four from another. |
| 10521 | If F can't have location, there is no problem of things having F in different locations [Hale] |
| Full Idea: If Fs are incapable of spatial location, it is impossible for a and b to be at the same time in different places and yet be the same F. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.3.III) | |
| A reaction: A passing remark from Hale which strikes me as incredibly significant. The very idea of a 'one-over-many' is that there are many locations for the thing, so to conclude that the thing is therefore non-located seems to negate the original problem. |
| 10511 | It is doubtful if one entity, a universal, can be picked out by both predicates and abstract nouns [Hale] |
| Full Idea: The traditional conception of universals, resting as it does upon the idea that some single type of entity is picked out by expressions of such radically different logical types as predicates and abstract nouns, is of doubtful coherence. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.3 Intro) | |
| A reaction: A striking case of linguistic metaphysics in action. I don't believe in universals, but I don't find this persuasive, as our capacity to express the same proposition by means of extremely varied syntax is obvious. Is 'horse' an abstract noun? |
| 10318 | Realists take universals to be the referrents of both adjectives and of nouns [Hale] |
| Full Idea: On the traditional realist's view abstract qualities (universals) are the common referents of two quite different sorts of expression - of ordinary adjectives (predicates), and of abstract nouns referring to them. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.2.II) | |
| A reaction: This fact alone should make us suspicious, especially as there isn't an isomorphism between the nouns and the adjectives, and the match-up will vary between languages. |
| 10310 | Objections to Frege: abstracta are unknowable, non-independent, unstatable, unindividuated [Hale] |
| Full Idea: Objections to Frege's argument for abstract objects: that the objects would not have the right sort of independence; that we could have no knowledge of them; that the singular term statements can't be had; that thoughts of abstracta can't be identified. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] [See Idea 10309 for the original argument] It is helpful to have this list, even if Hale rejects them all. They are also created but then indestructible, and exist in unlimited profusion, and seem relative to a language. Etc! |
| 10518 | Shapes and directions are of something, but games and musical compositions are not [Hale] |
| Full Idea: While a shape or a direction is necessarily of something, games, musical compositions or dance routines are not of anything at all. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.3.II) | |
| A reaction: This seems important, because Frege's abstraction principle works nicely for abstractions 'of' some objects, but is not so clear for abstracta that are sui generis. |
| 10513 | Many abstract objects, such as chess, seem non-spatial, but are not atemporal [Hale] |
| Full Idea: There are many plausible example of abstract objects which, though non-spatial, do not appear to satisfy the suggested requirement of atemporality, such as chess, or the English language. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.3.1) | |
| A reaction: Given the point that modern physics is committed to 'space-time', with no conceivable separation of them, this looks dubious. Though I think the physics could be challenged. Try Idea 7621, for example. |
| 10514 | If the mental is non-spatial but temporal, then it must be classified as abstract [Hale] |
| Full Idea: If mental events are genuinely non-spatial, but not atemporal, its effect is to classify them as abstract; the distinction between the abstract and the mental simply collapses. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.3.1) | |
| A reaction: This is important. You can't discuss this sort of metaphysics in isolation from debates about the ontology of mind. Functionalists do treat mental events as abstractions. |
| 10523 | Being abstract is based on a relation between things which are spatially separated [Hale] |
| Full Idea: The abstract/concrete distinction is, roughly, between those sortals whose grounding relations can hold between abstract things which are spatially but not temporally separated, those concrete things whose grounding relations cannot so hold. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.3.III) | |
| A reaction: Thus being a father is based on 'begat', which does not involve spatial separation, and so is concrete. The relation is one of equivalence. |
| 10307 | The modern Fregean use of the term 'object' is much broader than the ordinary usage [Hale] |
| Full Idea: The notion of an 'object' first introduced by Frege is much broader than that of most comparable ordinary uses of 'object', and is now fairly standard and familiar. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: This makes it very difficult to get to grips with the metaphysical issues involved, since the ontological claims disappear into a mist of semantic vagueness. |
| 10315 | We can't believe in a 'whereabouts' because we ask 'what kind of object is it?' [Hale] |
| Full Idea: Onotological outrage at such objects as the 'whereabouts of the Prime Minister' derives from the fact that we seem beggared for any convincing answer to the question 'What kind of objects are they?' | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.2.II) | |
| A reaction: I go further and ask of any object 'what is it made of?' When I receive the answer that I am being silly, and that abstract objects are not 'made' of anything, I am tempted to become sarcastic, and say 'thank you - that makes it much clearer'. |
| 10522 | The relations featured in criteria of identity are always equivalence relations [Hale] |
| Full Idea: The relations which are featured in criteria of identity are always equivalence relations. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.3.III) | |
