127 ideas
22496 | Wisdom only implies the knowledge achievable in any normal lifetime [Foot] |
Full Idea: Wisdom implies no more knowledge and understanding than anyone of normal capacity can and should acquire in the course of an ordinary life. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 5) | |
A reaction: Have philosophers stopped talking about wisdom precisely because you now need three university degrees to be considered even remotely good at phillosophy? Hence wisdom is an inferior attainment, because Foot is right. |
20383 | The wisest man is full of contradictions, and attuned to other people, with occasional harmony [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The wisest man would be the one richest in contradictions, who has, as it were, antennae for all types of men - as well as his great moments of grand harmony - a rare accident even in us! | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §259) | |
A reaction: By 'us' does he mean himself? Whether the rest of us thought such a person to be wise would depend on whether we met them on a contradictory or a harmonious day. Permanent harmony should be viewed with suspicion. |
4520 | I don't want to persuade anyone to be a philosopher; they should be rare plants [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: I do not wish to persuade anyone to philosophy: it is inevitable, it is perhaps also desirable, that the philosopher should be a rare plant. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §420) | |
A reaction: My immediate reaction is disagreement, but 'what if everybody' became a philosopher. The fear is that philosophy paralyses action, but it need not. Good philosophy is time-consuming. History would come to an end. The excitement of medieval history! |
4545 | Could not the objective character of things be merely a difference of degree within the subjective? [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Could not the objective character of things be merely a difference of degree within the subjective? | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §560) | |
A reaction: A reasonable speculation. I begin to feel my opinions are objective if they are reinforced by the agreement of others. One can believe in the facts, but despair of objectivity. It is called 'scepticism'. Buf cf. T.Nagel. |
4530 | Reason is a mere idiosyncrasy of a certain species of animal [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Reason is a mere idiosyncrasy of a certain species of animal. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §515) | |
A reaction: Call me narrow-minded, prejudiced and arrogant, but I just don't believe this. Rational minds meet across cultures, and good reasons can rise above culture. However, I may be wrong about this… |
4523 | What can be 'demonstrated' is of little worth [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: What can be 'demonstrated' is of little worth. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §431) | |
A reaction: He admits that some things can be demonstrated, and that they have some worth. But demonstration may be a matter of coherence, so that anything can be demonstrated, by assuming a range of ideas as being beyond demonstration. |
4531 | Our inability to both affirm and deny a single thing is merely an inability, not a 'necessity' [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: We are unable to affirm and to deny one and the same thing: this is a subjective empirical law, not the expression of any 'necessity', but only an inability. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §516) | |
A reaction: A remarkable claim, made by someone utterly gripped by relativism. I don't believe it. Why can't we do it? We experience it as a truth, not as a prejudice or mental block. I say it reflects reality - there is only one set of facts. |
4541 | Everything simple is merely imaginary [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Everything simple is merely imaginary. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §536) | |
A reaction: A wonderful aphorism. This is one's worst fear, which is why it is suggested that ontological O's R is bad, though epistemological O's R ('be cautious') is fine. I have to admit that I have no idea whether reality is simple. |
20357 | Truth was given value by morality, but eventually turned against its own source [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Among the forces cultivated by morality was truthfulness: this eventually turned against morality, discovered its teleology, its partial perspective. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §015) | |
A reaction: Just as 'duty' is said to have withered in modern times, because its religious underpinning has been lost, so this gives an account of the decline of the value of truth. It is still left to us to assert the value of truth, perhaps as the only value. |
4534 | 'Truth' is the will to be master over the multiplicity of sensations [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: 'Truth' is the will to be master over the multiplicity of sensations. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §517) | |
A reaction: I suspect that this is a nice explanation of why we value truth, but says nothing at all about what truth actually is. I can't think of a better explanation of why we value truth. |
4548 | Only because there is thought is there untruth [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Only because there is thought is there untruth. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §574) | |
A reaction: A nicely oblique place to start in one's study of truth. Untruth is a very human contribution to the world, making virtually no sense of animal thought. Meta-thought seems to be required. |
5652 | True beliefs are those which augment one's power [Nietzsche, by Scruton] |
Full Idea: For Nietzsche, the true belief is the one which augments one's power. | |
From: report of Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888]) by Roger Scruton - Short History of Modern Philosophy Ch.13 | |
A reaction: Scruton probably had in mind Idea 4534, from The Will to Power, but wider reading suggests this is not Nietzsche's view of truth, which was much more robust. Nietzsche was obsessed with identifying the motivation for a love of truth. |
4508 | The truth is what gives us the minimum of spiritual effort, and avoids the exhaustion of lying [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: What is true? Where an explanation is given which causes us the minimum of spiritual effort (moreover, lying is very exhausting). | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §279) | |
A reaction: Nietzsche is just being naughty here. Obviously lazy but intelligent people tell the truth, but to suggest that there is nothing more to truth means the collapse of language and thought. Which means no more reading Nietzsche… |
4538 | Judgements can't be true and known in isolation; the only surety is in connections and relations [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: An isolated judgement is never 'true', never knowledge; only in connection and relation of many judgements is there any surety. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §530) | |
A reaction: It actually seems impossible to state an isolated judgement in language without having a mass of presuppositions and beliefs to support it. I don't think the full holistic thesis about language follows, however. |
4533 | Logic and maths refer to fictitious entities which we have created [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Logic (like geometry and arithmetic) applies only to fictitious entities that we have created. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §516) | |
A reaction: This finds Nietzsche on the relativist wing of logical empiricism. The thing is, fictitious entities can have a close relationship with truth, as in a great novel. I believe in necessary logical truth, but there are many ways of slicing it. |
20359 | The nature of being, of things, is much easier to understand than is becoming [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The doctrine of being, of things, of all sorts of fixed unities is a hundred times easier than the doctrine of becoming, of development. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §238) | |
A reaction: I don't know if he intended it, but this is a fierce shaft hurled at Aristotle, who gives a wonderful essentialist account of the nature of things, but can offer nothing more on becoming than the doctrine of potentiality and actuality. |
3942 | I do not believe in the existence of anything, if I see no reason to believe it [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: It is to me a sufficient reason not to believe the existence of anything, if I see no reason for believing it. | |
