Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Moral Dilemmas Revisited', 'Aristotle on Learning to be Good' and 'Iteration Again'

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4 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / f. Limitation of Size
13547 Limitation of Size is weak (Fs only collect is something the same size does) or strong (fewer Fs than objects) [Boolos, by Potter]
     Full Idea: Weak Limitation of Size: If there are no more Fs than Gs and the Gs form a collection, then Fs form a collection. Strong Limitation of Size: A property F fails to be collectivising iff there are as many Fs as there are objects.
     From: report of George Boolos (Iteration Again [1989]) by Michael Potter - Set Theory and Its Philosophy 13.5
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
4377 Intellectualism is an excessive emphasis on reasoning in moral philosophy [Burnyeat]
     Full Idea: Intellectualism, a one-sided preoccupation with reason and reasoning, is a perennial failing in moral philosophy.
     From: Myles F. Burnyeat (Aristotle on Learning to be Good [1980], p.70)
     A reaction: But Kant's reply would be that while there is much more to moral behaviour, the only part which matters in morality is the reasoning part. And Socrates' view (ignorance is evil) is not obviously wrong.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / a. Dilemmas
22481 There is no restitution after a dilemma, if it only involved the agent, or just needed an explanation [Foot, by PG]
     Full Idea: The 'remainder' after a dilemma can't be a matter of apology and restitution, because the dilemma may only involve the agent's own life, and in the case of broken promises we only owe an explanation, if the breaking is justifiable.
     From: report of Philippa Foot (Moral Dilemmas Revisited [1995], p.183) by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: But what if someone has been financially ruined by it? If the agent feels guilty about that, is getting over it the rational thing to do? (Foot says that is an new obligation, and not part of the original dilemma).
22482 I can't understand how someone can be necessarily wrong whatever he does [Foot]
     Full Idea: I do not see how …we can know how to interpret the idea of a situation in which someone will necessarily be wrong whatever he does.
     From: Philippa Foot (Moral Dilemmas Revisited [1995], p.188)
     A reaction: Seems right. If you think of hideous dilemmas (frequent in wartime), there must always be a right thing to do (or two equally right things to do), even if the outcome is fairly hideous. Just distinguish the right from the good.