Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philosophical Essay on Probability', 'Daniel Dennett on himself' and 'Reasons and Persons'

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8 ideas

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony
The reliability of witnesses depends on whether they benefit from their observations [Laplace, by Hacking]
     Full Idea: The credibility of a witness is in part a function of the story being reported. When the story claims to have infinite value, the temptation to lie for personal benefit is asymptotically infinite.
     From: report of Pierre Simon de Laplace (Philosophical Essay on Probability [1820], Ch.XI) by Ian Hacking - The Emergence of Probability Ch.8
     A reaction: Laplace seems to especially have reports of miracles in mind. This observation certainly dashes any dreams one might have of producing a statistical measure of the reliability of testimony.
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
If a supreme intellect knew all atoms and movements, it could know all of the past and the future [Laplace]
     Full Idea: An intelligence knowing at an instant the whole universe could know the movement of the largest bodies and atoms in one formula, provided his intellect were powerful enough to subject all data to analysis. Past and future would be present to his eyes.
     From: Pierre Simon de Laplace (Philosophical Essay on Probability [1820]), quoted by Mark Thornton - Do we have free will? p.70
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 3. Intentional Stance
The 'intentional stance' is a way of interpreting an entity by assuming it is rational and self-aware [Dennett]
     Full Idea: The 'intentional stance' is the tactic of interpreting an entity by adopting the presupposition that it is an approximation of the ideal of an optimally designed (i.e. rational) self-regarding agent.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Daniel Dennett on himself [1994], p.239)
     A reaction: This is Dennett's 'instrumentalism', a descendant of behaviourism, which strikes me as a pragmatist's evasion of the ontological problems of mind which should interest philosophers
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
Like the 'centre of gravity', desires and beliefs are abstract concepts with no actual existence [Dennett]
     Full Idea: Like such abstracta as centres of gravity and parallelograms of force, the beliefs and desires posited by the highest intentional stance have no independent and concrete existence.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Daniel Dennett on himself [1994], p.239)
     A reaction: I don't see why we shouldn't one day have a physical account of the distinctive brain events involved in a belief or a desire
18. Thought / C. Content / 9. Conceptual Role Semantics
The nature of content is entirely based on its functional role [Dennett]
     Full Idea: All attributions of content are founded on an appreciation of the functional roles of the items in question.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Daniel Dennett on himself [1994], p.239)
     A reaction: This seems wrong to me. How can anything's nature be its function? It must have intrinsic characteristics in order to have the function. This is an evasion.
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
We should focus less on subjects of experience, and more on the experiences themselves [Parfit]
     Full Idea: It becomes more plausible, when thinking morally, to focus less upon the person, the subject of experiences, and instead to focus more upon the experiences themselves.
     From: Derek Parfit (Reasons and Persons [1984], §116)
     A reaction: This pinpoints how Parfit moves from a view of persons in terms of continuity of consciousness to a utilitarian morality. It brings out nicely what is wrong with utilitarianism - the reductio of a great ball of nice experiences, with no one having them.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Learning is evolution in the brain [Dennett]
     Full Idea: Learning is evolution in the brain.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Daniel Dennett on himself [1994], p.238)
     A reaction: This is a rather non-conscious, associationist view, connected to Dawkins' idea of 'memes'. It seems at least partially correct.
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 1. Biology
Biology is a type of engineering, not a search for laws of nature [Dennett]
     Full Idea: Biology is not a science like physics, in which one should strive to find 'laws of nature', but a species of engineering.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Daniel Dennett on himself [1994], p.239)
     A reaction: Yes. This is also true of chemistry, which has always struck me as minitiarised car mechanics.