| A reaction: This will only apply to strict identity. If I say 'a is almost identical to b', this will obviously not be endlessly transitive (as when we get to k we may have lost the near-identity to a). Are 'two threes' identical to 'three twos'? |
| 10321 | We sometimes apply identity without having a real criterion [Hale] |
| Full Idea: Not every (apparent) judgement of identity involves application of anything properly describable as a criterion of identity, ...such as being able to pronounce that mercy is the quality of being merciful. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.2.II) | |
| A reaction: This suggests some distinction between internal criteria (e.g. grammatical, conceptual) and external criteria (existent, sensed). |
| 3726 | The categorical imperative is a practical synthetic a priori proposition [Kant] |
| Full Idea: With the categorical imperative or law of morality we have a very serious difficulty, because it is a synthetic a priori practical proposition. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 420.50) |
| 3739 | Free will is a kind of causality which works independently of other causes [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Will is a kind of causality belonging to living beings so far as they are rational. Freedom would then be the property this causality has of being able to work independently of determination by alien causes. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 446.97) |
| 3741 | We shall never be able to comprehend how freedom is possible [Kant] |
| Full Idea: We shall never be able to comprehend how freedom is possible. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 456.115) |
| 3740 | We cannot conceive of reason as being externally controlled [Kant] |
| Full Idea: We cannot possibly conceive of a reason as being consciously directed from outside in regard to its judgements. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 448.101) |
| 5296 | Kant made the political will into a pure self-determined "free" will [Kant, by Marx/Engels] |
| Full Idea: Kant made the materially motivated determinations of the will of the French bourgeois into pure self-determinations of the "free will", of the will in and for itself. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by K Marx / F Engels - The German Ideology §II | |
| A reaction: This is the social determinism of Marx and Engels. Most commentators would say that Kant was taking the idea of "free will" from religion rather than politics, but presumably Marx would merely reply "same thing!" |
| 24011 | Kant thought emotions are too random and passive to be part of morality [Kant, by Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: Kant thinks emotions can't contribute to moral worth because emotions are too capricious, they are too passive, and they are fortuitously distributed by nature. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Bernard Williams - Morality and the emotions p.226 | |
| A reaction: [compressed] If, like Kant, you want morality to be concerned with rational principles, then you will want morality to be clear, stable and consistent - which emotions are not. I'm with Williams on this one. |
| 23694 | All criterions of practical rationality derive from goodness of will [Foot] |
| Full Idea: I want to say, baldly, that there is no criterion for practical rationality that is not derived from that of goodness of will. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 1) | |
| A reaction: Where does that put the successful and clever criminal? Presumably they are broadly irrational, but narrowly rational - but that is not very clear distinction. She says Kant's concept of the good will is too pure, and unrelated to human good. |
| 5074 | Kant united religion and philosophy, by basing obedience to law on reason instead of faith [Taylor,R on Kant] |
| Full Idea: Kant united the two ideas of virtue (as being and as doing) into the idea of a law that is founded not upon faith but upon reason. Thus in one stroke he united the seemingly irreconcilable philosophical and religious ethics, preserving the best of both. | |
| From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Richard Taylor - Virtue Ethics: an Introduction Ch.8 | |
| A reaction: An interesting analysis that sounds exactly right. Taylor's point is that Kant subjects himself to an authority, when the underpinnings of the authority are no longer there. There is a religious strand in the altruistic requirements of utilitarianism too. |
| 8024 | The categorical imperative says nothing about what our activities and ends should be [MacIntyre on Kant] |
| Full Idea: As to what activities we ought to engage in, what ends we should pursue, the categorical imperative seems to be silent. | |
| From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.14 | |
| A reaction: I think this is the fatal objection to Kant's view. He says, for example, that promise-breaking is inconsistent with a belief that promises are good, but who said promises are good? No ethical system can get started without values. |
| 23686 | Moral reason is not just neutral, because morality is part of the standard of rationality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
| Full Idea: In her late period she again reverses her thoughts on moral rationalism; …rather than a neutral rationality which fulfils desires, she argues that morality ought to be thought of as part of the standard of rationality itself. | |
| From: report of Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001]) by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought Intro | |
| A reaction: This comes much closer to the Greek and Aristotelian concept of logos. They saw morality as inseparable from our judgements about how the world is. All 'sensible' thinking will involve what is good for humanity. |
| 23693 | Practical rationality must weigh both what is morally and what is non-morally required [Foot] |
