Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Natural Goodness', 'Grundlagen (Foundations of Theory of Manifolds)' and 'De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence)'

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30 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom only implies the knowledge achievable in any normal lifetime [Foot]
     Full Idea: Wisdom implies no more knowledge and understanding than anyone of normal capacity can and should acquire in the course of an ordinary life.
     From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 5)
     A reaction: Have philosophers stopped talking about wisdom precisely because you now need three university degrees to be considered even remotely good at phillosophy? Hence wisdom is an inferior attainment, because Foot is right.
2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
If definitions must be general, and general terms can't individuate, then Socrates can't be defined [Aquinas, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
     Full Idea: Socrates has no definition if definitions by their nature must be in purely general terms, and if no purely general terms can succeed in uniquely singling out this signated matter.
     From: report of Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], 23) by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz 1.1.2
     A reaction: There seem to be two models. That general terms actually individuate the matter of Socrates, or that they cross-reference to (so to speak) define Socrates 'by elimination', as the only individual that fits. But the latter is a poor definition.
The definitions expressing identity are used to sort things [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: What sorts things into their proper genus and species are the definitions that express what they are.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.92)
     A reaction: This is straight from Aristotle, though Aristotle's view is a little more complex, I think. If the definitions 'express what they are', then definitions seem to specify the essence.
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Cantor developed sets from a progression into infinity by addition, multiplication and exponentiation [Cantor, by Lavine]
     Full Idea: Cantor's development of set theory began with his discovery of the progression 0, 1, ....∞, ∞+1, ∞+2, ..∞x2, ∞x3, ...∞^2, ..∞^3, ...∞^∞, ...∞^∞^∞.....
     From: report of George Cantor (Grundlagen (Foundations of Theory of Manifolds) [1883]) by Shaughan Lavine - Understanding the Infinite VIII.2
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
Ordinals are generated by endless succession, followed by a limit ordinal [Cantor, by Lavine]
     Full Idea: Ordinal numbers are generated by two principles: each ordinal has an immediate successor, and each unending sequence has an ordinal number as its limit (that is, an ordinal that is next after such a sequence).
     From: report of George Cantor (Grundlagen (Foundations of Theory of Manifolds) [1883]) by Shaughan Lavine - Understanding the Infinite III.4
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
If affirmative propositions express being, we affirm about what is absent [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: If being is what makes propositions true, then anything we can express in an affirmative proposition, however unreal, is said to be; so lacks and absences are, since we say that absences are opposed to presences, and blindness exists in an eye.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.92)
     A reaction: See Idea 11194 for the alternative Aristotelian approach to being, according to categories. Do absences and lacks have real essences, or causal properties? The absence of the sentry may cause the loss of the city.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
Properties have an incomplete essence, with definitions referring to their subject [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: Incidental properties have an incomplete essence, and need to refer in their definitions to their subject, lying outside their own genus.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.93)
     A reaction: These are 'incidental' properties, but it is a nice question whether properties have essences. Presumably they must have if they are universals, or platonic Forms. The notion of being 'strong' can be defined without specific examples.
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
If the form of 'human' contains 'many', Socrates isn't human; if it contains 'one', Socrates is Plato [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: If (in the Platonic view) manyness was contained in humanness it could never be one as it is in Socrates, and if oneness was part of its definition then Socrates would be Plato and the nature couldn't be realised more than once.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.100)
     A reaction: I suppose the reply is that since we are trying to explain one-over-many, then this unusual combination of both manyness and oneness is precisely what distinguishes forms from other ideas.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
The principle of diversity for corporeal substances is their matter [Aquinas, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
     Full Idea: In the view of Aquinas, while substantial form is the ultimate ground of identity and difference of angels, it is matter that provides a principle of diversity in the case of corporeal substances.
