12 ideas
6806 | Do not multiply entities beyond necessity [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: Do not multiply entities beyond necessity. | |
From: William of Ockham (works [1335]) | |
A reaction: This is the classic statement of Ockham's Razor, though it is not found in his printed works. It appears to be mainly aimed at Plato's Theory of Forms. It is taken to refer to types of entities, not numbers. One seraph is as bad as a hundred. |
22132 | Species and genera are individual concepts which naturally signify many individuals [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: In his mature nominalism, species and genera are identified with certain mental qualities called concepts or intentions of the mind. Ontologically they are individuals too, like everthing else, ...but they naturally signify many different individuals. | |
From: William of Ockham (works [1335]), quoted by Claude Panaccio - William of Ockham p.1056 | |
A reaction: 'Naturally' is the key word, because the concepts are not fictions, but natural responses to encountering individuals in the world. I am an Ockhamist. |
3296 | Sense-data are a false objectification of what is essentially subjective [Nagel] |
Full Idea: The private object or sense datum view is an instance of the false objectification of what is essentially subjective. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Subjective and Objective [1979], p.207) |
7458 | The reliability of witnesses depends on whether they benefit from their observations [Laplace, by Hacking] |
Full Idea: The credibility of a witness is in part a function of the story being reported. When the story claims to have infinite value, the temptation to lie for personal benefit is asymptotically infinite. | |
From: report of Pierre Simon de Laplace (Philosophical Essay on Probability [1820], Ch.XI) by Ian Hacking - The Emergence of Probability Ch.8 | |
A reaction: Laplace seems to especially have reports of miracles in mind. This observation certainly dashes any dreams one might have of producing a statistical measure of the reliability of testimony. |
3295 | Inner v outer brings astonishment that we are a particular person [Nagel] |
Full Idea: The problem of reconciling the objective and subjective points of view takes its purest form in a sense of incredulity that one should be anyone in particular. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Subjective and Objective [1979], p.206) | |
A reaction: Nice observation. This idea has always struck me forcibly, and seems to be one of those basic intuitions which motivates philosophy, and yet the subject has almost nothing to say about it. Of course you are you, or you wouldn't be amazed by it… |
3293 | If you assert that we have an ego, you can still ask if that future ego will be me [Nagel] |
Full Idea: The metaphysical ego, if it is a continuing individual with its identity over time, is just one more thing about which the same problem can be raised - will that ego still be me? | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Subjective and Objective [1979], p.200) | |
A reaction: You can worry too much about some philosophical questions. If it is me now, and it has continuing individual identity over time, I'm not going to lose sleep over the possibility that it might nevertheless somehow cease to be me. I'm overrated. |
3292 | The most difficult problem of free will is saying what the problem is [Nagel] |
Full Idea: The most difficult problem of free will is saying what the problem is. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Subjective and Objective [1979], p.198) |
3441 | If a supreme intellect knew all atoms and movements, it could know all of the past and the future [Laplace] |
Full Idea: An intelligence knowing at an instant the whole universe could know the movement of the largest bodies and atoms in one formula, provided his intellect were powerful enough to subject all data to analysis. Past and future would be present to his eyes. | |
From: Pierre Simon de Laplace (Philosophical Essay on Probability [1820]), quoted by Mark Thornton - Do we have free will? p.70 |
3294 | As far as possible we should become instruments to realise what is best from an eternal point of view [Nagel] |
Full Idea: The right thing to do is to turn oneself as far as possible into an instrument for the realisation of what is best 'sub specie aeternitatis'. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Subjective and Objective [1979], p.204) |
19381 | The past has ceased to exist, and the future does not yet exist, so time does not exist [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: Time is composed of non-entities, because it is composed of the past which does not exist now, although it did exist, and of the future, which does not yet exist; therefore time does not exist. | |
From: William of Ockham (works [1335], 6:496), quoted by Richard T.W. Arthur - Leibniz 7 'Nominalist' | |
A reaction: I've a lot of sympathy with this! I favour Presentism, so the past is gone and the future is yet to arrive. But we have no coherent concept of a present moment of any duration to contain reality. We are just completely bogglificated by it all. |
8010 | William of Ockham is the main spokesman for God's commands being the source of morality [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: The most notable philosopher who makes God's commandment the basis of goodness, rather than God's goodness a reason for obeying him, is William of Occam. | |
From: William of Ockham (works [1335]), quoted by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.9 | |
A reaction: Either view has problems. Why choose God to obey? Obey anyone who is powerful? But how do you decide that God is good? How do we know the nature of God's commands, or the nature of God's goodness? Etc. |
16679 | Even an angel must have some location [William of Ockham, by Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Ockham dismisses the possibility of non-location out of hand, remarking that even an angel has some location. | |
From: report of William of Ockham (works [1335]) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 14.4 |