Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philosophical Essay on Probability', 'Recent Aesthetics in England and America' and 'Reply to Sixth Objections'

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7 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Two things being joined together doesn't prove they are the same [Descartes]
     Full Idea: The fact that we often see two things joined together does not license the inference that they are one and the same.
     From: René Descartes (Reply to Sixth Objections [1641], 444)
     A reaction: Correct. The problem comes when they are never ever apart, and you begin to suspect that they are conjoined in all possible worlds. Why might this be so? It can only be identity or a causal link.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony
The reliability of witnesses depends on whether they benefit from their observations [Laplace, by Hacking]
     Full Idea: The credibility of a witness is in part a function of the story being reported. When the story claims to have infinite value, the temptation to lie for personal benefit is asymptotically infinite.
     From: report of Pierre Simon de Laplace (Philosophical Essay on Probability [1820], Ch.XI) by Ian Hacking - The Emergence of Probability Ch.8
     A reaction: Laplace seems to especially have reports of miracles in mind. This observation certainly dashes any dreams one might have of producing a statistical measure of the reliability of testimony.
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
Only judgement decides which of our senses are reliable [Descartes]
     Full Idea: Sense alone does not suffice to correct visual error: we also need a degree of reason to tell us that we should believe the judgement based on touch rather than vision. Since we don't have this power in infancy, it must be attributed to the intellect.
     From: René Descartes (Reply to Sixth Objections [1641], 439)
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
If a supreme intellect knew all atoms and movements, it could know all of the past and the future [Laplace]
     Full Idea: An intelligence knowing at an instant the whole universe could know the movement of the largest bodies and atoms in one formula, provided his intellect were powerful enough to subject all data to analysis. Past and future would be present to his eyes.
     From: Pierre Simon de Laplace (Philosophical Essay on Probability [1820]), quoted by Mark Thornton - Do we have free will? p.70
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 1. Aesthetics
Aesthetics has risen and fallen with Romanticism [Scruton]
     Full Idea: The rise and fall (as we presently perceive them) of aesthetics have been contemporaneous with the rise and fall of Romanticism.
     From: Roger Scruton (Recent Aesthetics in England and America [1980], p.3)
     A reaction: Maybe it started a little before Romanticism, as part of the Englightenment aim of being rational about everything, and maybe it survives Romanticism because we want to be scientific about everything.
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
Aesthetic experience informs the world with the values of the observer [Scruton]
     Full Idea: It is possible to conclude that aesthetic experience has a peculiar practical significance: it represents the world as informed by the values of the observer.
     From: Roger Scruton (Recent Aesthetics in England and America [1980], p.13)
     A reaction: An excellent remark. If you look at, or listen to, anything, you can make a conscious effort to drain away your personal values (objectivity; science?), or you can consciously flood them with values. But moral and aesthetic vision must differ...
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
Ideas in God's mind only have value if he makes it so [Descartes]
     Full Idea: It is impossible to imagine that anything is thought of in the divine intellect as good or true, or worthy of belief or action or omission, prior to the decision of the divine will to make it so.
     From: René Descartes (Reply to Sixth Objections [1641], 432)