     From: report of Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267]) by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz 5.2.3
     A reaction: This is at least as good a proposal as their apatial location. There is more chance of reidentifying matter than of precisely reidentifying a spatial location. Two indistinguishable spheres remain the classic problem case (of Max Black, Idea 10195)
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
It is by having essence that things exist [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: It is by having essence that things exist.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.94)
     A reaction: Compare Idea 11199, which gives a fuller picture. This idea seems to suggest essence as the cause of existence, which sounds wrong. Perhaps essence is a necessary condition of existence, but it is necessary that nothing indeterminate can exist?
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Specific individual essence is defined by material, and generic essence is defined by form [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: Specific essence differs from generic essence by being demarcated: individuals are demarcated within species by dimensionally defined material, but species within genus by a defining differentiation taken from the form.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.95)
     A reaction: It clearly won't be enough to define an individual just to define its material and its shape. The material might also be essential to the genus, as when defining fire. Probably not very helpful.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
The definition of a physical object must include the material as well as the form [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: Form alone cannot be a composite substance's essence. For a thing's essence is expressed by its definition, and unless the definition of a physical substance included both form and material, the definition wouldn't differ from mathematical objects.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.93)
     A reaction: This is the sort of thoroughly sensible remark that you only get from the greatest philosophers. Minor philosophers fall in love with things like forms, and then try to use them to explain everything.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Essence is something in common between the natures which sort things into categories [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: Since being as belonging to a category expresses the 'isness' of things, and belongs to all ten Aristotelian categories, essence must be something all the natures that sort different beings into genera and species have in common.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.92)
     A reaction: I like this because it is the essence which does the sorting, not the sorting which defines the essence (which seems to me to be a deep and widespread confusion).
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
A simple substance is its own essence [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: A simple substance is its own essence.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.103)
     A reaction: Aquinas takes complex substances to have their essences in various ways, but this thought is the basis of all essence. Presumably the Greek word 'ousia' names the key ingredient.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
Definition of essence makes things understandable [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: It is definition of essence that makes things understandable.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.92)
     A reaction: The aim of philosophy is understanding, which is achieved by successful explanation. I totally agree with this Aristotelian view, so neatly summarised by Aquinas.
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
The mind constructs complete attributions, based on the unified elements of the real world [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: Attribution is something mind brings to completion by constructing propositional connections and disconnections, basing itself on real-world unity possessed by the things being attributed to one another.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.102)
     A reaction: This compromise story seems to me to be exactly right. I take it that we respond to the real joints of nature, but using thought and language which is riddled with convention.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
All criterions of practical rationality derive from goodness of will [Foot]
     Full Idea: I want to say, baldly, that there is no criterion for practical rationality that is not derived from that of goodness of will.
     From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 1)
     A reaction: Where does that put the successful and clever criminal? Presumably they are broadly irrational, but narrowly rational - but that is not very clear distinction. She says Kant's concept of the good will is too pure, and unrelated to human good.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Moral reason is not just neutral, because morality is part of the standard of rationality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
     Full Idea: In her late period she again reverses her thoughts on moral rationalism; …rather than a neutral rationality which fulfils desires, she argues that morality ought to be thought of as part of the standard of rationality itself.
     From: report of Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001]) by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought Intro
     A reaction: This comes much closer to the Greek and Aristotelian concept of logos. They saw morality as inseparable from our judgements about how the world is. All 'sensible' thinking will involve what is good for humanity.
Practical rationality must weigh both what is morally and what is non-morally required [Foot]
     Full Idea: Different considerations are on a par, in that judgement about what is required by practical rationality must take account of their interaction: of the weight of the ones we call non-moral as well as those we call moral.
     From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 1)
     A reaction: Her final settled view of rationalism in morality, it seems. The point is that moral considerations are not paramount, because she sees possible justifications for ignoring moral rules (like 'don't lie') in certain practical situations.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Moral virtues arise from human nature, as part of what makes us good human beings [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
     Full Idea: In her later work she offers a view of the relationship of morality to human nature, arguing that the moral virtues are part of what makes us good as human beings.