| Full Idea: Different considerations are on a par, in that judgement about what is required by practical rationality must take account of their interaction: of the weight of the ones we call non-moral as well as those we call moral. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 1) | |
| A reaction: Her final settled view of rationalism in morality, it seems. The point is that moral considerations are not paramount, because she sees possible justifications for ignoring moral rules (like 'don't lie') in certain practical situations. |
| 22390 | Kant thought human nature was pure hedonism, so virtue is only possible via the categorical imperative [Foot on Kant] |
| Full Idea: Kant was a psychological hedonist about all actions except those done for the sake of the moral law, and this faulty theory of human nature prevented him from seeing that moral virtue might be compatible with the rejection of the categorical imperative. | |
| From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Philippa Foot - Morality as system of hypothetical imperatives p.165 | |
| A reaction: Nice. Kant wasn't unusual in his view, which seems standard in the Renaissance and Enlightenment. Aristotle understood that it is human nature, on the whole, to want to be a good citizen, since we are social beings. |
| 23687 | Moral virtues arise from human nature, as part of what makes us good human beings [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
| Full Idea: In her later work she offers a view of the relationship of morality to human nature, arguing that the moral virtues are part of what makes us good as human beings. | |
| From: report of Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001]) by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought Intro | |
| A reaction: In this phase she talks explicitly of the Aristotelian idea that successful function is the grounding of what is good for any living being, including humans. |
| 9750 | We must only value what others find acceptable [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
| Full Idea: We are limited to pursuits which are acceptable from the standpoint of others; ..hence we can't value just anything, and there are things which we must value. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Christine M. Korsgaard - Intro to 'Creating the Kingdom of Ends' x | |
| A reaction: This at least moves towards greater objectivity, compared with Idea 9749, but it now seems deeply conservative. Our values become lowest common denominator. We need space for the Nietzschean moral hero, who creates new values. |
| 22493 | Sterility is a human defect, but the choice to be childless is not [Foot] |
| Full Idea: Lack of capacity to reproduce is a defect in a human being. But choice of childlessness and even celibacy is not thereby shown to be defective choice, because human good is not the same as plant or animal good. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 3) | |
| A reaction: Is failure to reproduce a defect in an animal? If goodness and virtue derive from function, it is hard to see how deliberate childlessness could be a human good, even if it is not a defect. Choosing to terminate a hereditary defect seems good. |
| 22492 | Virtues are as necessary to humans as stings are to bees [Foot] |
| Full Idea: Virtues play a necessary part in the life of human beings as do stings in the life of a bee. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 2) | |
| A reaction: This presumably rests on the Aristotelian idea that humans are essentially social (as opposed to solitary humans who choose to be social, perhaps in a contractual way, as Plato implies). |
| 20160 | Kant focuses exclusively on human values, and neglects cultural and personal values [Kekes on Kant] |
| Full Idea: Kant grossly inflated the importance of the human dimension of value in which moral considerations are indeed overriding. He unjustifiably denied the perfectly reasonable contributions of the cultural and personal dimensions to human well-being. | |
| From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by John Kekes - The Human Condition 05.5 | |
| A reaction: Excellent to see someone talking about the ultimate values that reside behind Kant's theory. Without such assumptions his theory is, frankly, ridiculous (as Mill explained). |
| 22491 | Moral evaluations are not separate from facts, but concern particular facts about functioning [Foot] |
| Full Idea: A moral evaluation does not stand over against the statement of a matter of fact, but rather has to do with facts about a particular subject matter, as do evaluations of such things as sight and hearing in animals. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 1) | |
| A reaction: She avoids the word 'function', and only deals with living creatures, but she uses a 'good knife' as an example, and this Aristotelian view clearly applies to any machine which has a function. |
| 9749 | Our rational choices confer value, arising from the sense that we ourselves are important [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
| Full Idea: According to Kant, we confer value on the objects of our rational choices. ..When we choose things because they are important to us we are taking ourselves to be important. Hence our humanity is a source of value. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Christine M. Korsgaard - Intro to 'Creating the Kingdom of Ends' ix | |
| A reaction: He's trying to filter to out our gormless choices with the word 'rational', but it is common sense that I may choose things despite thinking they have little value, like watching soap opera. A more objective account of value seems needed. See 9750! |
| 7671 | Values are created by human choices, and are not some intrinsic quality, out there [Kant, by Berlin] |
| Full Idea: Kant's fundamental sermon is that a value is made a value (or, at least, a duty) by human choice and not by some intrinsic quality in itself, out there. Values are what humans freely choose to live, fight and die for. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Isaiah Berlin - The Roots of Romanticism Ch.4 | |
