6 ideas
10558 | Abstract objects are actually constituted by the properties by which we conceive them [Zalta] |
Full Idea: Where for ordinary objects one can discover the properties they exemplify, abstract objects are actually constituted or determined by the properties by which we conceive them. I use the technical term 'x encodes F' for this idea. | |
From: Edward N. Zalta (Deriving Kripkean Claims with Abstract Objects [2006], 2 n2) | |
A reaction: One might say that whereas concrete objects can be dubbed (in the Kripke manner), abstract objects can only be referred to by descriptions. See 10557 for more technicalities about Zalta's idea. |
7458 | The reliability of witnesses depends on whether they benefit from their observations [Laplace, by Hacking] |
Full Idea: The credibility of a witness is in part a function of the story being reported. When the story claims to have infinite value, the temptation to lie for personal benefit is asymptotically infinite. | |
From: report of Pierre Simon de Laplace (Philosophical Essay on Probability [1820], Ch.XI) by Ian Hacking - The Emergence of Probability Ch.8 | |
A reaction: Laplace seems to especially have reports of miracles in mind. This observation certainly dashes any dreams one might have of producing a statistical measure of the reliability of testimony. |
3441 | If a supreme intellect knew all atoms and movements, it could know all of the past and the future [Laplace] |
Full Idea: An intelligence knowing at an instant the whole universe could know the movement of the largest bodies and atoms in one formula, provided his intellect were powerful enough to subject all data to analysis. Past and future would be present to his eyes. | |
From: Pierre Simon de Laplace (Philosophical Essay on Probability [1820]), quoted by Mark Thornton - Do we have free will? p.70 |
10557 | Abstract objects are captured by second-order modal logic, plus 'encoding' formulas [Zalta] |
Full Idea: My object theory is formulated in a 'syntactically second-order' modal predicate calculus modified only so as to admit a second kind of atomic formula ('xF'), which asserts that object x 'encodes' property F. | |
From: Edward N. Zalta (Deriving Kripkean Claims with Abstract Objects [2006], p.2) | |
A reaction: This is summarising Zalta's 1983 theory of abstract objects. See Idea 10558 for Zalta's idea in plain English. |
17960 | Eternalism says all times are equally real, and future and past objects and properties are real [Merricks] |
Full Idea: Eternalism says all times are equally real. Objects existing at past times and objects existing at future times are just as real as objects existing at the present. Properties had at past and future times are as much properties as those at the present. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Goodbye Growing Block [2006], 1) | |
A reaction: He adds that the present is therefore 'subjective', resulting from one's perspective. Why would eternalists reject their subjective experiences of time, unless they reject all their other subjective experiences as well? |
17961 | Growing block has a subjective present and a growing edge - but these could come apart [Merricks, by PG] |
Full Idea: Merricks argues that the growing block view says that we live in the subjective present, and that there is a growing edge of being, but he then suggests that these two could come apart, and it would make no difference, so the growing block is incoherent. | |
From: report of Trenton Merricks (Goodbye Growing Block [2006], 4) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: [I think that is the nub of his argument. I couldn't find a concise summary in his words] |