From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], II p.205) | |
A reaction: This may just be a reasonable application of Ockham's Razor, but I fear that Berkeley painted himself into corner by demanding too many 'reasons' for everything. |
3952 | I know that nothing inconsistent can exist [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: I know that nothing inconsistent can exist. | |
From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], III p.224) | |
A reaction: Fine, but the problem is to assess with confidence what is inconsistent. Human imagination seems to be the test for existence. But what else can we do? |
4525 | There are no facts in themselves, only interpretations [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Against positivism, which halts at phenomena, and says "there are only facts", I would say: No, facts is precisely what there is not, only interpretations. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §481) | |
A reaction: A cornerstone of relativism is the denial of facts. A cornerstone of realism is the affirmation of facts. Personally, I affirm facts. |
4543 | There are no 'facts-in-themselves', since a sense must be projected into them to make them 'facts' [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: There are no 'facts-in-themselves', for a sense must always be projected into them before they can be 'facts'. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §556) | |
A reaction: The relativist (and anti-realist) view. Any attempt at taking this proposal seriously induces a hopeless vertigo, a well known consequence of reading Nietzsche. I don't believe this. It is not to my taste. |
4546 | We realise that properties are sensations of the feeling subject, not part of the thing [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: There comes a point where one realises that what one calls a property of a thing is a sensation of the feeling subject; at this point the property ceases to belong to the thing. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §562) | |
A reaction: I don't believe this. Has Nietzsche no theory about WHY we have one sensation rather than another? I prefer to distinguish primary from secondary qualities. |
4544 | A thing has no properties if it has no effect on other 'things' [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The properties of a thing are effects on other 'things'; if one removes other 'things', then a thing has no properties. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §557) | |
A reaction: This is a causal theory of properties. A counterexample is a potential property, like a bomb which never explodes. |
20362 | We saw unity in things because our ego seemed unified (but now we doubt the ego!) [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: We borrowed the concept of unity from our 'ego' concept - our oldest article of faith. If we did not hold ourselves to be unified, we would never have formed the concept 'thing'. Now, somewhat late, we are convinced that the ego does not guarantee unity. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §635) | |
A reaction: Nietzsche tells a similar story about the emergence and subsequent undermining of truth. I am becoming an enthusiast for Nietzsche's account of how our psychology has generated out metaphysics - which doesn't make the metaphysics false. |
3959 | There is no other substance, in a strict sense, than spirit [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: There is no other substance, in a strict sense, than spirit. | |
From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], III p.257) | |
A reaction: A nice clear statement of idealism. Why is he so confident of making this assertion. Note the addition, though, of 'in a strict' sense. He is presenting an epistemological claim as if it was an ontological one. |
3946 | A thing is shown to be impossible if a contradiction is demonstrated within its definition [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: A thing is shown to be impossible when a repugnancy is demonstrated between the ideas comprehended in its definition. | |
From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], II p.214) | |
A reaction: The problem is always that imagination is needed to see the 'repugnancy', and that is relative and limited. |
4528 | For me, a priori 'truths' are just provisional assumptions [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The most strongly believed a priori 'truths' are for me provisional assumptions (e.g. the law of causality). | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §497) | |
A reaction: The example of causality would fit in with Humean scepticism, but presumably Nietzsche would also apply it to maths and logic, since he is a thorough-going relativist. I cautiously disagree. |
4537 | We can't know whether there is knowledge if we don't know what it is [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: If we do not know what knowledge is, we cannot possibly answer the question of whether there is knowledge. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §530) | |
A reaction: Obviously Nietzsche is pessimistic about the prospects here, but this is a motto for the whole modern analysis of knowledge, and (besides) we have lots of things (like a concept of identity) which we can't define. |
4485 | Every belief is a considering-something-true [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Every belief is a considering-something-true. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §015) | |
A reaction: This is correct, I think, but a little perplexing coming from Nietzsche, who seems to deny objective truth. Presumably we should follow instinct, rather than 'belief'. |
4487 | A note for asses: What convinces is not necessarily true - it is merely convincing [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: What convinces is not necessarily true - it is merely convincing (a note for asses). | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §017) | |
A reaction: I hope I am not such an ass that I need Nietzsche to explain this, as I have always thought it true. Many good modern epistemologists seem to me guilty of this error, though. Pragmatists, riff-raff like that… |
3958 | Since our ideas vary when the real things are said to be unchanged, they cannot be true copies [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: As our ideas are perpetually varied, without any change in the supposed real things, it necessarily follows that they cannot all be true copies of them. | |
From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], III p.239) | |
A reaction: This seems a good objection to any direct or naďve realist view. Colours get darker as the sun goes down, and objects become blurred as they recede into the distance. |
3943 | If existence is perceived directly, by which sense; if indirectly, how is it inferred from direct perception? [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: Either you perceive the being of matter immediately, or mediately; if immediately, pray inform me by which of the senses you perceive it; if mediately, let me know by what reasonings it is inferred from those things which you perceive immediately. | |
From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], II p.208) | |
A reaction: A problem for strong empiricists, and he is right that existence can't be directly perceived, but it seems a good explanation (for which some reason can be shown), and supports a more rationalist view. |
3931 | Sensible objects are just sets of sensible qualities [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: Sensible things are nothing else but so many sensible qualities. | |
From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], I p.154) | |
A reaction: As it stands this is phenomenalism, but Berkeley eventually votes for idealism. He should acknowledge possible sensations which aren't actually experienced. |
5192 | Berkeley did not deny material things; he merely said they must be defined through sensations [Berkeley, by Ayer] |
Full Idea: Berkeley did not (as we are commonly told) deny the reality of material things. ..What Berkeley discovered was that material things must be defined in terms of sense-contents. | |
From: report of George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713]) by A.J. Ayer - Language,Truth and Logic Ch.2 | |
A reaction: This seems to be a rather debatable attempt to claim that Berkeley was a phenomenalist (like Ayer), rather than an idealist. Try ideas 3942, 3944, 3945, 3957, 3959 in this database. |
5174 | Berkeley needed a phenomenalist account of the self, as well as of material things [Ayer on Berkeley] |
Full Idea: The considerations which make it necessary, as Berkeley saw, to give a phenomenalist account of material things, make it necessary also, as Berkeley did not see, to give a phenomenalist account of the self. | |