| A reaction: If this is right, then it would appear that the great Kant is the father of relativism, which wouldn't please him. However, his whole system rests on what is consistent and rational, and that seems to a value that is above our choices. |
| 3720 | We may claim noble motives, but we cannot penetrate our secret impulses [Kant] |
| Full Idea: We are pleased to flatter ourselves with the false claim to a nobler motive, but in fact we can never, even by the most strenuous self-examination, get to the bottom of our secret impulsions. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 407.26) | |
| A reaction: Sounds more like Nietzsche than Kant. If some impulsions are totally hidden from us, then they are presumably irrelevant to any rational or moral thinking. Look at the deeds. |
| 3717 | Reverence is awareness of a value which demolishes my self-love [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Reverence is awareness of a value which demolishes my self-love. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 401.16 n) | |
| A reaction: Presumably simple love of someone or something could achieve this, without the addition of reverence. I'm suspicious of this idea, because some dreadful people have commanded reverence. |
| 3725 | The good of an action is in the mind of the doer, not the consequences [Kant] |
| Full Idea: What is essentially good in an action consists in the mental disposition, let the consequences be what they may. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 416.43) | |
| A reaction: Dreadful idea. I always claim that consequences are relevant in Kant, in formulating and choosing maxims for action, but this idea seems to refute my view. This is a slogan for the Spanish Inquisition. |
| 3712 | A good will is not good because of what it achieves [Kant] |
| Full Idea: A good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 394.3) | |
| A reaction: This invites the obvious objection of the well-meaning fool, who causes misery despite meaning well. I firmly hold the view that what matters is what we do, not what we intend. |
| 22497 | Deep happiness usually comes from the basic things in life [Foot] |
| Full Idea: Possible objects of deep happiness seem to be things that are basic in human life, such as home, and family, and work, and friendship. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 6) | |
| A reaction: I've not encountered discussion of 'deep' happiness before. I heard of an old man in tears because he had just seen a Purple Emperor butterfly for the first time. She makes it sound very conservative. How about mountaineering achievements? |
| 22498 | Happiness is enjoying the pursuit and attainment of right ends [Foot] |
| Full Idea: In my terminology 'happiness' is understood as the enjoyment of good things, meaning the enjoyment in attaining, and in pursuing, right ends. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 6) | |
| A reaction: A modified version of Aristotle's view, which she contrasts with McDowell's identification of happiness with the life of virtue. They all seem to have an optimistic hope that the pleasure in being a bit wicked is false happiness. |
| 23695 | Good actions can never be justified by the good they brings to their agent [Foot] |
| Full Idea: There is no good case for assessing the goodness of human action by reference only to good that each person brings to himself. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 1) | |
| A reaction: She observes that even non-human animals often act for non-selfish reasons. The significance of this is its rejection of her much earlier view that virtues are justified by the good they bring their possessor. |
| 3733 | The 'golden rule' cannot be a universal law as it implies no duties [Kant] |
| Full Idea: The 'golden rule' is merely derivative from our principle, but it cannot be a universal law since it isn't the ground of duties to oneself or others (since it implies a breakable contract). | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 430.68 n) |
| 22499 | We all know that just pretending to be someone's friend is not the good life [Foot] |
| Full Idea: We know perfectly well that it is not true that the best life would consist in successfully pretending friendship: having friends to serve one but without being a real friend oneself. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 7) | |
| A reaction: For some skallywags the achieving of something for nothing seems to be very much the good life, but not many of them want to exploit people who are seen to be their friends. |
| 3736 | Virtue lets a rational being make universal law, and share in the kingdom of ends [Kant] |
| Full Idea: A morally good attitude of mind (or virtue) claims the intrinsic value of dignity, because it affords a rational being a share in the making of universal law, which therefore fits him to be a member in a possible kingdom of ends. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 435.79) |
| 3544 | Kant thinks virtue becomes passive, and hence morally unaccountable [Kant, by Annas] |
| Full Idea: Kant thinks that if virtue becomes a stable disposition of the person, then it turns into a rigid mechanical habit, with respect to which the person is passive, and thus not fully morally accountable. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Julia Annas - The Morality of Happiness 2.1 |
| 22495 | Someone is a good person because of their rational will, not their body or memory [Foot] |
| Full Idea: To speak of a good person is to speak of an individual not in respect of his body, or of faculties such as sight and memory, but as concerns his rational will (his 'will as controllable by reason'). | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 5) | |
| A reaction: She more or less agrees with Kant that the only truly good moral thing is a good will, though she has plenty of other criticisms of his views. |
| 7674 | Generosity and pity are vices, because they falsely imply one person's superiority to another [Kant, by Berlin] |