     From: report of Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001]) by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought Intro
     A reaction: In this phase she talks explicitly of the Aristotelian idea that successful function is the grounding of what is good for any living being, including humans.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
Sterility is a human defect, but the choice to be childless is not [Foot]
     Full Idea: Lack of capacity to reproduce is a defect in a human being. But choice of childlessness and even celibacy is not thereby shown to be defective choice, because human good is not the same as plant or animal good.
     From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 3)
     A reaction: Is failure to reproduce a defect in an animal? If goodness and virtue derive from function, it is hard to see how deliberate childlessness could be a human good, even if it is not a defect. Choosing to terminate a hereditary defect seems good.
Virtues are as necessary to humans as stings are to bees [Foot]
     Full Idea: Virtues play a necessary part in the life of human beings as do stings in the life of a bee.
     From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 2)
     A reaction: This presumably rests on the Aristotelian idea that humans are essentially social (as opposed to solitary humans who choose to be social, perhaps in a contractual way, as Plato implies).
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
Moral evaluations are not separate from facts, but concern particular facts about functioning [Foot]
     Full Idea: A moral evaluation does not stand over against the statement of a matter of fact, but rather has to do with facts about a particular subject matter, as do evaluations of such things as sight and hearing in animals.
     From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 1)
     A reaction: She avoids the word 'function', and only deals with living creatures, but she uses a 'good knife' as an example, and this Aristotelian view clearly applies to any machine which has a function.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Deep happiness usually comes from the basic things in life [Foot]
     Full Idea: Possible objects of deep happiness seem to be things that are basic in human life, such as home, and family, and work, and friendship.
     From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 6)
     A reaction: I've not encountered discussion of 'deep' happiness before. I heard of an old man in tears because he had just seen a Purple Emperor butterfly for the first time. She makes it sound very conservative. How about mountaineering achievements?
Happiness is enjoying the pursuit and attainment of right ends [Foot]
     Full Idea: In my terminology 'happiness' is understood as the enjoyment of good things, meaning the enjoyment in attaining, and in pursuing, right ends.
     From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 6)
     A reaction: A modified version of Aristotle's view, which she contrasts with McDowell's identification of happiness with the life of virtue. They all seem to have an optimistic hope that the pleasure in being a bit wicked is false happiness.
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Good actions can never be justified by the good they brings to their agent [Foot]
     Full Idea: There is no good case for assessing the goodness of human action by reference only to good that each person brings to himself.
     From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 1)
     A reaction: She observes that even non-human animals often act for non-selfish reasons. The significance of this is its rejection of her much earlier view that virtues are justified by the good they bring their possessor.
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 5. Free Rider
We all know that just pretending to be someone's friend is not the good life [Foot]
     Full Idea: We know perfectly well that it is not true that the best life would consist in successfully pretending friendship: having friends to serve one but without being a real friend oneself.
     From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 7)
     A reaction: For some skallywags the achieving of something for nothing seems to be very much the good life, but not many of them want to exploit people who are seen to be their friends.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
Someone is a good person because of their rational will, not their body or memory [Foot]
     Full Idea: To speak of a good person is to speak of an individual not in respect of his body, or of faculties such as sight and memory, but as concerns his rational will (his 'will as controllable by reason').
     From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 5)
     A reaction: She more or less agrees with Kant that the only truly good moral thing is a good will, though she has plenty of other criticisms of his views.
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
Refraining from murder is not made good by authenticity or self-fulfilment [Foot]
     Full Idea: If a stranger should come on us when we are sleeping he will not think it all right to kill us. …In human life as it is, this kind of action is not made good by authenticity or self-fulfilment in the one who does it.
     From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 7)
     A reaction: A rare swipe from Foot at existentialism, which she hardly ever mentions. I find it hard to see these existential virtues as in any way moral. It means nothing to other citizens whether one of their number is 'authentic'.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
A cause can exist without its effect, but the effect cannot exist without its cause [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: When things are so related that one causes the other to exist, the cause can exist without what it causes but not vice versa.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.103)
     A reaction: This is open to question, if causes are supposed to be sufficient for effects. Presumably Aquinas would support the view that if the cause had not been, the effect would not have happened. But the current idea indicates the priority relation.