From: comment on George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713]) by A.J. Ayer - Language,Truth and Logic Ch.7 | |
A reaction: Phenomenalism involves 'possible' experiences as well as actual ones. That could add up to quite a rich and stable account of the self, as opposed to Hume's notorious introspection, which only saw an actual shifting 'bundle' of experience. |
1103 | 'To be is to be perceived' is a simple confusion of experience with its objects [Russell on Berkeley] |
Full Idea: Berkeley thinks 'to be is to be perceived', and only God provides continuity. He has simply confused the experience of perception with the thing being perceived. Ideas have content. | |
From: comment on George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713]) by Bertrand Russell - Problems of Philosophy |
6403 | For Berkelely, reality is ideas and a community of minds, including God's [Berkeley, by Grayling] |
Full Idea: Berkeley's thesis is that reality ultimately consists of a community of minds and their ideas; one of the minds (God) is infinite, and causes most of the ideas. | |
From: report of George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2 | |
A reaction: I think Russell nicely pinpoints what is wrong with Berekely, which is that he confuses ideas with their contents. If I think about my garden, the garden is real (probably), which is the content, and they idea is just a way of thinking. |
3936 | Time is measured by the succession of ideas in our minds [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: Time is measured by the succession of ideas in our minds. | |
From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], I p.172) | |
A reaction: But we distinguish between subjective time (which flies when you are having fun), and objective time, judged from observation of clocks and nature. |
3930 | There is no such thing as 'material substance' [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: That there is no such thing as what philosophers call 'material substance', I am seriously persuaded. | |
From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], I p.150) | |
A reaction: I'm sorry, but I can't do with this. It confuses epistemology with ontology. Ontology is a matter of judgement; epistemology is the evidence on which we base it. We know sensations; personally I judge that there are material substances. What about you? |
3939 | I conceive a tree in my mind, but I cannot prove that its existence can be conceived outside a mind [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: I may conceive in my own thoughts the idea of a tree, but that is all. And this is far from proving that I can conceive it existing out of the minds of all spirits. | |
From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], I p.184) | |
A reaction: If Berkeley has based a world view on this point, then his mistake is to require a 'proof'. Aristotle explained why you can't prove everything (not to mention Gödel). |
3945 | There is nothing in nature which needs the concept of matter to explain it [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: I challenge you to show me that thing in nature which needs matter to explain or account for it. | |
From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], II p.212) | |
A reaction: I disagree. Physics is a good theory for explaining why we have perceptions. Failing that there is not even a glimmer of an explanation of our experiences. |
3947 | Perceptions are ideas, and ideas exist in the mind, so objects only exist in the mind [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: Wood, fire, water, flesh, iron, are things that I know, and only known because I perceive them by my senses; these are immediately perceived, and so are ideas; ideas cannot exist without the mind; their existence consists therefore in being perceived. | |
From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], III p.220) | |
A reaction: This makes no distinction between an idea and its content. Berkeley fails to grasp the weird concept of intentionality. Trees aren't in my head, just because I think about them! |
4539 | The forms of 'knowledge' about logic which precede experience are actually regulations of belief [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The basic laws of logic (identity and contradiction) are said to be forms of pure knowledge because they precede experience. But these are not forms of knowledge at all! They are regulative articles of belief. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §530) | |
A reaction: This is a standard objection to foundationalism - that the basic beliefs (of reason, or raw experience) are not actually knowledge. We can all speculate about their origin and basis. Personally I think 'truth' must be somewhere in the explanation. |
3933 | Primary qualities (such as shape, solidity, mass) are held to really exist, unlike secondary qualities [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: Sensible qualities are by philosophers divided into primary and secondary; the former are extension, figure, solidity, gravity, motion and rest, which exist really in bodies. | |
From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], I p.169) | |
A reaction: A crucial distinction, which anti-realists such as Berkeley end up denying. I think it is a good distinction, and philosophers should fight to preserve it. |
3934 | A mite would see its own foot as large, though we would see it as tiny [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: A mite must be supposed to see his own foot as a body of some considerable dimension, though they appear to you scarcely discernible. | |
From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], I p.170) | |
A reaction: Berkeley is confused. Hot is secondary, but temperature is primary. Bigness is secondary, size primay. Midgets and tall people don't disagree over the size of a table. |
3935 | The apparent size of an object varies with its distance away, so that can't be a property of the object [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: As we approach to or recede from an object, the visible extension varies, being at one distance ten or a hundred times greater than at another; doth it not follow that it is not really inherent in the object? | |
From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], I p.171) | |
A reaction: Berkeley is confused, because he is too literally empirical. Qualities are not self-evidently primary or secondary, but are judged so after comparisons (e.g. with testimony, or with the other senses). |
3937 | 'Solidity' is either not a sensible quality at all, or it is clearly relative to our senses [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: By 'solidity' either you do not mean any sensible quality, and so it is beside our enquiry; or if you do, it must be hardness or resistance, which are plainly relative to our senses. | |
From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], I p.173) | |
A reaction: Berkeley fails to recognise that a quality can have primary and secondary aspects (hot/high temperature). He is right that primary qualities are not directly perceived. They are judgements. |
3940 | Distance is not directly perceived by sight [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: Distance is not properly and immediately perceived by sight. | |
From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], I p.186) | |
A reaction: Interestingly, if secondary qualities are not strictly perceptions of the object, and primary qualities are not directly perceived, then we don't seem to perceive anything at all. Perhaps we should drop the concept of 'perception'? |
3957 | Immediate objects of perception, which some treat as appearances, I treat as the real things themselves [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: Those immediate objects of perception, which, according to you, are only appearances of things, I take to be the real things themselves. | |
From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], III p.237) | |
A reaction: If that is a judgement, which it seems to be, it is a strange one. Realists offer a much better explanation of perceptions. |
3953 | Real things and imaginary or dreamed things differ because the latter are much fainter [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: The difference between real things, and chimeras formed by the imagination, or the visions of a dream, is that the latter are faint and indistinct. | |
From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], III p.225) | |
A reaction: In Hume this becomes 'impressions' and 'ideas'. It does raise the question of WHY some ideas are not as faint as others. |
3938 | Geometry is originally perceived by senses, and so is not purely intellectual [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: Figures and extension, being originally perceived by sense, do not belong to pure intellect. | |
