11 ideas
9198 | It is no longer possible to be a sage, but we can practice the exercise of wisdom [Hadot] |
Full Idea: Personally I firmly believe, perhaps naively, that it is possible for modern man to live, not as a sage (sophos) - most of the ancients did not hold this to be possible - but as a practitioner of the ever-fragile exercise of wisdom. | |
From: Pierre Hadot (Philosophy as a way of life [1987], 7) | |
A reaction: It seems to me quite plausible that the philosophical life might yet become a widespread ideal, even though philosophers seem to still be sheltering from storms two thousand years after Plato gave us that image. |
21900 | Deleuze relies on Spinoza (immanence), Bergson (duration), and difference (Nietzsche) [May] |
Full Idea: The three tripods on which the philosophy of Deleuze stands are immanence (Spinoza), duration (Bergson), and the affirmation of difference (Nietzsche). | |
From: Todd May (Gilles Deleuze [2006], 2.12) | |
A reaction: [Just to begin sketching how continental philosophy sees its tradition]. |
9197 | The logos represents a demand for universal rationality [Hadot] |
Full Idea: The logos represents a demand for universal rationality. | |
From: Pierre Hadot (Philosophy as a way of life [1987], 3.3) | |
A reaction: That is at one end of the spectrum. At the other, in parts of 'Theaetetus', it is just a polite request to be given a few reasons, instead of a splattering of hopes and prejudices. |
6806 | Do not multiply entities beyond necessity [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: Do not multiply entities beyond necessity. | |
From: William of Ockham (works [1335]) | |
A reaction: This is the classic statement of Ockham's Razor, though it is not found in his printed works. It appears to be mainly aimed at Plato's Theory of Forms. It is taken to refer to types of entities, not numbers. One seraph is as bad as a hundred. |
22132 | Species and genera are individual concepts which naturally signify many individuals [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: In his mature nominalism, species and genera are identified with certain mental qualities called concepts or intentions of the mind. Ontologically they are individuals too, like everthing else, ...but they naturally signify many different individuals. | |
From: William of Ockham (works [1335]), quoted by Claude Panaccio - William of Ockham p.1056 | |
A reaction: 'Naturally' is the key word, because the concepts are not fictions, but natural responses to encountering individuals in the world. I am an Ockhamist. |
9196 | The pleasure of existing is the only genuine pleasure [Hadot] |
Full Idea: For epicureans, the only genuine pleasure there is is the pleasure of existing. | |
From: Pierre Hadot (Philosophy as a way of life [1987], 3.1) | |
A reaction: I don't know Hadot's source for this claim, but it is a nice idea, which I shall endeavour to incorporate into my own attitude to daily living. I'm not quite clear, though, why the pleasure of music is not a 'genuine' one. |
21898 | For existentialists the present is empty without the pull of the future and weight of the past [May] |
Full Idea: For the existential view of lived time, the present would be empty if it were not for the pull of the future and the weight of the past that give it its character. | |
From: Todd May (Gilles Deleuze [2006], 2.05) | |
A reaction: Bergson seems to be important in developing this idea, though I suspect that Kierkegaard is a source. |
21905 | Liberal theory starts from the governed, not from the governor [May] |
Full Idea: For liberal theory, it is the individual to be governed, not the governor, who is the starting point. | |
From: Todd May (Gilles Deleuze [2006], 4.02) | |
A reaction: I'm inclined to see this as the single-handed achievement of Thomas Hobbes, who starts from the need of citizens to secure their contracts. Plato's society starts from entrepreneurs, but their need for a ruler seems a priori. |
19381 | The past has ceased to exist, and the future does not yet exist, so time does not exist [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: Time is composed of non-entities, because it is composed of the past which does not exist now, although it did exist, and of the future, which does not yet exist; therefore time does not exist. | |
From: William of Ockham (works [1335], 6:496), quoted by Richard T.W. Arthur - Leibniz 7 'Nominalist' | |
A reaction: I've a lot of sympathy with this! I favour Presentism, so the past is gone and the future is yet to arrive. But we have no coherent concept of a present moment of any duration to contain reality. We are just completely bogglificated by it all. |
8010 | William of Ockham is the main spokesman for God's commands being the source of morality [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: The most notable philosopher who makes God's commandment the basis of goodness, rather than God's goodness a reason for obeying him, is William of Occam. | |
From: William of Ockham (works [1335]), quoted by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.9 | |
A reaction: Either view has problems. Why choose God to obey? Obey anyone who is powerful? But how do you decide that God is good? How do we know the nature of God's commands, or the nature of God's goodness? Etc. |
16679 | Even an angel must have some location [William of Ockham, by Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Ockham dismisses the possibility of non-location out of hand, remarking that even an angel has some location. | |
From: report of William of Ockham (works [1335]) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 14.4 |