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6345
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Minimalism is incoherent, as it implies that truth both is and is not a property [Boghossian, by Horwich]
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Full Idea:
Boghossian argues that minimalism is incoherent because it says truth both is and is not a property; the essence of minimalism is that, unlike traditional theories, truth is not a property, yet properties are needed to explain the theory.
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From:
report of Paul Boghossian (The Status of Content [1990]) by Paul Horwich - Truth (2nd edn) Post.8
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A reaction:
I doubt whether this is really going to work as a demolition, because it seems to me that no philosophers are even remotely clear about what a property is. If properties are defined causally, it is not quite clear how truth would ever be a property.
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5692
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Introspection is not perception, because there are no extra qualities apart from the mental events themselves [Rosenthal]
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Full Idea:
Introspection cannot be a form of perceiving, since that invariably involves sensory qualities, and no qualities occur in introspection other than those of the sensations and perceptions we introspect; there are no additional qualities.
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From:
David M. Rosenthal (Instrospection [1998])
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A reaction:
This sounds pretty conclusive. Presumably introspection is best described as meta-thought rather than perception, which means that it involves beliefs and judgements, rather than new perceptual qualities. It has to be conceptual, and probably linguistic.
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