From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], I p.176) | |
A reaction: Is the square root of 169 less 'pure' in my mind if I learn it from laying out bricks instead of by thinking about numbers? Confusion of how you learn with what you learn? |
4532 | We can have two opposite sensations, like hard and soft, at the same time [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: There is a coarse sensualistic prejudice that sensations teach us truths about things - that I cannot say at the same time that a thing is hard and soft. To say that I cannot have two opposite sensations at the same time is quite coarse and false. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §516) | |
A reaction: I am struggling to think of examples. I might experience something as cool, but judge it to be warm (because my hand is hot). I don't think I know what experience he is referring to. Interesting claim, though. |
3944 | It is possible that we could perceive everything as we do now, but nothing actually existed. [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: We might perceive all things just as we do now, though there was no matter in the world. | |
From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], II p.209) | |
A reaction: An old Greek argument. Now we have an explanation of experience, but we wouldn't if nothing existed. Which doesn't prove that anything exists. Is some explanation always preferable to none? Cf. religion. |
4486 | The extreme view is there are only perspectives, no true beliefs, because there is no true world [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The most extreme form of nihilism would be the view that every belief, every considering-something-true, is necessarily false because there is simply no true world. Thus: a perspectival appearance, whose origin lies in us. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §015) | |
A reaction: The idea that 'there is no true world' is incomprehensible to me. But note that here Nietzsche labels this an 'extreme' view, which he may not be asserting. He likes to flirt with danger. |
3932 | A hot hand and a cold hand will have different experiences in the same tepid water [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: Suppose now one of your hands hot, and the other cold, and that they are both at once put into the same vessel of water, in an intermediate state; will not the water seem cold to one hand, and warm to the other? | |
From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], I p.158) | |
A reaction: A nice clear example of how some relativism must be acknowledged. It feels hot, but what is its temperature in degrees C? |
3948 | Experience tells me that other minds exist independently from my own [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: It is plain that other minds have an existence exterior to my mind, since I find them by experience to be independent of it. | |
From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], III p.220) | |
A reaction: This is a surprising claim from Berkeley. If trees only exist through their experience in my mind, why don't other minds exist in the same way? |
4536 | It is a major blunder to think of consciousness as a unity, and hence as an entity, a thing [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: There is a tremendous blunder in absurdly overestimating consciousness, the transformation of it into a unity, an entity - 'spirit', 'soul', something that feels, thinks, wills. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §529) | |
A reaction: This is a wonderfully modern and scientific view. Even strong materialists still make claims about mental unity, behind which an extravagent and contradictory metaphysics can be hidden. Was Nietzsche, then, an 'eliminativist' about mind? |
4551 | Great self-examination is to become conscious of oneself not as an individual, but as mankind [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Tremendous self-examination: becoming conscious of oneself, not as an individual but as mankind. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §575) | |
A reaction: A lovely thought, which illustrates the fact that it is hard to be introspective without bringing an agenda to the process. |
4527 | Perhaps we are not single subjects, but a multiplicity of 'cells', interacting to create thought [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The assumption of one single subject is perhaps unnecessary; perhaps we are a multiplicity of subjects, whose interaction and struggle is the basis of our thought and consciousness, an aristocracy of 'cells' in which dominion resides equally. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §490) | |
A reaction: A nice combination of Humean scepticism, and an anticipation of the modularity of mind. Was Nietzsche thinking about evolution? It goes with his doubts about reason (if we are run by a committee). |
20374 | Consciousness is a terminal phenomenon, and causes nothing [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Everything of which we become conscious is a terminal phenomenon, an end - and causes nothing. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §478) | |
A reaction: This appears to endorse epiphenomenalism - which I take to be an incoherent concept. How can becoming fully aware of something, rather than subliminally or subconsciously aware, make no difference at all? If it exists, it has causal powers. |
3941 | How can that which is unthinking be a cause of thought? [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: How can that which is unthinking be a cause of thought? | |
From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], II p.203) | |
A reaction: Presumably, though, he thinks that thought can cause 'that which is unthinking' to move'. He likes one half of the interaction problem (which supports dualism), but avoids the other half. |
23938 | Passions are ranked, as if they are non-rational and animal pleasure seeking [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The whole conception of an order of rank among the passions: as if it were the right and normal thing to be guided by reason - with the passions as abnormal, dangerous, semi-animal …and nothing other than desires for pleasure. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §387) | |
A reaction: This thought of Nietzsche's seems to be very important, because the Enlightenment relegation of passions was inherited from Christianity, and dominated European culture (and Buddhism too, I think). |
23939 | We fail to see that reason is a network of passions, and every passion contains some reason [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The misunderstanding of passion and reason, as if the latter were an independent entity and not rather a system of relations between various passions and desires; and as if every passion did not possess its quantum of reason. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §387) | |
A reaction: This seems to me a much more accurate account of the relation of reason and passion than almost anything in earlier philosophy (though Aristotle is quite good on it). I am retraining myself to see my mental life in this way. |
5374 | Berkeley probably used 'idea' to mean both the act of apprehension and the thing apprehended [Russell on Berkeley] |
Full Idea: Berkeley seems to have confused the colour of the thing apprehended with the act of apprehension; probably either of these would have been called an 'idea' be Berkeley. | |
From: comment on George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713]) by Bertrand Russell - Problems of Philosophy | |
A reaction: If we are saying that Berkeley's error was entirely verbal, there is a chicken-and-egg problem. He was an idealist, so he wouldn't have thought that there were two separate concepts behind the word 'idea'. Russell merely asserts that there are. |
4554 | The concept of the 'will' is just a false simplification by our understanding [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: There is no such thing as 'will'; it is only a simplifying conception of understanding, as is 'matter'. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §671) | |
A reaction: Nietzsche shares this view with British philosophers such as Hobbes and Bernard Williams. So what is the ontological status of the 'will to power'? |
4552 | There is no such things a pure 'willing' on its own; the aim must always be part of it [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: There is no such thing as 'willing', but only willing something: one must not remove the aim from the total condition - as epistemologists do. 'Willing' as they understand it is as little a reality as 'thinking': it is a pure fiction. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §668) | |