| Full Idea: For Kant, generosity is a vice, because it is a form of condescension and patronage, and pity is detestable, because it entails a superiority on the part of the pitier, which Kant stoutly denied. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Isaiah Berlin - The Roots of Romanticism | |
| A reaction: An interesting view, but being too proud to receive help from friends strikes me as a greater vice. How can friendship and community be built, if we do not rush to help one another when needed? The virtue is generosity without condescension. |
| 21029 | Kantian respect is for humanity and reason (not from love or sympathy or solidarity) [Kant, by Sandel] |
| Full Idea: Kantian respect is unlike love. It's unlike sympathy. It's unlike solidarity or fellow feeling. ...Kantian respect is for humanity as such, for a rational capacity that resides, undifferentiated, in all of us. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Michael J. Sandel - Justice: What's the right thing to do? 05 | |
| A reaction: Why is it 'undifferentiated'? If reason is the source of the respect, why don't greater powers of reason command greater respect? The nice thing is that the rejected versions involve bias, but Kant's version does not. |
| 7105 | If 'maxims' are deeper underlying intentions, Kant can be read as a virtue theorist [Kant, by Statman] |
| Full Idea: It has been argued that by 'maxim' Kant does not mean a specific intention for some discrete act, but the underlying intention by which the agent orchestrates his numerous more specific intentions, ...which leads to a virtue reading of Kant. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Daniel Statman - Introduction to Virtue Ethics §7 | |
| A reaction: Kant admired virtue of character, and would want to fit it into the framework of his moral duties. Nevertheless a virtue would often seem to be beyond words, and principles seem to crumble in the face of complex cases. |
| 7625 | We can ask how rational goodness is, but also why is rationality good [Putnam on Kant] |
| Full Idea: We can reverse the terms of the comparison and ask not how rational is goodness, but why is it good to be rational? | |
| From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Hilary Putnam - Reason, Truth and History | |
| A reaction: [Putnam doesn't mention Kant]. This seems to me to be the biggest question for Kant. See Idea 1403. The main point of tbe romantic movement, I take it, is that purely rational living does not bring happiness or fulfilment. |
| 4024 | Kant follows Rousseau in defining freedom and morality in terms of each other [Taylor,C on Kant] |
| Full Idea: Kant follows Rousseau in defining freedom and morality essentially in terms of each other. | |
| From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Charles Taylor - Sources of the Self §20.2 | |
| A reaction: An interesting comment on the modern tendency to overvalue freedom at the expense of the other civic virtues. |
| 3710 | The only purely good thing is a good will [Kant] |
| Full Idea: It is impossible to conceive anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which can be taken as good without qualification, except a good will. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 393.1) | |
| A reaction: This is precisely the thought of Epictetus, that the will is the source of goodness, because morality resides in choices (as opposed to character, or states of affairs). |
| 3737 | The will is good if its universalised maxim is never in conflict with itself [Kant] |
| Full Idea: The will is absolutely good if it cannot be evil - that is, if its maxim, when made into a universal law, can never be in conflict with itself. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 437.81) |
| 3715 | Other causes can produce nice results, so morality must consist in the law, found only in rational beings [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Agreeable results could be brought about by other causes;…therefore nothing but the idea of the law in itself, which is present only in a rational being, can constitute that pre-eminent good which we call moral. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 401.15) |
| 20715 | It is basic that moral actions must be done from duty [Kant] |
| Full Idea: The first proposition of morality is that to have moral worth an action must be done from duty. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], p.19), quoted by Brian Davies - Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion 9 'Religion' | |
| A reaction: [p.19 in Beck tr] In Aristotle's account these are 'controlled' actions [enkrateia], which are a step below virtuous actions, which combine reason and pleasure. |
| 3735 | Men are subject to laws which are both self-made and universal [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Man is subject only to laws which are made by himself and yet are universal. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 432.73) |
| 3718 | Telling the truth from duty is quite different from doing so to avoid inconvenience [Kant] |
| Full Idea: To tell the truth for the sake of duty is something entirely different from doing so out of concern for inconvenient results. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 402.18) |
| 3723 | There are no imperatives for a holy will, as the will is in harmony with moral law [Kant] |
| Full Idea: For the divine or holy will there are no imperatives: 'I ought' is here out of place, because 'I will' is already of itself necessarily in harmony with the law. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 414.39) |
| 3724 | A categorical imperative sees an action as necessary purely for its own sake [Kant] |
| Full Idea: A categorical imperative would be one which represented an action as objectively necessary in itself apart from its relation to a further end. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 414.39) |
| 3714 | Dutiful actions are judged not by purpose, but by the maxim followed [Kant] |
| Full Idea: An action done from duty has its moral worth, not in the purpose to be attained by it, but in the maxim according to which it is decided upon. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 399.13) |
