34 ideas
22496 | Wisdom only implies the knowledge achievable in any normal lifetime [Foot] |
Full Idea: Wisdom implies no more knowledge and understanding than anyone of normal capacity can and should acquire in the course of an ordinary life. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 5) | |
A reaction: Have philosophers stopped talking about wisdom precisely because you now need three university degrees to be considered even remotely good at phillosophy? Hence wisdom is an inferior attainment, because Foot is right. |
14052 | Begin philosophy when you are young, and keep going when you are old [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: Let no one delay the study of philosophy while young nor weary of it when old; for no one is either too young or too old for the health of the soul. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 122) | |
A reaction: I agree with this on both accounts. I think the correct age to begin the study of philosophy is four, and it is vital to continue its study up to the point where you can no longer remember your own name. 'Health of the soul' sounds right too. |
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
Full Idea: It seems unavoidable that the facts about logically necessary relations between levels of facts are themselves logically distinct further facts, irreducible to the microphysical facts. | |
From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], C) | |
A reaction: I'm beginning to think that rejecting every theory of reality that is proposed by carefully exposing some infinite regress hidden in it is a rather lazy way to do philosophy. Almost as bad as rejecting anything if it can't be defined. |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
Full Idea: Logical supervenience, restricted to individuals, seems to imply strong reduction. It is said that where the B-facts logically supervene on the A-facts, the B-facts simply re-describe what the A-facts describe, and the B-facts come along 'for free'. | |
From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], C) | |
A reaction: This seems to be taking 'logically' to mean 'analytically'. Presumably an entailment is logically supervenient on its premisses, and may therefore be very revealing, even if some people think such things are analytic. |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
Full Idea: The root intuition behind nonreductive materialism is that reality is composed of ontologically distinct layers or levels. …The upper levels depend on the physical without reducing to it. | |
From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], B) | |
A reaction: A nice clear statement of a view which I take to be false. This relationship is the sort of thing that drives people fishing for an account of it to use the word 'supervenience', which just says two things seem to hang out together. Fluffy materialism. |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
Full Idea: Jessica Wilson (1999) says what makes physicalist accounts different from emergentism etc. is that each individual causal power associated with a supervenient property is numerically identical with a causal power associated with its base property. | |
From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], n 11) | |
A reaction: Hence the key thought in so-called (serious, rather than self-evident) 'emergentism' is so-called 'downward causation', which I take to be an idle daydream. |
14062 | Sooner follow mythology, than accept the 'fate' of natural philosophers [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: It would be better to follow the stories told about the gods than to be a slave to the fate of the natural philosophers. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 134) | |
A reaction: At this point in history there is a blurring between autonomous decisions and what we now call free will, and also between fate and determinism, which we try to keep distinct. |
1837 | We should not refer things to irresponsible necessity, but either to fortune or to our own will [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: The best men have no belief in necessity (set up by some as mistress of all), but refer some things to fortune, some to ourselves, because necessity is irresponsible, and fortune is unstable, while our own will is free. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 133), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.27 |
23694 | All criterions of practical rationality derive from goodness of will [Foot] |
Full Idea: I want to say, baldly, that there is no criterion for practical rationality that is not derived from that of goodness of will. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 1) | |
A reaction: Where does that put the successful and clever criminal? Presumably they are broadly irrational, but narrowly rational - but that is not very clear distinction. She says Kant's concept of the good will is too pure, and unrelated to human good. |
1836 | Prudence is more valuable than philosophy, because it avoids confusions of the soul [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: The greatest good in avoiding confusion of the soul is prudence [phronesis], on which account prudence is something more valuable than even philosophy. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 132), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.27 |
14061 | Our own choices are autonomous, and the basis for praise and blame [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: What occurs by our own agency is autonomous, and it is to this that praise and blame are attached. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 133) | |
A reaction: I don't think this should be understand as an assertion of free will in the modern sense. The 'swerve' of the atoms just means that decisions can arise out of us - not that they are somehow outside of nature. |
23686 | Moral reason is not just neutral, because morality is part of the standard of rationality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
Full Idea: In her late period she again reverses her thoughts on moral rationalism; …rather than a neutral rationality which fulfils desires, she argues that morality ought to be thought of as part of the standard of rationality itself. | |