A reaction: This is parallel to the common modern assertion that emotions also have intentional content, and cannot be understood as having a 'pure' identity. |
23694 | All criterions of practical rationality derive from goodness of will [Foot] |
Full Idea: I want to say, baldly, that there is no criterion for practical rationality that is not derived from that of goodness of will. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 1) | |
A reaction: Where does that put the successful and clever criminal? Presumably they are broadly irrational, but narrowly rational - but that is not very clear distinction. She says Kant's concept of the good will is too pure, and unrelated to human good. |
3954 | Immorality is not in the action, but in the deviation of the will from moral law [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: Sin or moral turpitude doth not consist in the outward physical action or motion, but in the internal deviation of the will from the laws of reason and religion. | |
From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], III p.227) | |
A reaction: A Kantian view (that the only good thing is a good will). It is a very empiricist (and anti-Greek) view to deny that actions have any intrinsic value. |
4521 | None of the ancients had the courage to deny morality by denying free will [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Not one of the ancient philosophers had the courage for a theory of the 'unfree will' (i.e. for a theory that denies morality). | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §428) | |
A reaction: The ancients were struck by fate, and by the elusiveness of truth, and Heraclitus said that "character is fate". But Nietzsche seems basically correct. |
23686 | Moral reason is not just neutral, because morality is part of the standard of rationality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
Full Idea: In her late period she again reverses her thoughts on moral rationalism; …rather than a neutral rationality which fulfils desires, she argues that morality ought to be thought of as part of the standard of rationality itself. | |
From: report of Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001]) by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought Intro | |
A reaction: This comes much closer to the Greek and Aristotelian concept of logos. They saw morality as inseparable from our judgements about how the world is. All 'sensible' thinking will involve what is good for humanity. |
23693 | Practical rationality must weigh both what is morally and what is non-morally required [Foot] |
Full Idea: Different considerations are on a par, in that judgement about what is required by practical rationality must take account of their interaction: of the weight of the ones we call non-moral as well as those we call moral. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 1) | |
A reaction: Her final settled view of rationalism in morality, it seems. The point is that moral considerations are not paramount, because she sees possible justifications for ignoring moral rules (like 'don't lie') in certain practical situations. |
4496 | 'Conscience' is invented to value actions by intention and conformity to 'law', rather than consequences [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: "Conscience" was created as an inner voice which does not measure the value of every action with regard to its consequences, but with regard to its intention, and the degree to which this intention conforms with the "laws". | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §141) | |
A reaction: The idea of conscience does seem to preserve moral authority in the absence of gods, but intentions need not only be judged by their obedience to laws. |
23687 | Moral virtues arise from human nature, as part of what makes us good human beings [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
Full Idea: In her later work she offers a view of the relationship of morality to human nature, arguing that the moral virtues are part of what makes us good as human beings. | |
From: report of Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001]) by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought Intro | |
A reaction: In this phase she talks explicitly of the Aristotelian idea that successful function is the grounding of what is good for any living being, including humans. |
20136 | There is an extended logic to a great man's life, achieved by a sustained will [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: There is a logic in all of a great man's activities, hard to survey because of its length .... he has the ability to extend his will across great stretches of his life. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §962 (1885)) | |
A reaction: This looks very close to Nietzsche's moral ideal - that one creates a life in impeccable taste, like a great work of art, by deliberately training one's nature, like a gardener. He talks of it as having 'style' in character. |
20358 | The highest man can endure and control the greatest combination of powerful drives [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The highest man has the greatest multiplicity of drives, in the relatively greatest strength that can be endured. Indeed, when the plant 'man' shows himself strongest one finds instincts that conflict powerfully (e.g. in Shakespeare), but are controlled. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §966) | |
A reaction: Are there some people, perhaps in mental hospitals, who cannot endure or control such things? Do these people have some drives which the rest of us never experience? Do good people only have good drives? |
20369 | The highest man directs the values of the highest natures over millenia [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: He who determines values and directs the will of millenia by giving direction to the highest natures is the highest man. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §999) | |
A reaction: The second half is the interesting bit. If Ghengis Khan inspires hordes to commit massacres, he certainly creates values, but he hasn't inspired highest natures. So who inspires highest natures? Who are the role models of role models? |
4506 | There is a conspiracy (a will to power) to make morality dominate other values, like knowledge and art [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Whose will to power is morality? - Since Socrates there has been a sustained attempt to make moral values dominate over other values, so that they guide living, but also knowledge, the arts, and political and social endeavour. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §274) | |
A reaction: Is the 'will to power' really an explanation? If all human activity is the will to power, then you have to explain the difference between activities. Genocide and altruism are strikingly different manifestations of the will to power. |
4514 | The basic tendency of the weak has always been to pull down the strong, using morality [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The basic tendency of the weak and mediocre of all ages is to weaken and pull down the stronger: chief means, the moral judgement. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §345) | |
A reaction: Obviously this contains some truth. Morality is a vast trade union movement by means of which the weak seek power and security. And good luck to them, I say. Why is mass power any worse than aristocratic or oligarchic power? |
22492 | Virtues are as necessary to humans as stings are to bees [Foot] |
Full Idea: Virtues play a necessary part in the life of human beings as do stings in the life of a bee. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 2) | |
A reaction: This presumably rests on the Aristotelian idea that humans are essentially social (as opposed to solitary humans who choose to be social, perhaps in a contractual way, as Plato implies). |
22493 | Sterility is a human defect, but the choice to be childless is not [Foot] |
Full Idea: Lack of capacity to reproduce is a defect in a human being. But choice of childlessness and even celibacy is not thereby shown to be defective choice, because human good is not the same as plant or animal good. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 3) | |
A reaction: Is failure to reproduce a defect in an animal? If goodness and virtue derive from function, it is hard to see how deliberate childlessness could be a human good, even if it is not a defect. Choosing to terminate a hereditary defect seems good. |
22491 | Moral evaluations are not separate from facts, but concern particular facts about functioning [Foot] |
Full Idea: A moral evaluation does not stand over against the statement of a matter of fact, but rather has to do with facts about a particular subject matter, as do evaluations of such things as sight and hearing in animals. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 1) | |