| 5295 | Kant was happy with 'good will', even if it had no result [Kant, by Marx/Engels] |
| Full Idea: Kant was satisfied with "good will" alone, even if it remained entirely without result. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by K Marx / F Engels - The German Ideology §II | |
| A reaction: Kant is obviously a million miles away from Marxist pragmatism. And yet the members of the revolutionary class can only be identified and endorsed if they show a particular kind of will. |
| 6695 | Kant has to attribute high moral worth to some deeply unattractive human lives [Kant, by Graham] |
| Full Idea: An implausible and uncomfortable conclusion to be drawn from Kant's conception of morality is that we must attribute high moral worth to deeply unattractive human lives. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Gordon Graham - Eight Theories of Ethics Ch.6 | |
| A reaction: Graham quotes a loathsome character from a Victorian novel, who coldly 'does her duty'. Indeed it might be that a robot could be programmed with the categorical imperative (though it would need a table of values first). Virtue theory is the answer. |
| 8028 | Kantian duty seems to imply conformism with authority [MacIntyre on Kant] |
| Full Idea: Anyone educated into the Kantian notion of duty will (so far) have been educated into easy conformism with authority. | |
| From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.14 | |
| A reaction: The Nazi Eichmann cited Kant at his trial for mass murder. I'm not sure the criticism is fair. There are surely times when the categorical imperative will go quite contrary to what the irrational authorities are implementing? |
| 8026 | Almost any precept can be consistently universalized [MacIntyre on Kant] |
| Full Idea: With sufficient ingenuity, almost every precept can be consistently universalized. | |
| From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.14 | |
| A reaction: A concise statement of J.S.Mill's point (Idea 3762). The point is that Kant seems to allow burglary, as long as you don't complain when you are burgled. What sort of maxim would a suicidal mass murderer being willing to universalize? |
| 15673 | The intuition behind the categorical imperative is that one ought not to make an exception of oneself [Kant, by Finlayson] |
| Full Idea: Kant's first formulation of the categorical imperative is supposed to capture the widespread intuition that one ought not to make an exception of oneself. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by James Gordon Finlayson - Habermas Ch.6:83 | |
| A reaction: Interesting. I always take the plain English version to be 'what if everybody did that?' Suppose I were to forgive everyone, except myself? |
| 8068 | Universalising a maxim needs to first stipulate the right description for the action [Anscombe on Kant] |
| Full Idea: Kant's rule about universalisable maxims is useless without stipulations as to what shall count as a relevant description of an action with a view to constructing a maxim about it. | |
| From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by G.E.M. Anscombe - Modern Moral Philosophy p.176 | |
| A reaction: This is one of the key objections to Kant (along with his need for preliminary values). One man's 'terrorist' is another man's 'freedom fighter'. The charge adds up to Nietzsche's view, that Kant could never shake off his very conventional prejudices. |
| 8025 | The categorical imperative will not suggest maxims suitable for testing [MacIntyre on Kant] |
| Full Idea: The doctrine of the categorical imperative provides me with a test for rejecting proposed maxims; it does not tell me whence I am to derive the maxims which first provide the need for a test. | |
| From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.14 | |
| A reaction: Nice objection. 'What if we all stood on one leg for an hour (in this crisis)?' Question for Kant: what sort of maxims should we consider, when faced with a dilemma. Mill will obviously suggest happiness as a target. Good of society? My own good? |
| 8027 | I can universalize a selfish maxim, if it is expressed in a way that only applies to me [MacIntyre on Kant] |
| Full Idea: If we enquire whether I can consistently universalize the maxim 'I may break my promises only when.....', the gap can be filled by a description devised so that it will apply to my present circumstances, but to very few others. | |
| From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.14 | |
| A reaction: Another good objection to Kant. There is just a huge problem with how you state the maxim under discussion. One man's 'terrorist' is another man's 'freedom fighter'. 'Do everything possible to implement the will of God'. |
| 3728 | Suicide, false promises, neglected talent, and lack of charity all involve contradictions of principle [Kant, by PG] |
| Full Idea: Kant's four illustrations of the Categorical Imperative are: the contradiction of suicide, the contradiction of false promises, the contradiction of neglecting your talents, and the contradiction of neglecting charity. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 422.53) by PG - Db (ideas) |
| 22008 | Always treat yourself and others as an end, and never simply as a means [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Act in such a way that you always treat humanity whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], AA429 p.96), quoted by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 02 | |
| A reaction: This sets up the Kingdom of Ends. Note that this does not prohibit using people as a means. It just asks you to respect waiters and shop assistants. It seems to say you should not treat 'your own person' merely as a means. Prostitution? |
| 3719 | If lying were the universal law it would make promises impossible [Kant] |
| Full Idea: I can indeed will to lie, but I can by no means will a universal law of lying; for by such a law there could properly be no promises at all. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 403.19) |