From: report of Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001]) by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought Intro | |
A reaction: This comes much closer to the Greek and Aristotelian concept of logos. They saw morality as inseparable from our judgements about how the world is. All 'sensible' thinking will involve what is good for humanity. |
23693 | Practical rationality must weigh both what is morally and what is non-morally required [Foot] |
Full Idea: Different considerations are on a par, in that judgement about what is required by practical rationality must take account of their interaction: of the weight of the ones we call non-moral as well as those we call moral. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 1) | |
A reaction: Her final settled view of rationalism in morality, it seems. The point is that moral considerations are not paramount, because she sees possible justifications for ignoring moral rules (like 'don't lie') in certain practical situations. |
23687 | Moral virtues arise from human nature, as part of what makes us good human beings [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
Full Idea: In her later work she offers a view of the relationship of morality to human nature, arguing that the moral virtues are part of what makes us good as human beings. | |
From: report of Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001]) by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought Intro | |
A reaction: In this phase she talks explicitly of the Aristotelian idea that successful function is the grounding of what is good for any living being, including humans. |
22492 | Virtues are as necessary to humans as stings are to bees [Foot] |
Full Idea: Virtues play a necessary part in the life of human beings as do stings in the life of a bee. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 2) | |
A reaction: This presumably rests on the Aristotelian idea that humans are essentially social (as opposed to solitary humans who choose to be social, perhaps in a contractual way, as Plato implies). |
22493 | Sterility is a human defect, but the choice to be childless is not [Foot] |
Full Idea: Lack of capacity to reproduce is a defect in a human being. But choice of childlessness and even celibacy is not thereby shown to be defective choice, because human good is not the same as plant or animal good. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 3) | |
A reaction: Is failure to reproduce a defect in an animal? If goodness and virtue derive from function, it is hard to see how deliberate childlessness could be a human good, even if it is not a defect. Choosing to terminate a hereditary defect seems good. |
22491 | Moral evaluations are not separate from facts, but concern particular facts about functioning [Foot] |
Full Idea: A moral evaluation does not stand over against the statement of a matter of fact, but rather has to do with facts about a particular subject matter, as do evaluations of such things as sight and hearing in animals. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 1) | |
A reaction: She avoids the word 'function', and only deals with living creatures, but she uses a 'good knife' as an example, and this Aristotelian view clearly applies to any machine which has a function. |
14053 | It is absurd to fear the pain of death when you are not even facing it [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: He is a fool who says that he fears death not because it will be painful when present but because it is painful when it is still to come. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 125) | |
A reaction: Not very plausible, I'm afraid. It provides a good argument in favour of smoking, if the lung cancer is far in the future. Paralysing fear is daft, but some remote fears should be heeded. |
14054 | Fearing death is absurd, because we are not present when it occurs [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: Death, the most frightening of bad things, is nothing to us; since when we exist, death is not yet present, and when death is present, then we do not exist. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 125) | |
A reaction: This is a fairly accurate observation. To fear not being in this life is a bit like fearing not being in Vancouver next Tuesday. It also involves the paradox of the present moment. E.g. Idea 1904. |
14055 | The wisdom that produces a good life also produces a good death [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: The same kind of practice produces a good life and a good death. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 126) | |
A reaction: This is the kind of old fashioned observation which we would do well to hang on to. The ideal of dying well has vanished from our culture. |
1833 | Pleasure is the first good in life [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: Pleasure is the beginning and end of living happily, and we recognise this as the first good. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 128) | |
A reaction: We might enquire what we would live for if our capacities for pleasure were surgically removed. Would we still experience intellectual curiosity, or an aspiration to some cold and remote goodness? |
14057 | All pleasures are good, but it is not always right to choose them [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: Every pleasure is a good thing, since it has a nature congenial to us, but not every one is to be chosen, just as every pain is a bad thing, but not every one is such as to be always avoided. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 129) | |
A reaction: This kind of sensible remark would be wholly endorsed by Bentham and Mill. This fits in with the excellent distinction between what is right and what is good. |
14058 | Pleasure is the goal, but as lack of pain and calm mind, not as depraved or greedy pleasure [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: When we say that pleasure is the goal we do not mean the pleasures of the profligate or the pleasures of consumption, but rather the lack of pain in the body and disturbance in the soul. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 131) | |
A reaction: I don't really understand the aspiration to a 'calm mind'. No one likes stress, but total calmness sounds close to non-existence. The mean! There is no achievement without pain. |