A reaction: She avoids the word 'function', and only deals with living creatures, but she uses a 'good knife' as an example, and this Aristotelian view clearly applies to any machine which has a function. |
20370 | All evaluation is from some perspective, and aims at survival [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: All evaluation is made from a definite perspective: that of the preservation of the individual, a community, a race, a state, a church, a faith, a culture. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §259) | |
A reaction: There seems to be a tension over the source of values in Nietzsche. Are they the individualistic visions of an übermensch, or do they arise from the collective pressures of one of these social groups? I suspec that his answer tries to combine them. |
20354 | The ruling drives of our culture all want to be the highest court of our values [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: What is common to all [the artistic, scientific, religious and moral views]: the ruling drives want to be viewed also as the highest courts of value in general, indeed as creative and ruling powers. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §677) | |
A reaction: An interesting question is whether those four socially dominant forces could reach a consensus on a core of values. And also which value held by one of the groups is viewed as crazy by the other three. |
4505 | How can it be that I should prefer my neighbour to myself, but he should prefer me to himself? [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: What does it mean that the welfare of my neighbour ought to possess for me a higher value than my own? But that my neighbour ought to subordinate his welfare to my welfare? | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §269) | |
A reaction: Interestingly, this is Nietzsche using a Kantian tool to criticise Christian morality. He is pointing out a logical inconsistency. It seems to me an excellent question, though Christians could say it is benignly circular. The most benign circle possible. |
4509 | Utilitarians prefer consequences because intentions are unknowable - but so are consequences! [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Utilitarians say actions must be judged by consequences, because it is impossible to know the origins. But one only knows the consequences about five steps ahead, and who knows what an action can stimulate, excite, provoke? | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §291) | |
A reaction: The utilitarian slogan seems to be 'do your best', but that could apply equally to intentions and consequences. Nietzsche seems to offer nothing to compensate us for our massive ignorance. Nihilism. |
22497 | Deep happiness usually comes from the basic things in life [Foot] |
Full Idea: Possible objects of deep happiness seem to be things that are basic in human life, such as home, and family, and work, and friendship. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 6) | |
A reaction: I've not encountered discussion of 'deep' happiness before. I heard of an old man in tears because he had just seen a Purple Emperor butterfly for the first time. She makes it sound very conservative. How about mountaineering achievements? |
22498 | Happiness is enjoying the pursuit and attainment of right ends [Foot] |
Full Idea: In my terminology 'happiness' is understood as the enjoyment of good things, meaning the enjoyment in attaining, and in pursuing, right ends. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 6) | |
A reaction: A modified version of Aristotle's view, which she contrasts with McDowell's identification of happiness with the life of virtue. They all seem to have an optimistic hope that the pleasure in being a bit wicked is false happiness. |
4558 | We have no more right to 'happiness' than worms [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: One has no right to 'happiness': the individual human being is in precisely the same case as the lowest worm. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §759) | |
A reaction: This seems an obvious truth, but nicely made clear. It is, I suppose, aimed at Christians and socialists. |
4500 | It is a sign of degeneration when eudaimonistic values begin to prevail [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: It is a sign of degeneration when eudaemonistic valuations begin to prevail (physiological fatigue, feebleness of the will). | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §222) | |
A reaction: Aristotle's analysis of eudaimonia says that it is only achievable through action, and he considers consequences to be an essential part of an action. Surely hedonism is more degenerate than aiming at all-round success in life? |
4550 | Pleasure and pain are mere epiphenomena, and achievement requires that one desire both [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Brave and creative men never consider pleasure and pain as ultimate values - they are epiphenomena: one must desire both if one is to achieve anything. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §579) | |
A reaction: I am struggling with the notion that I must desire pain if I am ambitious, but to label these feeling 'epiphenomena' is challenging and plausible. I certainly deny that they have intrinsic value, which is a matter of judgement, not feeling. |
23695 | Good actions can never be justified by the good they brings to their agent [Foot] |
Full Idea: There is no good case for assessing the goodness of human action by reference only to good that each person brings to himself. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 1) | |
A reaction: She observes that even non-human animals often act for non-selfish reasons. The significance of this is its rejection of her much earlier view that virtues are justified by the good they bring their possessor. |
4519 | The ego is only a fiction, and doesn't exist at all [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The 'subject' is only a fiction: the ego of which one speaks when one censures egoism does not exist at all. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §370) | |
A reaction: This is the true Nietzsche, the nihilistic relativist. On optimistic days he thought some people had quivering dynamic egoes, to which they apparently owe duties, as one might to a great talent with which one was born. |
4517 | Egoism is inescapable, and when it grows weak, the power of love also grows weak [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: There cannot be anything other than egoism; in men whose ego is weak and thin the power of great love also grows weak. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §362) | |
A reaction: We have captured this now in the popular psychological notion of 'low self-esteem', which blights a persons behaviour. It runs counter to the Christian ideal of self-effacing altruism. |
4560 | The Golden Rule prohibits harmful actions, with the premise that actions will be requited [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The rule 'do nothing that ought not to be done to you' prohibits actions on account of their harmful consequences: the concealed premise is that an action will always be requited. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §925) | |
A reaction: Indeed it seems to be a slogan for contractarians, though I don't see why you shouldn't be influenced by the thought that there might be reciprocation, even if you don't expect it. |
22499 | We all know that just pretending to be someone's friend is not the good life [Foot] |
Full Idea: We know perfectly well that it is not true that the best life would consist in successfully pretending friendship: having friends to serve one but without being a real friend oneself. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 7) | |
A reaction: For some skallywags the achieving of something for nothing seems to be very much the good life, but not many of them want to exploit people who are seen to be their friends. |
4555 | The great error is to think that happiness derives from virtue, which in turn derives from free will [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The tremendous rat's tail of errors that has hitherto counted as the highest inspiration of humanity: 'All happiness is a consequence of virtue, all virtue is a consequence of free will!' | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §705) | |
A reaction: A nice suggestion about the hidden agenda of Greek and Christian philosophy. If one began to doubt free will, where would that leave Socrates and Aristotle? |
4493 | Be natural! But how, if one happens to be "unnatural"? [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Be natural! But how, if one happens to be "unnatural"? | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §066) | |