| 3762 | Why couldn't all rational beings accept outrageously immoral rules of conduct? [Mill on Kant] |
| Full Idea: Kant fails, almost grotesquely, to show that there would be any logical or physical impossibility in the adoption by all rational beings of the most outrageously immoral rules of conduct. | |
| From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by John Stuart Mill - Utilitarianism Ch.1 |
| 4413 | The categorical imperative smells of cruelty [Nietzsche on Kant] |
| Full Idea: The categorical imperative smells of cruelty. | |
| From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Friedrich Nietzsche - On the Genealogy of Morals II.§6 | |
| A reaction: I presume this is because it is so pure and impersonal. Seems harsh. Nowadays we don't think pure just has to be cruel, but Nietzsche may have assumed it had to be. |
| 3716 | Act according to a maxim you can will as a universal law [Kant] |
| Full Idea: I ought never to act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 402.17) |
| 3727 | Act as if your maxim were to become a universal law of nature [Kant] |
| Full Idea: The universal imperative may also run as follows: 'Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature'. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 421.52) |
| 22009 | Morality is the creation of the laws that enable a Kingdom of Ends [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Morality consists in the relation of all action to the making of laws whereby alone a kingdom of ends is possible. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], AA434 p.102), quoted by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 02 | |
| A reaction: Each individual gives themselves a law in the categorical imperative. Presumably the kingdom of ends is the convergence of these laws, because the categorical imperative has to be rational. |
| 22050 | The maxim of an action is chosen, and not externally imposed [Kant, by Bowie] |
| Full Idea: Kant does not dictate what the maxim (the principle) of my action should be, and this is the crux. The individual has to decide the basis for their actions, rather than have it imposed on them, which differentiates us from the world of nature. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Andrew Bowie - German Philosophy: a very short introduction 1 | |
| A reaction: Apparenty this inspired the Romantic era (the Age of Freedom?) just as much as the French Revolution. It is the chief doctrine of extreme individualism - except that the maxim chosen should be one on which rational beings should agree. |
| 6694 | Always treat humanity as an end and never as a means only [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or that of another always as an end and never as a means only. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]), quoted by Gordon Graham - Eight Theories of Ethics Ch.6 | |
| A reaction: Does this really mean that I can't just negligently buy a newspaper without making an effort to respect its seller? How do I ensure that I treat myself as an end, and don't slip into treating myself as a means? What would that be like? Prostitution? |
| 3731 | Rational beings necessarily conceive their own existence as an end in itself [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Rational nature exists as an end in itself; this is the way in which a man necessarily conceives his own existence. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 429.66) |
| 4345 | For Kant, even a person who lacks all sympathy for others still has a motive for benevolence [Kant, by Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: Kant, we may suppose, would say that if a man were 'cold in temperament and indifferent to the sufferings of others', he would still find in himself a source that would enable him to do what is benevolent. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Rosalind Hursthouse - On Virtue Ethics Ch.4 | |
| A reaction: This identifies a strong appeal of Kant's theory - that whether we are morally good should not be a matter of luck in our upbringing or natural temperament. How is the vicious person to be saved, if not by reason? |
| 4251 | If we are required to give moral thought the highest priority, this gives morality no content [Williams,B on Kant] |
| Full Idea: The Kantian view of what is important is that people should give moral considerations the highest deliberative priority, which Hegel attacked because it gives moral thought no content. | |
| From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Bernard Williams - Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy Ch.10 | |
| A reaction: Interesting. This points towards empathy and compassion as motivators, rather than reason, because there is some content to the morality, which calls out to us. |
| 16004 | If Kant lives by self-administered laws, this is as feeble as self-administered punishments [Kierkegaard on Kant] |
| Full Idea: Kant thought that man is his own law - he binds himself under the law which he gives himself. This is how lawlessness or experimentation is established. This is no more rigorously earnest than Sancho Panza's self-administered blows to his own ass. | |
| From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Søren Kierkegaard - The Journals of Kierkegaard JP-I, 188 | |
| A reaction: It really is tempting to go easy on yourself rather than on others. Kant had the right ideas, but human beings aren't as disciplined as the categorical imperative requires. [SY] |
| 3711 | Only a good will makes us worthy of happiness [Kant] |
| Full Idea: A good will seems to constitute the indispensable condition of our very worthiness to be happy. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 393.2) |
| 3713 | The function of reason is to produce a good will [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Since reason has been imparted to us as a practical power, which thus influences the will, its true function must be to produce a will which is good. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 396.7) |