14063 | Sooner a good decision going wrong, than a bad one turning out for the good [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: It is better for a good decision not to turn out right in action than for a bad decision to turn out right because of chance. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 135) | |
A reaction: This sounds right, and on the whole the law agrees. Notice that what we need is a 'good decision', and not just to 'mean well'. The well-meaning fool is wicked. I am opposed to consequentialism, and agree with this idea. |
22497 | Deep happiness usually comes from the basic things in life [Foot] |
Full Idea: Possible objects of deep happiness seem to be things that are basic in human life, such as home, and family, and work, and friendship. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 6) | |
A reaction: I've not encountered discussion of 'deep' happiness before. I heard of an old man in tears because he had just seen a Purple Emperor butterfly for the first time. She makes it sound very conservative. How about mountaineering achievements? |
22498 | Happiness is enjoying the pursuit and attainment of right ends [Foot] |
Full Idea: In my terminology 'happiness' is understood as the enjoyment of good things, meaning the enjoyment in attaining, and in pursuing, right ends. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 6) | |
A reaction: A modified version of Aristotle's view, which she contrasts with McDowell's identification of happiness with the life of virtue. They all seem to have an optimistic hope that the pleasure in being a bit wicked is false happiness. |
14059 | The best life is not sensuality, but rational choice and healthy opinion [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: It is not drinking bouts or enjoying boys and women or consuming fish which produces the pleasant life, but sober calculation which searches out reasons for every choice, and drives out opinions which produce turmoil of the soul. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 132) | |
A reaction: This more or less sums up what I would call the philosophical life. Spontaneity is good, and some pleasures are killed by excessive thought, but on the whole actions are always better if good reasons are found, and error brings chaos. |
1835 | True pleasure is not debauchery, but freedom from physical and mental pain [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: When we say that pleasure is the chief good, we do not mean debauchery, but freedom of the body from pain, and of the soul from confusion…. which requires sober contemplation. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 131), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.27 | |
A reaction: I'm not clear how lack of pain and confusion counts as pleasure. Also the concepts of debauchery held by the puritan and the sybarite are wildly different. |
14056 | We only need pleasure when we have the pain of desire [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: We are in need of pleasure only when we are in pain because of the absence of pleasure, and when we are not in pain, then we no longer need pleasure. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 128) | |
A reaction: This Buddhist aspiration to eliminate desire has no appeal for me. It just sounds like a recipe for boredom, and an aversion to risk-taking. Start by asking what is best in life; it inevitably involves pleasure of some sort. Anyway, desire isn't painful. |
23695 | Good actions can never be justified by the good they brings to their agent [Foot] |
Full Idea: There is no good case for assessing the goodness of human action by reference only to good that each person brings to himself. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 1) | |
A reaction: She observes that even non-human animals often act for non-selfish reasons. The significance of this is its rejection of her much earlier view that virtues are justified by the good they bring their possessor. |
22499 | We all know that just pretending to be someone's friend is not the good life [Foot] |
Full Idea: We know perfectly well that it is not true that the best life would consist in successfully pretending friendship: having friends to serve one but without being a real friend oneself. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 7) | |
A reaction: For some skallywags the achieving of something for nothing seems to be very much the good life, but not many of them want to exploit people who are seen to be their friends. |
14060 | Prudence is the greatest good, and more valuable than philosophy, because it produces virtue [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: Prudence is the principle of the rational life and is the greatest good. That is why prudence is more valuable than philosophy, for prudence is the source of all the other virtues. | |
From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 132) | |
A reaction: ['prudence' will be Greek 'phronesis']The interest of this is that it is almost copied straight out of Aristotle's Ethics. Epicurus was an opponent of the Peripatetics, but greatly influenced by them. |
22495 | Someone is a good person because of their rational will, not their body or memory [Foot] |
Full Idea: To speak of a good person is to speak of an individual not in respect of his body, or of faculties such as sight and memory, but as concerns his rational will (his 'will as controllable by reason'). | |
From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 5) | |
A reaction: She more or less agrees with Kant that the only truly good moral thing is a good will, though she has plenty of other criticisms of his views. |
22502 | Refraining from murder is not made good by authenticity or self-fulfilment [Foot] |
Full Idea: If a stranger should come on us when we are sleeping he will not think it all right to kill us. …In human life as it is, this kind of action is not made good by authenticity or self-fulfilment in the one who does it. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 7) | |
A reaction: A rare swipe from Foot at existentialism, which she hardly ever mentions. I find it hard to see these existential virtues as in any way moral. It means nothing to other citizens whether one of their number is 'authentic'. |