A reaction: Quite so, though Nietzsche isn't the person to offer a solution. Choose the route of Aristotle ('normal' human function), or Kant (escape from nature into reason). |
4494 | Not "return to nature", for there has never yet been a natural humanity [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Not "return to nature", for there has never yet been a natural humanity. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §120) | |
A reaction: I like that. The notion of dividing humanity into natural and unnatural makes me uneasy (and certainly isn't PC), and yet us all having to be 'natural' seems a conservative straight-jacket. |
4498 | 'Love your enemy' is unnatural, for the natural law says 'love your neighbour and hate your enemy' [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: One drives nature out of morality when one say "love your enemies": for then the natural "Thou shalt love thy neighbour and hate thy enemy" in the law (in instinct) has become meaningless. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §204) | |
A reaction: When the stoics said 'live according to nature' they meant according to reason, which presumably compromises with enemies. Profoundly Christian acts may be unnatural, but they are very moving. |
4511 | We would avoid a person who always needed reasons for remaining decent [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: It would arouse doubts in us concerning a man if we heard he needed reasons for remaining decent: certainly, we would avoid him. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §313) | |
A reaction: This is a perfect slogan for virtue theory, and so rather surprising coming from Nietzsche. And 'decent' isn't a great Nietzsche value (though he WAS a very decent man). |
4512 | Virtue is pursued from self-interest and prudence, and reduces people to non-entities [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Above all, gentlemen of virtue, you are not our superiors: it is a miserable self-interest and prudence that suggests virtue to you. If you had more strength and courage you would not reduce yourselves to virtuous nonentities in this way. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §318) | |
A reaction: It is certainly true that virtue is about self-interest, and also that it tends to be rather conservative. But we recognise the virtues of adventure and risk. |
22495 | Someone is a good person because of their rational will, not their body or memory [Foot] |
Full Idea: To speak of a good person is to speak of an individual not in respect of his body, or of faculties such as sight and memory, but as concerns his rational will (his 'will as controllable by reason'). | |
From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 5) | |
A reaction: She more or less agrees with Kant that the only truly good moral thing is a good will, though she has plenty of other criticisms of his views. |
20372 | The instinct of the herd, the majority, aims for the mean, in the middle [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The instinct of the herd considers the middle and the mean as the highest and most valuable: the place where the majority finds itself. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §280) | |
A reaction: The reason, I think, for Nietzsche's hostility to Aristotle. But the doctrine of the mean doesn't just seek the middle. It seeks what is appropriate. The mean for bravery and cowardice is not somewhat timid bravery; it is alarmingly brave, but sensible. |
4510 | A path to power: to introduce a new virtue under the name of an old one [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: A path to power: to introduce a new virtue under the name of an old one. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §310) | |
A reaction: A nicely wicked Nietzschean suggestion. One doesn't replace altruism, one 'reinterprets' it. Or democracy. Or 'true' courage. |
4515 | Modesty, industriousness, benevolence and temperance are the virtues of a good slave [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Modest, industrious, benevolent, temperate: is that how you would have men? good men? But to me that seems only the ideal slave, the slave of the future. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §356) | |
A reaction: An extremely good critical observation on virtue theory. Start from scratch, and list the virtues you would want in a good slave. |
4516 | Many virtues are merely restraints on the most creative qualities of a human being [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Industry, modesty, benevolence, temperance are just so many hindrances to a sovereign disposition, great inventiveness, heroic purposiveness, noble being-for-oneself. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §358) | |
A reaction: The traditional virtues here are reasonably precise and clear, but Nietzsche's preferred virtues are vague, and open to bizarre interpretations. One foresees a bunch of obsessive arrogant fools trying to live up to Nietzsche's ideal. |
4559 | When powerless one desires freedom; if power is too weak, one desires equal power ('justice') [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: One desires freedom as long as one does not possess power. Once one does possess it, one desires to overpower; if one cannot do that (if one is too weak), one desires 'justice', i.e. equal power. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §784) | |
A reaction: Personally I hope the Martians have freedom and justice, but that is presumably just a sublimation. People have given up power for freedom and justice. |
4557 | The supposed great lovers of honour (Alexander etc) were actually great despisers of honour [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The type of the ambitious man who thirsts after honour is supposed to be Napoleon, or Caesar, or Alexander! As if these were not precisely the great despisers of honour! | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §751) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure how Nietzsche knows this, but it sounds right. Great success comes from total focus on the end, not on incidental rewards. |
4507 | The categorical imperative needs either God behind it, or a metaphysic of the unity of reason [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: One needed God as an unconditional sanction, as a 'categorical imperative'; or, if one believed in the authority of reason, one needed a metaphysic of unity, by virtue of which this was logical. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §275) | |
A reaction: I am not sure what a 'metaphysic of unity' is, but this still captures the problem with Kant. The categorical imperative is purely formal, and will justify consistent principles of pain and destruction, without some value to get it off the ground. |
4501 | Utilitarianism criticises the origins of morality, but still believes in it as much as Christians [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Utilitarianism (socialism, democracy) criticises the origins of moral evaluations, but it believes them just as much as the Christian does. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §253) | |
A reaction: It is a critique of both utilitarianism and Kantian deontology that they seem to rest on unquestioned assumptions about what has value (pleasure, happiness, reason). I think Aristotle offers a better answer to this problem than 'divine' authority. |
4489 | If faith is lost, people seek other authorities, in order to avoid the risk of willing personal goals [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Having unlearned faith, one still seeks another authority (in conscience, or reason, or social instinct, or history); one wants to get around the will, the willing of a goal, the risk of positing a goal for oneself. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §020) | |
A reaction: But what goal should you risk willing, and why? And what limits my goals? What is the hallmark of a healthy goal, or good taste in goals, or whatever it is Nietzsche aspires to? |
4513 | Virtuous people are inferior because they are not 'persons', but conform to a fixed pattern [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: A virtuous man is a lower species because he is not a "person" but acquires his value by conforming to a pattern of man that is fixed once and for all. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §319) | |
A reaction: A penetrating critque of virtue theory. If, even now, we are trying to conform to Aristotle's model, that is VERY conservative. The obliteration of individual identity is also a charge against Kant and Bentham. Virtues are more flexible than rules. |
22502 | Refraining from murder is not made good by authenticity or self-fulfilment [Foot] |