| 3729 | Our inclinations are not innately desirable; in fact most rational beings would like to be rid of them [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Inclinations, as a source of needs, are so far from having an absolute value to make them desirable for their own sake that it must rather be the universal wish of every rational being to be wholly free from them. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 428.65) |
| 4344 | Actions where people spread happiness because they enjoy it have no genuine moral worth [Kant] |
| Full Idea: There are many spirits of so sympathetic a temper that they find an inner pleasure in spreading happiness around them. ..I maintain that an action of this kind, however right and amiable it may be, has still no genuinely moral worth. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], p.66) | |
| A reaction: We understand what he means (that principle is everything), but this still seems a big hole in his account, one which drives us to Aristotle's sensible views about what a nice person is really like. |
| 22502 | Refraining from murder is not made good by authenticity or self-fulfilment [Foot] |
| Full Idea: If a stranger should come on us when we are sleeping he will not think it all right to kill us. …In human life as it is, this kind of action is not made good by authenticity or self-fulfilment in the one who does it. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 7) | |
| A reaction: A rare swipe from Foot at existentialism, which she hardly ever mentions. I find it hard to see these existential virtues as in any way moral. It means nothing to other citizens whether one of their number is 'authentic'. |
| 3732 | Rational beings have a right to share in the end of an action, not just be part of the means [Kant] |
| Full Idea: A violator of the rights of man intends to use the person of others merely as a means, not considering that they should be used only as beings who must themselves be able to share in the end of the very same action. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 430.68) |
| 7670 | Kant is the father of the notion of exploitation as an evil [Kant, by Berlin] |
| Full Idea: Kant is the father of the notion of exploitation as an evil. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Isaiah Berlin - The Roots of Romanticism Ch.3 | |
| A reaction: This is central to the idea of Kant as the main father of liberalism, the idea that every individual deserves respect, and hence has rights. The idea would also be a crucial element in Europe turning against slavery. |
| 7591 | Kant completed Grotius's project of a non-religious basis for natural law [Scruton on Kant] |
| Full Idea: Kant is often held to have completed a task begun by Grotius, giving a basis for natural law which does not invoke the will of God, but rather commands God himself to obedience. | |
| From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Roger Scruton - A Dictionary of Political Thought 'Kant' | |
| A reaction: This project, if successful, would clinch the naturalistic response to the Euthyphro Question (Ideas 336 and 337). It is a key issue for atheists, who generally wish to deny that their lack of religion leads inevitably to amorality. |
| 7673 | Retributive punishment is better than being sent to hospital for your crimes [Kant, by Berlin] |
| Full Idea: Kant believed in retributive punishment, because he thought that a man would prefer being sent to prison to going to hospital. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Isaiah Berlin - The Roots of Romanticism Ch.4 | |
| A reaction: That is, even criminals welcome the dignity of being treated as if they are actually responsible for their deeds, and are not just victims of inner forces. Criminals demand free will! Truth is best, though; many of them are not responsible at all. |
| 3730 | Non-rational beings only have a relative value, as means rather than as ends [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Beings whose existence depends not on our will but on nature have, if they are non-rational beings, only a relative value as means and are consequently called 'things' (rather than 'persons'). | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 428.65) | |
| A reaction: Ugh. Is there nothing in between 'persons' and 'things'? How about a deeply comatose human, or an embryo? It is a gross distortion to think of a chimpanzee as a 'thing'. |
| 3721 | We judge God to be good by a priori standards of moral perfection [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Where do we get the concept of God as the highest good? Solely from the idea of moral perfection, which reason traces a priori. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 408.29) |
| 8046 | We can only know we should obey God if we already have moral standards for judging God [Kant, by MacIntyre] |
| Full Idea: On Kant's view it never follows that we ought to do what God commands, for we would have to know that we always ought to do what God commands, but that would need a standard of moral judgement independent of God's commands. God's commands are redundant. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory Ch.4 | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as a very powerful argument, even an undeniable one. How could you accept any authority if you didn't have some standards for accepting it, even if the standard was just to be awestruck by someone's charisma and will-power? |
| 20714 | God is not proved by reason, but is a postulate of moral thinking [Kant, by Davies,B] |
| Full Idea: Kant speaks of God not as something known or proved to exist by virtue of rational argument, but as a postulate of moral reflection (that is, of 'practical reason'). | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Brian Davies - Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion 9 'Morality' | |
| A reaction: Presumably it is a necessary postulate, which makes this a transcendental argument, surely? |