13 ideas
21901 | 'Difference' refers to that which eludes capture [Deleuze, by May] |
Full Idea: 'Difference' is a term which Deleuze uses to refer to that which eludes capture. | |
From: report of Gilles Deleuze (Difference and Repetition [1968]) by Todd May - Gilles Deleuze 3.03 | |
A reaction: Presumably its ancestor is Kant's noumenon. This is one of his concepts used to 'palpate' our ossified conceptual scheme. |
21908 | Ontology can be continual creation, not to know being, but to probe the unknowable [Deleuze] |
Full Idea: Ontology can be an ontology of difference ....where what is there is not the same old things but a process of continual creation, an ontology that does not seek to reduce being to the knowable, but widens thought to palpate the unknowable. | |
From: Gilles Deleuze (Difference and Repetition [1968]), quoted by Todd May - Gilles Deleuze 5.05 | |
A reaction: I'm inclined to think that the first duty of ontology is to face up to the knowable. I'm not sure that probing the unknowable, with no success or prospect of it, is a good way to spend a life. Probing ('palpating') can sometimes discover things. |
21902 | 'Being' is univocal, but its subject matter is actually 'difference' [Deleuze] |
Full Idea: Being is said in a single and same sense of everything of which it is said, but that of which it is said differs: it is said of difference itself. | |
From: Gilles Deleuze (Difference and Repetition [1968], p.36), quoted by Todd May - Gilles Deleuze 3.03 | |
A reaction: This is an attempt to express the Heraclitean view of reality, as process, movement, multiplicity - something which always eludes our attempts to pin it down. |
21903 | Ontology does not tell what there is; it is just a strange adventure [Deleuze, by May] |
Full Idea: In Deleuze's hands ontology is not a matter of telling us what there is, but of taking us on strange adventures. | |
From: report of Gilles Deleuze (Difference and Repetition [1968]) by Todd May - Gilles Deleuze 3.03 | |
A reaction: Presumably you only indulge in the strange adventure because you have no idea how to specify what there is. This sounds like the essence of post-modernism, in which life is just a game. |
21904 | Being is a problem to be engaged, not solved, and needs a new mode of thinking [Deleuze, by May] |
Full Idea: In Deleuze, Being is not a puzzle to be solved but a problem to be engaged. It is to be engaged by a thought that moves as comfortably among problems as it does among solutions, as fluidly among differences as it does among identities. | |
From: report of Gilles Deleuze (Difference and Repetition [1968]) by Todd May - Gilles Deleuze 4.01 | |
A reaction: This sounds like what I've always known as 'negative capability' (thanks to Keats). Is philosophy just a hobby, like playing darts? It seems that the aim of the process is 'liberation', about which I would like to know more. |
472 | No things would be clear to us as entity or relationships unless there existed Number and its essence [Philolaus] |
Full Idea: No existing things would be clear to anyone, either in themselves or in their relationship to one another, unless there existed Number and its essence. | |
From: Philolaus (On the Cosmos (lost) [c.435 BCE], B11), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.03.8 |
12185 | Logical necessity is epistemic necessity, which is the old notion of a priori [Edgington, by McFetridge] |
Full Idea: Edgington's position is that logical necessity is an epistemic notion: epistemic necessity which, she claims, is the old notion of the a priori. Like Kripke, she thinks this is two-way independent of metaphysical necessity. | |
From: report of Dorothy Edgington (Epistemic and Metaphysical Possibility [1985]) by Ian McFetridge - Logical Necessity: Some Issues §1 | |
A reaction: [her paper was unpublished] She hence thinks an argument can be logically valid, while metaphysically its conclusion may not follow. Dubious, though I think I favour the view that logical necessity is underwritten by metaphysical necessity. |
473 | There is no falsehood in harmony and number, only in irrational things [Philolaus] |
Full Idea: The nature of number and harmony admits of no falsehood; for this is unrelated to them. Falsehood and envy belong to the nature of the Unlimited and the Unintelligent and the Irrational. | |
From: Philolaus (On the Cosmos (lost) [c.435 BCE], B11), quoted by (who?) - where? |
1518 | Everything must involve numbers, or it couldn't be thought about or known [Philolaus] |
Full Idea: Everything which is known has number, because otherwise it is impossible for anything to be the object of thought or knowledge. | |
From: Philolaus (On the Cosmos (lost) [c.435 BCE], B04), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.21.7b |
1519 | Harmony must pre-exist the cosmos, to bring the dissimilar sources together [Philolaus] |
Full Idea: It would have been impossible for the dissimilar and incompatible sources to have been made into an orderly universe unless harmony had been present in some form or other. | |
From: Philolaus (On the Cosmos (lost) [c.435 BCE], B06), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.21.7d |
469 | Existing things, and hence the Cosmos, are a mixture of the Limited and the Unlimited [Philolaus] |
Full Idea: Since it is plain that existing things are neither wholly from the Limiting, nor wholly from the Unlimited, clearly the cosmos and its contents were fitted together from both the Limiting and the Unlimited. | |
From: Philolaus (On the Cosmos (lost) [c.435 BCE], B02), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.21.7a |
476 | Self-created numbers make the universe stable [Philolaus] |
Full Idea: Number is the ruling and self-created bond which maintains the everlasting stability of the contents of the universe. | |
From: Philolaus (On the Cosmos (lost) [c.435 BCE], B23), quoted by (who?) - where? |
1787 | Philolaus was the first person to say the earth moves in a circle [Philolaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Philolaus was the first person to affirm that the earth moves in a circle. | |
From: report of Philolaus (On the Cosmos (lost) [c.435 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 08.Ph.3 |