Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Reasons for Actions and Desires', 'works' and 'fragments/reports'

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4 ideas

6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
Numbers have been defined in terms of 'successors' to the concept of 'zero' [Peano, by Blackburn]
     Full Idea: Dedekind and Peano define the number series as the series of successors to the number zero, according to five postulates.
     From: report of Giuseppe Peano (works [1890]) by Simon Blackburn - Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy p.279
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
0 is a non-successor number, all successors are numbers, successors can't duplicate, if P(n) and P(n+1) then P(all-n) [Peano, by Flew]
     Full Idea: 1) 0 is a number; 2) The successor of any number is a number; 3) No two numbers have the same successor; 4) 0 is not the successor of any number; 5) If P is true of 0, and if P is true of any number n and of its successor, P is true of every number.
     From: report of Giuseppe Peano (works [1890]) by Antony Flew - Pan Dictionary of Philosophy 'Peano'
     A reaction: Devised by Dedekind and proposed by Peano, these postulates were intended to avoid references to intuition in specifying the natural numbers. I wonder if they could define 'successor' without reference to 'number'.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
I don't understand the idea of a reason for acting, but it is probably the agent's interests or desires [Foot]
     Full Idea: I am sure I do not understand the idea of a reason for acting, and I wonder whether anyone else does either. I incline to the view that all such reasons depend either on the agent's interests (meaning here what is in his interest) or else on his desires.
     From: Philippa Foot (Reasons for Actions and Desires [1972], p.156 Post)
     A reaction: It seems common to assume that a reason for an action must be something rational, but it makes sense to say that the reason for someone's action was an irrational whim. Is the reason for an action just the cause of the action?
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
Critolaus redefined Aristotle's moral aim as fulfilment instead of happiness [Critolaus, by White,SA]
     Full Idea: Critolaus reformulated Aristotelian theory by defining happiness as a 'fulfilment' (sumplêrôma) of psychic, physical, and external goods, where virtue vastly outweighs the rest.
     From: report of Critolaus (fragments/reports [c.170 BCE]) by Stephen A. White - Critolaus
     A reaction: The sounds more like an attempt at clarification than a real change of Peripatetic doctrine. Occasionally 'fulfilment' is offered as a translation for eudaimonia. Maybe we should just take up Critolaus' suggestion when we are discussing Aristotle.