Full Idea: If a stranger should come on us when we are sleeping he will not think it all right to kill us. …In human life as it is, this kind of action is not made good by authenticity or self-fulfilment in the one who does it. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 7) | |
A reaction: A rare swipe from Foot at existentialism, which she hardly ever mentions. I find it hard to see these existential virtues as in any way moral. It means nothing to other citizens whether one of their number is 'authentic'. |
4504 | Morality used to be for preservation, but now we can only experiment, giving ourselves moral goals [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Formerly one employed morality for preservation: but nobody wants to preserve any longer, there is nothing to preserve. Therefore an experimental morality: to give oneself a goal. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §260) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as the essence of Nietzsche, and the relativist position. Exciting and dangerous. Let's kill someone (Gide). Take drugs (Manson). Betray friends (Genet). Be altruistic…? |
4495 | The high points of culture and civilization do not coincide [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The high points of culture and civilization do not coincide. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §121) | |
A reaction: Intriguing. What can Nietzsche have meant by 'civilization'? Certainly not the English utilitarian ideal. He probably means aristocrats running slaves… |
4491 | In modern society virtue is 'equal rights', but only because everyone is zero, so it is a sum of zeroes [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Our entire sociology simply does not know any other instinct than that of the herd, i.e. that of the sum of zeroes - where every zero has "equal rights", where it is virtuous to be zero. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §053) | |
A reaction: I see his point, but all social arrangements are a trade-off. It would be quite exciting if warlike aristocrats dragged us into massive conquest, but nuclear weapons seem to have ruined that game. |
4542 | Science has taken the meaning out of causation; cause and effect are two equal sides of an equation [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Science has emptied the concept of causality of its content and retained it as a formula of an equation, in which it has become at bottom a matter of indifference on which side cause is placed and on which side effect. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §551) | |
A reaction: What a perceptive remark in the nineteenth century. Science is notoriously uninterested in the direction of time, and such a symmetry seems to make the concept of causation redundant. |
4553 | We derive the popular belief in cause and effect from our belief that our free will causes things [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The popular belief in cause and effect is founded on the presupposition that free will is the cause of every effect: it is only from this that we derive the feeling of causality. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §667) | |
A reaction: It may be that our first experiences of causation involve the wil, though I don't see why babies shouldn't also observe. Nietzsche is muddling the epistemology with the ontology. |
4535 | A 'species' is a stable phase of evolution, implying the false notion that evolution has a goal [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: When a 'species' appears, it is a phase in which evolution is not visible, so an equilibrium seems to have been attained, making possible the false notion that a goal has been attained, and that evolution has a goal. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §521) | |
A reaction: A penetrating explanation of a crucial that won't go away, and that still grips people's minds. Even if we all want a particular goal, evolution will ignore our dreams and go another way. |
4497 | The concept of 'God' represents a turning away from life, and a critique of life [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The concept 'God' represents a turning away from life, a critique of life, even a contempt for it. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §141) | |
A reaction: Clearly Nietzsche has the same view of Platonism, and any view which aspires to 'higher' things, and views humans as being potentially divine (even Aristotle's dream of pure 'contemplation'). |
4488 | Those who have abandoned God cling that much more firmly to the faith in morality [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Those who have abandoned God cling that much more firmly to the faith in morality. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §018) | |
A reaction: A nice remark. The interesting implication is that theists do NOT cling so strongly to morality (perhaps because they hope for mercy, or ultimate justice). |
4502 | Morality cannot survive when the God who sanctions it is missing [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Morality cannot survive when the God who sanctions it is missing! The "beyond" is absolutely necessary if faith in morality is to be maintained. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §253) | |
A reaction: It strikes me that Nietzsche is self-evidently wrong. We must ask why people hang on to moral absolutes after they lose religious faith. Nietzsche seems to think it is a comfort blanket. But he admits the contractarian origins of morality. |
3950 | There must be a God, because all sensible things must be perceived by him [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: I immediately and necessarily conclude the being of a God, because all sensible things must be perceived by him. | |
From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], II p.198) | |
A reaction: Daft. This contradicts Berkeley's whole empiricist position, that existence depends on known experience. Who knows whether God is thinking about trees? |
3951 | There must be a God, because I and my ideas are not independent [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: From the dependency I find in myself and my ideas, I do by an act of reason necessarily infer the existence of a God. | |
From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], III p.222) | |
A reaction: No. Hume answered this, by showing how big abstract ideas are built up from experience. This is a future bishop's wish-fulfilment. |
3949 | It has been proved that creation is the workmanship of God, from its beauty and usefulness [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: Divines and philosophers have proved beyond all controversy, from the beauty and usefulness of the several parts of creation, that it was the workmanship of God. | |
From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], II p.198) | |
A reaction: Not convincing. Beauty is probably a sublimation of sexual desire (or an echo of the human mind in the external world, in music), and utility is relative to homo sapiens, I presume. |
4499 | Primitive Christianity is abolition of the state; it is opposed to defence, justice, patriotism and class [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Primitive Christianity is abolition of the state: it forbids oaths, war service, courts of justice, defence of self or community, the distinction between citizens and foreigners, and differences of class. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §207) | |
A reaction: Interesting. This tension is still in Christianity, and permeates international socialism movements. But then Diogenes the Cynic said he was a citizen of the world. |
3956 | People are responsible because they have limited power, though this ultimately derives from God [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: Thinking rational beings, in the production of motions, have the use of limited powers, ultimately derived from God, but immediately under the direction of their own wills, which is sufficient to entitle them to all the guilt of their own actions. | |
From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], III p.228) | |
A reaction: An episcopal evasion. A classic attempt to have cake and eat it. Either God is in charge or he isn't. |
3955 | If sin is not just physical, we don't consider God the origin of sin because he causes physical events [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: If sin doth not consist of purely physical actions, the making God a cause of all such actions, is not making him the author of sin. | |
From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], III p.227) | |
A reaction: An equivocation. If responsibility resides in consciousness, God is presumably conscious, and we can judge the events he causes. |