9 ideas
| 304 | Beautiful things must be different from beauty itself, but beauty itself must be present in each of them [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Are fine things different from or identical to fineness? They are different from fineness itself, but fineness itself is in a sense present in each of them. | |
| From: Plato (Euthydemus [c.379 BCE], 301a) |
| 16120 | Knowing how to achieve immortality is pointless without the knowledge how to use immortality [Plato] |
| Full Idea: If there exists the knowledge of how to make men immortal, but without the knowledge of how to use this immortality, there seems to be no value in it. | |
| From: Plato (Euthydemus [c.379 BCE], 289b) | |
| A reaction: I take this to be not a gormless utilitarianism about knowledge, but a plea for holism, that knowledge only has value as part of some larger picture. The big view is the important view. He's wrong, though. Work out the use later. |
| 303 | Say how many teeth the other has, then count them. If you are right, we will trust your other claims [Plato] |
| Full Idea: If each of you says how many teeth the other has, and when they are counted we find you do know, we will believe your other claims as well. | |
| From: Plato (Euthydemus [c.379 BCE], 294c) | |
| A reaction: This is the clairvoyant problem for reliabilism, if truth is delivered for no apparent reason. Useful, but hardly knowledge. HOW did you know the number of teeth? |
| 22511 | Some reasonings are stronger than we are [Philolaus] |
| Full Idea: Some reasonings are stronger than we are. | |
| From: Philolaus (fragments/reports [c.425 BCE]), quoted by Aristotle - Eudemian Ethics 1225a33 | |
| A reaction: This endorses the Aristotle view of akrasia (as opposed to the Socratic view). This isolated remark seems to imply that we are more clearly embodiments of will than of reason. |
| 7293 | It is legitimate to do harm if it is the unintended side-effect of an effort to achieve a good [Grayling] |
| Full Idea: The doctrine of double effect says that it is legitimate to do harm if the harm is the unintended side-effect of an effort to achieve a legitimate goal. | |
| From: A.C. Grayling (Among the Dead Cities [2006], Ch.6) | |
| A reaction: I think a key principle of morality is our duty to think about possible unnoticed consequences of our actions. To neglect concern for side-effects is wicked. Beyond that, the issue must concern the particulars of the situation. |
| 302 | What knowledge is required to live well? [Plato] |
| Full Idea: What knowledge would enable us to live finely for the rest of our lives? | |
| From: Plato (Euthydemus [c.379 BCE], 293a) | |
| A reaction: A successful grasp of other people's points of view might lead to respect for them. Also a realisation that we are not isolated individuals. We really are all in it together. |
| 301 | Only knowledge of some sort is good [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Nothing is good except knowledge of some sort. | |
| From: Plato (Euthydemus [c.379 BCE], 292b) | |
| A reaction: I've heard it suggested that truth is the only value. This is the Socratic idea that moral goodness is a matter of successful rational judgement. Not convinced, but interesting. |
| 305 | Something which lies midway between two evils is better than either of them [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Something which is composed of two factors which are bad for different purposes and lies midway between them is better than either of the factors. | |
| From: Plato (Euthydemus [c.379 BCE], 306a) |
| 7292 | War must also have a good chance of success, and be waged with moderation [Grayling] |
| Full Idea: To Aquinas's three conditions for war (Idea 7291) modern theorists have added two others: that to be just a war must have a reasonable chance of success, and that the means used to conduct it must be proportional to the ends sought. | |
| From: A.C. Grayling (Among the Dead Cities [2006], Ch.6) | |
| A reaction: These two principles strike me as being much more civilized and humane than Aquinas's original contribution, suggesting that in our theoretical thinking we might be making some progress. |